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Preface 
As part of NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System 
(NAS) Project, NASA is conducting research to investigate airworthiness requirements for UAS 
performing low-risk commercial operations.  The goal of the research is to help fill the void in standards 
needed to certify UAS to operate routinely and safely in the NAS.  Specifically, a case study was 
conducted to suggest airworthiness requirements for a midsize unmanned rotorcraft performing precision 
agricultural spraying operations over uninhabited fields.  The study considered operations in visual line-
of-sight, beyond line-of-sight, and in reduced visibility conditions.  This report contains research 
prototypes of some of the documentation needed to support airworthiness certification, including a 
proposed (or mock) type certification basis with design and performance criteria for the unmanned 
rotorcraft, corresponding rationale, a concept of operations, and a hazard list.   
This report presents one view of the extent to which existing airworthiness standards for normal category 
(manned) rotorcraft may apply to a midsize unmanned rotorcraft (i.e., approximately 1000 lb with 
payload).  The mock type certification basis includes requirements on subjects including flight, design 
and construction, powerplant, equipment, and operating limitations.  A complete and expert treatment of 
all requirements relevant to airworthiness certification of a midsize unmanned rotorcraft, such as those for 
noise and fuel venting, is beyond the scope of this effort.  Prototype certification artifacts were 
documented using the FAA’s issue paper format, so that their form would be familiar to certification 
specialists and regulatory authorities.   
The concept of operations, description of hazards, and mock type certification basis and rationale are 
intended collectively to provide a plausible picture of the data that influences airworthiness approvals.  
Because this document covers all of the airworthiness standards for normal category rotorcraft in Part 27 
of the Federal Aviation Regulations, the report is substantial.  Readers may find some specific sections of 
this report more relevant to their interests than others.  For example, readers interested in using UAS in 
agricultural pursuits might find the concept of operations (in Section 3) and hazard analysis (in Section 4) 
most valuable.  Regulators and UAS developers may be interested in the mock type certification basis (in 
Section 5), whereas the rationale for the certification basis (in the Appendix) might be of interest only to 
regulators. Researchers may find the description of hazards and the concepts for mitigating them (as 
described in Section 5.1-5.7) most relevant.  
As part of the case study, NASA selected a representative UAS platform, namely Dragonfly Pictures’ DP-
14, to demonstrate the plausibility of the design requirements.  NASA evaluated the prototype DP-14 to 
confirm that an existing UAS could likely (a) accomplish the aerial application mission with equipment 
based on existing technology and (b) meet the proposed design requirements in the mock certification 
basis.  Ideally, the design requirements in the mock certification basis suggest a reasonable starting point 
for establishing airworthiness requirements for UAS such as the DP-14 and other aircraft.   
The work presented in this report has not been vetted by any regulatory authority.  Neither the mock type 
certification basis nor any other part of the report represents US Government or FAA policy or guidance.  
Furthermore, this report in no way represents an intent or application for certification on the part of 
Dragonfly Pictures. 
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Executive Summary 
This technical report presents the results of a case study using a hazard-based approach to develop 
preliminary design and performance criteria for an unmanned agricultural rotorcraft requiring 
airworthiness certification.  This case study is one of the first in the public domain to examine design and 
performance criteria for an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in tandem with its concept of operations.  
The case study results are intended to support development of airworthiness standards that could form a 
minimum safety baseline for midsize unmanned rotorcraft performing precision agricultural spraying 
operations under beyond visual line-of-sight conditions in a rural environment.  
This study investigates the applicability of current methods, processes, and standards for assuring 
airworthiness of conventionally piloted (manned) aircraft to assuring the airworthiness of UAS.  The 
study started with the development of a detailed concept of operations for precision agricultural spraying 
with an unmanned rotorcraft (pp. 5-18).  The concept of operations in conjunction with a specimen 
unmanned rotorcraft were used to develop an operational context and a list of relevant hazards (p. 22).  
Minimum design and performance requirements necessary to mitigate the hazards provide the foundation 
of a proposed (or mock) type certification basis.  A type certification basis specifies the applicable 
standards an applicant must show compliance with to receive regulatory approval.   
A detailed analysis of the current airworthiness regulations for normal-category rotorcraft (14 Code of 
Federal Regulations, Part 27) was performed.  Each Part 27 regulation was evaluated to determine 
whether it mitigated one of the relevant hazards for the specimen UAS.  Those regulations that did were 
included in the initial core of the type certification basis (pp. 26-31) as written or with some simple 
modifications. Those regulations that did not mitigate a recognized hazard were excluded from the 
certification basis.  The remaining regulations were applicable in intent, but the text could not be easily 
tailored.  Those regulations were addressed in separate issue papers. Exploiting established regulations 
avoids the difficult task of generating and interpreting novel requirements, through the use of acceptable, 
standardized language. The rationale for the disposition of the regulations was assessed and captured (pp. 
58-115).  The core basis was then augmented by generating additional requirements (pp. 38-47) to 
mitigate hazards for an unmanned sprayer that are not covered in Part 27.   
Findings and Results: 
The research produced some of the initial artifacts that would be developed in a traditional aircraft 
certification program.  Namely, a mock airworthiness certification basis for a midsize (unmanned 
rotorcraft (approximately 1000 lb with full payload) was derived from an analysis of Part 27, along with 
the generation of UAS-specific requirements, based on hazards identified through operational and 
functional hazard assessment.  The certification basis also includes seven supplemental issue papers that 
address new or novel aspects of the unmanned agricultural rotorcraft.   
The type certification basis comprises 67 requirements in its core, plus seven additional issue papers.  
Eleven of these requirements were adopted as written from Part 27’s original 260 regulations.  A total of 
119 regulations from Part 27 were outright excluded.  Of the residual 130 regulations, 56 had their text 
modified for inclusion in the certification basis, while the remaining 74 had their intent abstracted into 
three special issue papers.  These three special issue papers (pp. 32-37) detail high level requirements on 
the subjects of: (1) controllability, maneuverability and stability, (2) structural integrity, and (3) 
powerplant and support systems.  The issue papers address these topics in a less prescriptive fashion than 
Part 27.  The certification basis also includes four additional issue papers (pp. 38-47) that propose 
requirements for new and novel technology not covered in Part 27.  The requirements address (1) vehicle 
containment, (2) detection and avoidance of other aircraft, (3) detection and avoidance of ground-based 
obstacles, and (4) command and control links.  Altogether, less than 5% of the Part 27 regulations were 
deemed applicable verbatim to the derived mock type certification basis, 22% were suitable with textual 
modifications, and 28% were useful, but required substantial re-interpretation. 
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These results draw attention to the fact that the application of current airworthiness regulations to UAS is 
not straightforward, even for UAS operating in low-risk environments.  Indeed, current airworthiness 
regulations may be insufficient to ensure the safety of UAS, due to novel operational concepts and vehicle 
design types and the unique hazards they pose.  Furthermore, many regulations, written as they are today, 
may not be appropriate because they are not relevant to UAS or present an undue burden to the 
certification process. 
The hazard-based approach employed in this research leads to the recognition that airworthiness 
requirements for a UAS are inseparable from its concept of operations.  Any airworthiness assessment of 
UAS must address the hazards unique to that UAS’s design and concept of operations.  The following are 
major findings in the report: 
1. A clearly defined concept of operations is crucial to developing suitable design and performance 
criteria for airworthiness certification of UAS. The operation and UAS must be considered in tandem 
in order to derive the relevant hazards to be mitigated.   
2. A single regulation may act to mitigate multiple hazards. Any proposed modification of an existing 
regulation from an established set of airworthiness standards must be assessed carefully with respect 
to all identified hazards.   
3. Protection of public safety (i.e., avoidance of harm to people in other aircraft and people on the 
ground) is the key driver of airworthiness considerations for UAS.  The absence of people aboard an 
unmanned aircraft means that design criteria for manned aircraft might not be directly relevant to the 
safety of the UAS.  For example, many design criteria for manned aircraft are intended to address the 
risk of hull loss.  But, loss of the hull might not be unsafe in many concepts of UAS operation such as 
precision agriculture.  Consequently, design and performance criteria to ensure that hull loss is 
extremely improbable might not be suitable for many UAS. This point represents a significant shift in 
system safety thinking for civil aircraft certification. 
 
This research forms a basis for interpreting the extent to which some established airworthiness 
certification processes and standards for civil aircraft can be applied to UAS.  More specifically, the 
results and supporting artifacts from the mock type certification exercise can provide: 
 awareness to the UAS industry about operational parameters and assumptions that should be specified 
through a concept of operations document to support development of a type certification basis;  
 an example of airworthiness certification artifacts to help inform the UAS industry about civil 
certification; 
 a suitable set of design and performance criteria that could be used by regulators as a starting point 
for establishing airworthiness criteria for unmanned rotorcraft intended for low-risk operations; and 
 a preliminary point of departure for establishing design and performance requirements (at the level of 
typical airworthiness standards) for new systems and equipment (e.g., a containment system for 
UAS). 
 
These findings and results are based on the development of a research prototype of a type certification 
basis for a fixed concept of operations (precision agriculture) and UAS type (midsize rotorcraft).  
Extensions of this basis to different vehicle types (e.g., fixed wing), concept of operations (e.g., 
surveillance, delivery, etc.), operational environments (e.g., urban, beyond radio line-of-sight, etc.), and 
levels of autonomy will greatly enhance the applicability of the work. 
 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Three regulatory actions within the past few years have opened the door in the United States (US) for 
commercial use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS): the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 [1], proposed rulemaking for small unmanned aircraft [2], and 
launch of the Section 333 exemption process [3].  These regulatory actions are useful for many 
lightweight UAS that can operate in limited risk settings such as operation within visual line-of-sight 
(VLOS), under visual flight rules, at low altitudes, and at relatively slow speeds.  The Section 333 
exemptions officially relieve a UAS operator of the need to comply with airworthiness regulations, 
pursuant to multiple conditions and operational limitations.  UAS with less restrictive operational 
aspirations, such as operation beyond VLOS (BVLOS), will likely require compliance with design and 
performance standards for airworthiness to operate for commercial use.  Standardized airworthiness 
criteria for different UAS design types do not exist yet.   
As part of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) 
Project, NASA is conducting research to explore airworthiness requirements for UAS performing low-
risk commercial operations.  This effort aims to determine the extent to which some existing aircraft 
certification processes and airworthiness standards are suitable for UAS, and how, if necessary, they may 
be amended to better fit. This work directly supports the FAA’s incremental approach to gaining 
airworthiness approvals by “developing design standards tailored to a specific UAS application and 
proposed operating environment” [4]. This work also supports the European Aviation Safety Agency’s 
(EASA’s) efforts to regulate UAS in the “specific” category [5].  This research aims to lay groundwork to 
facilitate development of airworthiness requirements for UAS that would neither qualify under the 
Section 333 exemption criteria (or the “open” category for EASA) nor have sufficient systems and 
equipment to comply with current civil aircraft standards (EASA’s “certified” category).   
At the heart of this research is a case study to put forward a suggested set of design and performance 
standards for an unmanned agricultural rotorcraft operating in a rural environment. This case study 
examines a midsize unmanned rotorcraft (i.e., approximately 1000 lb with payload) used to spot-treat 
crops in a precision agriculture context. Ideally, the concept of spot-treatment or targeted aerial 
application using unmanned aircraft will have a number of benefits, both economic and environmental. 
According to a recent National Research Council report [6], the United States lags behind other countries 
in the commercial use of UAS, particularly in agriculture, despite the large potential market.  The Section 
333 process enables commercial use of small UAS for agricultural work, especially for aerial surveillance 
and monitoring.  However, routine operation BVLOS with larger UAS would have a significant impact 
on the growth of the UAS industry.   
The research reported here takes a hazard-based approach to establishing safety criteria midsize 
unmanned rotorcraft.  The approach evaluates existing regulation in the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs) Part 27 for normal category rotorcraft, with the goal of determining the extent to which the 
existing regulations apply to an unmanned rotorcraft operating in a low-risk context. The approach was 
influenced by previous work on UAS certification frameworks [7-9].  Evaluation of regulations was 
influenced by the proposed rules for small UAS [2], regulations for light sport aircraft [10], regulations 
for commercial space operations [11], and recent FAA presentations on UAS certification [12].  This 
report focuses attention on some of the initial artifacts developed in a traditional aircraft certification 
program and how those artifacts may differ when applied to a UAS.  The artifacts include a mock type 
certification basis that proposes design and performance criteria for a specimen unmanned rotorcraft and a 
concept of operations (ConOps) that defines the objectives for precision agricultural spraying.  The report 
also includes rationale for the derivation of requirements in the mock type certification basis, including 
evaluation of airworthiness standards for normal category rotorcraft [13] and a modified variant produced 
by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS) [14].    
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The objectives for this research were to: 
 investigate the possibility of specifying suitable design and performance criteria (streamlined in 
comparison to current airworthiness standards) as the starting point for establishing airworthiness 
criteria for a specific combination of UAS and concept of operations, 
 examine how UAS unique attributes and features can be described in traditional certification program 
artifacts, 
 propose design and performance requirements (at the level of typical airworthiness standards) for new 
systems and equipment that are not addressed in existing airworthiness standards (e.g., a geospatial 
containment system), and   
 provide a representative example of certification artifacts to the UAS community. 
This report is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the scope and key research concepts, 
especially relevant to UAS certification.  Section 3 introduces the ConOps for aerial application using an 
unmanned rotorcraft.  Section 4 provides an overview of the approach used to determine primary hazards 
for the specimen unmanned rotorcraft and ConOps.  That section discusses how those hazards are used to 
derive the content of the mock type certification basis.  Section 5 contains the mock type certification 
basis, documented using the form of an FAA G-1, Certification Basis Issue Paper [15].  Additional Issue 
Papers addressing new and novel aspects of the unmanned rotorcraft are included with the certification 
basis.  Section 6 describes one possible UAS configuration, using Dragonfly Pictures’ DP-14 unmanned 
rotorcraft as a reference model, that might meet the requirements specified in the ConOps and in the mock 
type certification basis.  Conclusions follow in Section 7.  Text for the requirements and their rationale in 
the mock type certification basis are included in the Appendix. 
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2. Scope and Research Questions 
Several different certificates or approvals are needed for an aircraft to operate for commercial use in the 
NAS.  Certification of an aircraft’s airworthiness, meaning that it conforms to its type design and is in a 
condition for safe operation, is one such approval.  FAR Part 21 describes procedural requirements for 
issuing these approvals.  Three different certificates are relevant to airworthiness certification: a type 
certificate, a production certificate, and an airworthiness certificate.  A type certificate is issued for a 
particular design of a civil aircraft, engine, or propeller insofar as it complies with applicable 
airworthiness requirements. A type certification basis identifies applicable regulation paragraphs and 
subparagraphs, exemptions, equivalent level of safety findings, and special conditions that apply to an 
aircraft certification program. The quality system used for manufacturing aircraft is addressed through 
production certification. An airworthiness certificate signifies approval that an aircraft, as built, complies 
with its type design and is in a condition for safe operation.  Type certification applies to all aircraft of the 
same design, whereas airworthiness certification applies on an airframe-by-airframe basis.  The same 
design and performance standards, however, are the basis for both certificates. This report focuses on 
what those standards might look like for an unmanned rotorcraft system used for precision aerial 
application, including the potential for trade-offs between operational limitations and type design 
requirements for UAS.  This report does not consider issues related to production or airworthiness 
certificates or continuing airworthiness for individual aircraft. 
The current design and performance standards for conventionally-piloted aircraft (CPA) are often thought 
to be the logical starting point for determining airworthiness standards for most UAS.  Those 
requirements represent time-honored best-practices for safe design and lessons learned from incidents and 
accidents.  Existing airworthiness standards for CPA levy requirements on aircraft structure, design and 
construction, powerplant and supporting systems, electrical systems, etc. to safeguard the aircraft, and 
hence, safeguard anyone on board.  Compliance with those requirements is intended to ensure that hull 
loss or other aircraft-specific failures that could entail harm to onboard passengers and crew are extremely 
improbable.  They also have a secondary effect of protecting persons and property on the ground.  Key 
questions for UAS are (1) to what extent do existing airworthiness processes and standards apply, given 
that protection of onboard passengers and crew is not necessary? and (2) to what extent can operational 
limitations be used to offset airworthiness requirements?  To answer these questions, it is helpful to look 
at key differences in hazards between CPA and UAS and their operations. 
Hull loss is always unacceptable in commercial CPA because those on board are likely to be harmed, 
regardless of the operational context.  In contrast, operational context is a significant factor in determining 
the safety-related risk1 posed by a UAS [16].  For example, risk posed by a UAS operating in an urban 
environment is significantly different from risk posed by the same UAS operating in an uninhabited 
environment.  A number of potential UAS operations exist wherein hull loss presents negligible risk to 
people, because there are no people on board and because there are no uninvolved people expected in 
proximity to the operation. Operations in the Arctic or over vast stretches of farmland are obvious 
examples.  Ensuring that hull loss is extremely improbable in those cases is more of an economic issue 
than a safety concern. This point represents a significant shift in system safety thinking for civil aircraft, 
and has implications for UAS airworthiness requirements. EASA has proposed an operation-centric 
framework for regulating UAS to reflect this shift in thinking [5].  
The case study of a midsize unmanned rotorcraft used for targeted aerial application examines 
airworthiness standards in light of an operational context where risk to others is limited, but not 
eliminated completely.  Risk to persons overflown or to other airspace users is minimized in a number of 
ways in the ConOps, including the following. 
                                                     
1 References to risk in this report are specific to safety-related risk, in contrast to other types of risk (e.g., security or economics). 
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 Operations will be conducted only over farmland in rural, agricultural areas.  The operation does not 
include transit between locations (from an airport to the application site or from one application site 
to another), but could be adjacent to an aviation activity (e.g., conventional crop dusting). 
 Operations will typically be very low-altitude, only a few feet over crop height to minimize dispersal 
of chemicals.  The UA will not be flown above 400 ft. 
 Operations will be constrained to a pre-defined containment volume over the application site. 
Although these operational characteristics reduce risk, they do not eliminate it.  Failure of the systems and 
equipment on board the UA, in the ground control station, or associated with the command and control 
(C2) links could pose:   
 harm to people in the operational vicinity, primarily crew, e.g., from release of high energy parts from 
loss of rotor system integrity or explosion; 
 harm to people in other aircraft, e.g., from failure to detect and avoid other aircraft, particularly aerial 
applicators (i.e., crop dusters) that enter the operational area; 
 harm to people on the ground, e.g., from failure to detect and avoid people who may inadvertently 
enter the operational area; or 
 harm to people and property beyond the operational area, e.g., from loss of containment (i.e., flight 
beyond the designated containment volume). 
The purpose of airworthiness standards is to provide design and performance criteria to mitigate hazards 
that could lead to the outcomes above. The operational limitations set forth in the ConOps play an 
important role in understanding and evaluating hazards and potential mitigations.  
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3. Concept of Operations for Targeted Aerial Application Using a UAS 
This concept of operations (ConOps) describes a UAS performing a relatively low-risk operation, namely, 
targeted aerial application of agricultural chemicals such as fertilizers or pesticides to crops (i.e., crop 
dusting).  The general concept is to have an unmanned rotorcraft apply chemicals to relatively small areas 
in a field of crops that have been determined to need treatment. This operation is intended to be 
compatible with precision agriculture: applying the right chemical at the right place at the right time.  This 
ConOps describes the entire operation, primarily from the perspective of the people performing the 
operation.  The information in this ConOps is used to derive information relevant to type certification and 
could also be used to support operational approvals, pilot training requirements, flight manual, continuing 
airworthiness, etc. 
Within this ConOps, targeted aerial application is considered to be spot treatment of distinct areas of a 
field of crops, to a level of accuracy of at least 1 meter in either direction [17].  Crop treatment 
instructions are captured in electronic prescription maps that incorporate information regarding crop 
health, field conditions, and agricultural inputs needed for treatment [18]. Prescription maps can be based 
on Landsat or other imaging data, such as data from manned or unmanned aircraft, or may be developed 
by traditional methods, such as direct inspection of fields.  The existence of a prescription map suitable to 
allow the generation of a flight plan for the UAS is assumed. The yellow areas in Figure 1 give an 
example of how areas in a field requiring treatment might appear on a prescription map.   
 
 
Figure 1. Notional Prescription Map Illustrating Zones Requiring Treatment 
An unmanned, midsize rotorcraft was chosen as the target aerial vehicle for this case study.  For aerial 
application, a rotorcraft’s ability to operate at very low speeds supports spot treatment of fields.  
Moreover, a rotorcraft’s ability to take off and land without a runway or airport and ability to quickly 
terminate flight with a minimal landing footprint (compared to a fixed wing aircraft with unknown glide 
path) are important to constraining the operation of the UAS to a defined location.  Having the operation 
constrained within a well-defined area, in which there is limited possibility of impact with other aircraft 
or people, is important to limiting operational risk in this ConOps.  
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The unmanned rotorcraft system includes the UA, ground control station (GCS), sensors, C2 links, and a 
spraying system.  All operations are conducted using this equipment. The rotorcraft and all of its 
supporting equipment are transported to the application site by ground vehicle(s).  The activities 
associated with the spray operation, including preflight, launch, aerial application, refueling, and 
replenishment of chemicals, are performed at the application site. 
The rotorcraft is remotely operated by a pilot in command2 from the GCS at the application site.  The 
pilot in command is the person who has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of 
flight of the UA.  Additional crewmembers may be needed to assist with tasks such as launch and 
recovery, refueling, observing air traffic and weather, and monitoring the boundaries.  
Operations are conducted by an aerial application service provider (e.g., a crop dusting service) rather 
than by individual farmers or landowners.  The service provider is responsible for meeting operational 
requirements for handling chemicals, including those required by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), as well as training requirements for the pilot in command and crew, and general operating and 
flight rules that may be levied on UAS, such as those in FAR Parts 61, 91, and 137.  Those aspects of the 
operation are beyond the intended scope of this work, which is to examine type certification 
considerations. 
3.1. Operational Objectives and Environment Description 
The following subsections describe the objectives of the spray operation, the environment (geographic, 
airspace, agricultural, and economic) in which the system is intended to operate, notable safety 
considerations, and expectations for routine operational use.  The operational information is provided here 
to help identify important safety concerns and key design and operational features that could mitigate 
those concerns. 
3.1.1. Operational Objectives for Targeted Spray Service 
Listed below are the objectives for aerial application using an unmanned rotorcraft for this ConOps.  
Specific operational activities throughout the phases of operation (from mission planning to landing) are 
described in Section 3.1.6. 
1. The UA should be capable of applying liquid agricultural chemicals (e.g., pesticides, insecticides, 
fungicides, herbicides, rodenticides, attractants, repellents, and fertilizers) to spots designated on a 
prescription map of a field.  The prescription map could be based on Landsat data or other geospatial 
information sources. 
2. The chemicals should be applied at a level of precision of at least 1 meter in either direction. 
3. The UA and supporting equipment should be transportable to the operational area over local 
roadways. 
The nominal operational area is a 0.25 square mile block of farmland (160 acres).  This area is known as a 
quarter section.  The GCS and supporting equipment are located in such a manner as to provide adequate 
VLOS and radio line-of-sight (RLOS) for the targeted quarter section and, where feasible, adjacent 
quarter sections to minimize required movements of vehicles and equipment. 
                                                     
2  The pilot in command is responsible for remote operation of the rotorcraft, although direct stick-to-servo control (comparable 
to a model aircraft) is not required for the UA in this case study. 
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3.1.2. Geography 
In this ConOps, the focus is on targeted application of chemicals to crops grown in largely rural areas 
with significant stretches of farmland.  The Red River Valley region of North Dakota and Minnesota 
serves as a good example of such a region. Corn, wheat, and soybeans are common crops in the region, in 
addition to specialty crops such as sugar beets. Although many geographic areas would be suitable for 
this operation, choosing a specific geographic area is helpful in identifying realistic safety and 
airworthiness considerations.  
Farmland in the eastern half of North Dakota including the Red River Valley is generally flat prairie land.  
The elevation of the Red River Valley region ranges from 780 feet above mean sea level (MSL) in the 
north to 962 feet MSL in the south.  
Farms in the Red River Valley vary in size, with 1,675 acres being an average farm size [19].  Many 
farms are bordered by “wind breaks” of tall trees, often with creeks, rivers, streams, or ponds sporadically 
situated within the growing sections.  In general terms, land in North Dakota is symmetrically organized 
by sections of land as established by the national Public Land Survey System, each measuring 
approximately 1 statute mile wide by 1 statute mile long, or 640 acres in total size.  Each section is further 
broken into quarters, providing workable quarter-section fields of 160 acres each.  
There are two significant urban areas in the Red River Valley: Grand Forks and Fargo, ND.  Most farms 
where aerial spraying is conducted are located in rural, sparsely populated areas. Some farms, however, 
abut housing developments. 
North Dakota’s climate is characterized by large temperature variation across all time scales, light to 
moderate irregular precipitation, plentiful sunshine, low humidity, and nearly continuous wind.  The 
temperature in the growing season (April–September) ranges from about 30 F to 84 F.  Average wind 
speeds during the summer range from 10-13 mph, with up to 20-25 mph gusts. 
3.1.3. Airspace Environment 
The airspace over the Red River Valley to the north of, and including, Fargo, North Dakota is comprised 
primarily of Class G and Class E airspaces.  Points to note relevant to potential airspace hazards include: 
 The aeronautical sectional chart indicates the existence of some small obstructions (such as grain 
elevators), most around 1000-1300 ft MSL.  
 There are two National Wildlife Refuges in the region: Ardoch and Kellys Slough. Both are wetlands 
with significant numbers of birds.  
 There is no Special Use Airspace in the region, although there are several Military Operations Areas 
(MOAs) to the immediate west (Devil’s Lake East/West MOA, Tiger North/South MOA). 
Regional airports include Grand Forks International, Grand Forks Air Force Base, and Fargo Hector 
International, as well as numerous smaller airports.  Smaller airports include both towered and non-
towered airports, glider fields, crop dusting fields, and private airfields. 
3.1.4. Agricultural Environment 
Precision can be applied to many aspects of farming and crop production, including improved crop 
assessment through various imaging technologies and improved precision in the application of 
agricultural chemicals, as shown in Figure 2.  When used to modify “aerial application” or “crop 
dusting,” the word precision indicates that the application need not be to an entire field or at a uniform 
rate. 
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Figure 2. Life Cycle Phases in Precision Agriculture 
  
Improvements in precision can be made with respect to the timing of specific agricultural actions, the 
geospatial accuracy of actions, and the quantities of agricultural chemicals applied.  Although aerial 
application of chemicals may support several phases of the life cycle, the prominent role is likely in the 
growing phase. 
During the growing phase (summer months), icing conditions rarely occur near ground level.  In the rare 
case when they do occur, there would be no agricultural need to conduct spray operations3. Spray 
operations normally occur during low-wind and low-gust conditions to avoid undesirable drift of 
chemicals into unintended areas.  Therefore, operations are not conducted during thunderstorms or other 
high wind situations. 
3.1.5. Economic Environment 
Ideally, the concept of targeted aerial application of agricultural chemicals has a number of benefits, 
including safety, environmental, and economic benefits. Safety benefits include the elimination of risk to 
the (nonexistent) onboard crew and the reduction of risk to others, arising from the use of smaller, lighter-
weight aircraft.  Environmental benefits include more effective chemical usage and therefore less 
chemical runoff.  The ability to reduce the overall amount of chemical being dispersed (and thus cost) 
should lead to quantifiable saving on the part of the agricultural enterprise.  Furthermore, there are other 
benefits, which, while not easily quantifiable, are expected to have a positive impact.  Precision aerial 
application of agricultural chemicals at the right time, in the right place, could increase the value 
associated with yield per acre by: (1) limiting damage to crops from the infestation being treated, (2) 
limiting the physical damage to crops during the application process, (3) reducing soil compaction, and 
(4) and providing a more optimal mix of dispersed product through rotor-wash action.  
This operation comes with attendant costs, which must then be analyzed in the operational context.  
Limiting factors on economics of the operational concept include: width of the spray rig, area covered, 
cost of chemicals applied, fuel, labor etc., and lifecycle costs of the UAS (purchase, operation, and 
disposal).  For economic viability, these costs must be benchmarked with respect to current state of the art 
application processes, such as conventional aerial application and tractor-based dispersal.  
                                                     
3  One could conceive of an agricultural spray operation that would be conducted during icing conditions, such as spraying 
chemicals on fruit trees to prevent damage during a late frost.  This usage is not considered in this ConOps. 
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Costs 
Direct costs are expenses that can be directly attributed to the production and harvesting of the crops.  
These account for 60% of the operating costs.  The major direct costs associated with this operational 
concept of precision spraying are: (1) the cost of chemicals applied, (2) fuel costs (for transport and 
operation of the UAS) and (3) labor costs of operating the UAS.  It is unclear which of these costs will 
dominate the operational expenses.  Chemical costs impact the cost-benefit analysis most directly, as 
quantifiable savings can be realized through a precise application of less chemical, thereby reducing the 
amount of chemical applied.  These cost savings directly depend on the precision of the delivery 
mechanism.  This will be influenced by the guidance system of the vehicle and by the nozzle delivery 
system. The cost of the fuel consumed in the course of the precision application of chemicals is directly 
related to the prescription map, vehicle guidance, navigation and control algorithms and vehicle engine 
efficiency.  Labor costs for the precision application of chemicals under the proposed operational concept 
are the least clearly defined.  Labor costs will be incurred for the setup and take-down operations at the 
beginning and end of each day.  Each individual flight will require pilot and crew time (including, visual 
observers, if any) to monitor the safe operation of the flight and perform fueling and chemical 
replenishing operations.  Regulatory bodies are developing training and qualification requirements for the 
pilot and other crewmembers.  Costs associated with those activities would constitute indirect labor costs.  
Key Operational Cost/Benefit Factors 
The average operational time depends on the average flight time, the number of flights to complete the 
treatment of the quarter section, the time to reload fuel and resupply chemicals, and the time to perform 
setup and take-down activities.  
From an economic standpoint, the average flight time of the system is one of the key parameters of the 
operational design.  Frequent returns for refueling (or chemical resupply) will degrade the operational 
efficiency of the precision application function.  Flight time can be divided into two components: the 
average time spent applying chemicals (while in flight) and the average time transiting to the area where 
application needs to occur.  The average time in transit is dependent on the prescription map, the initial 
deployment site of the vehicle, and the path-planning algorithm.  The average time spent spraying is 
dependent on the vehicle’s speed in translational lift (moving from hover to forward flight), the vehicle’s 
precision in spraying an area, and the variable rate of spray, as well as the prescription map.   
Average chemical coverage is the average volume of chemical required to treat a quarter section.  This is 
determined by the type of chemical, the rate of application, and the prescription map. Average chemical 
coverage directly influences both cost and timeliness of coverage.  The ability to spray a given area with 
increased precision increases savings based on the amount of chemicals applied. 
3.1.6. Special Safety Features and Considerations 
There are a few special safety features and considerations worth highlighting for this ConOps that are a 
consequence of there being no pilot or passengers onboard the aircraft. 
3.1.6.1. Containment 
A primary safety consideration is that aerial application will be contained or geospatially bounded.  For 
this ConOps, containment can be thought of in the simplest case as a virtual, 3-dimensional dome or box 
surrounding the field that constrains the area of operation.  In practice, the height of the containment area 
may be variable so as to limit acceptable altitude near the boundaries.  Limiting altitude, especially near 
the boundaries, can help to protect persons and property outside of the containment area from high energy 
debris released in the event of rotor system failure or a crash landing.  
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Procedures prior to and during operation ensure that no people are in the containment zone.  The GCS, 
pilot, and crew are not located within the containment zone but are near the boundaries. The operational 
area, shown as a dashed red line in Figure 3, encompasses all of the areas targeted for treatment.  Takeoff, 
aerial spraying, and landing all occur within the operational zone.  That zone is completely within the 
containment zone, depicted as the green box in Figure 3.  The internal navigation and flight control 
system for the UAS is intended to limit operations to the operational area defined in the flight plan and 
limit the spraying to the spray areas (shown in yellow in the figure).       
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship of Containment Zone, Operational Area, and Spray Areas 
This ConOps assumes the UAS has a high-integrity approach to ensure the UA remains within the 
containment zone.  The containment system provides a safety net, intended to limit the exposure of people 
and property outside of the operational area to UA hazards.  The containment function only ensures the 
UA stays inside the containment zone. The containment function does not prohibit people or vehicles, 
including other aircraft, from entering the zone.  Thus the containment function does not provide air 
traffic separation (see next subsection).  Operating predominately at crop height with a low containment-
zone ceiling (400 ft), reduces the chance of an aircraft encounter, but does not eliminate the risk.  
Ensuring that the UA will not exit the containment zone is a key safety requirement. 
3.1.6.2. Detection and Avoidance of Other Aircraft, Weather, and Obstacles 
Without a pilot onboard who can directly observe other aircraft, static or dynamic obstacles, or weather, 
other means are needed to detect and avoid them.  One option is to have ground observers watch the 
unmanned aircraft and its surroundings.  For some scenarios in this ConOps, operations take place in 
daylight with visibilities of three miles or greater, thus enabling visual line-of-sight (VLOS) operations.  
VLOS refers to visual observation of UA; that is, operations where visual contact can be reliably 
maintained with an unmanned aircraft. The FAA currently defines VLOS to be within 0.5 nautical mile of 
the UA in flight, at a maximum of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) [20].  VLOS operations can use 
trained observers as the primary means of (1) identifying potential intruder aircraft before they enter the 
containment zone, (2) recognizing changes in weather conditions that might necessitate a change in the 
planned activity (e.g., termination or a change in control mode), and (3) identifying obstacles within the 
containment zone (e.g., farm workers who may inadvertently enter the field or farm equipment that was 
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not identified in flight planning).  Permanent obstacles or other terrain features to be avoided in the 
operational area can be accounted for in geographical databases or by other means.   
Other scenarios in this ConOps include non-VLOS operations, such as operating at night or beyond visual 
line-of-sight (BVLOS).  In those scenarios, ground observers may not be sufficient.  Other means of 
mitigating hazards associated with detecting and avoiding other aircraft, weather, and obstacles are 
needed.  Those means may include, but are not limited to, onboard automation to detect and avoid other 
aircraft and unanticipated obstacles, or ground-based detection systems, such as those using ground-based 
radars or acoustics. 
3.1.6.3. Hull Loss 
For manned aircraft operations, hull loss (i.e., a crash) is considered a catastrophic event, because of the 
potential harm to those on board.  In this ConOps, crashing within the containment zone, which is 
monitored to ensure no people are present, is largely an economic concern.  Hull loss is only a safety 
concern in situations where energetic departure of rotorcraft parts or pieces can cause harm to people or 
property outside of the containment zone (e.g., the pilot or crew).  Any spill of agricultural chemicals 
caused by the loss of the hopper contents in a hull loss scenario may also be a safety concern, but is 
considered out of scope for this case study. 
3.1.7. Operational Scenarios 
Operational scenarios describe ways that a system is envisaged to be used through the various phases of 
operation, which include mission planning, take off, flight, landing, inspection and maintenance. Four 
operational scenarios are postulated here.  The first is a description of daytime operations that occur 
entirely within VLOS in a rural, agricultural area where there is no aviation activity within three miles.  
The other scenarios build on the first scenario by introducing additional challenges for the UAS design.  
For example, the second scenario is similar to the first, except that spray operations are conducted in an 
area within three miles of known aviation activity (e.g., rural airport, glider port, or aerial applicator 
field).  The next two scenarios add nighttime and low visibility operations that cannot be conducted using 
current VLOS rules.  Each scenario description only addresses considerations that differ from the 
preceding scenario. 
All scenarios assume an airworthy rotorcraft at the outset.  All scenarios also assume that adequate 
planning and reconnaissance of the planned area of operations is performed prior to the operation.  Pre-
operation activities are assumed to be governed by FAA-approved handbooks approved for the specific 
commercial activity. 
3.1.7.1. Scenario 1 – Daytime Operations Away from other Aviation Activities 
In this scenario, operations take place (a) during daylight hours, (b) in good visibility conditions 
acceptable for VLOS operations, and (c) at least three miles away from any other aviation activity (e.g., 
nearby airport or crop dusting operation). 
Mission Planning 
The mission planning phase includes activities that can be done well in advance of the actual spraying 
task, such as assessment of the physical topography of the fields to be sprayed.  Mission planning may 
include both onsite and offsite work.  For example, planning may include preflight reconnaissance of the 
target fields to identify permanent obstacles, establish “no fly” zones around those obstacles for flight 
planning, and set containment-zone boundaries.  Other activities may include long-range weather checks 
and set up and checkout of ground-based support systems (e.g., multi-lateration sensors).  Mission 
planning is expected to be done by the service provider’s management personnel or project planners and 
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schedulers.  The number and location of the support personnel is determined by the service provider 
based on preflight reconnaissance, operational needs, and provisions of the operational approvals given 
by the FAA and other relevant authorities. 
Prior to dispatching the UAS for the spray operation, the service provider obtains the prescription map 
specifying the locations, densities, and types of chemicals to be applied, and plans the flight paths 
accordingly. 
Preflight 
The preflight phase includes day-of-flight activities such as transportation to the field, check out of the 
rotorcraft (much like a manned aircraft preflight check), checkout of the observer communication system, 
final weather checks, C2 system checks, and the preflight briefing for all personnel.  These activities are 
done by the crew, which includes the pilot in command, support and maintenance personnel, and possibly 
observers and an onsite operations manager.   
Pre-flight begins with deploying the UA, GCS, datalink, and necessary support equipment to the target 
area of operations.  Once on site, the GCS and support equipment are set up outside of the containment 
zone, allowing adequate safety margin for the rotors.  The UA is positioned within the containment zone, 
allowing adequate clearance from obstacles above and around the vehicle.  Positioning would also 
consider local ambient wind field and slope restrictions for the UA.  The UA is configured and inspected 
in accordance with specifications in its continuing airworthiness instructions and operations manual. 
Preflight checks of the UAS, including the spray system, are made per the operations handbook, including 
checks to ensure continuity of the C2 links, checks for weight and balance, and checks of the physical 
systems.  All necessary flight information, including containment boundaries, location of stationary 
obstacles, flight plan, and local altimeter information are verified and loaded from the GCS.  
The UA is provisioned with fuel and the chemicals to be applied. Safety measures that address the 
handling and loading of both the fuel and chemicals are specified in FAA-approved operational 
procedures.   
While the UA and GCS are being prepared for flight, support equipment and personnel are deployed.  
Support equipment may include the transmitters, sensors, and power equipment necessary to support 
operations.  Calibrated positioning sensors might be needed to ensure the prescription map corresponds to 
the locations the UA flies with respect to ground truth. Personnel include visual observers to monitor for 
unplanned obstacles, containment boundary violations, and transient low-flying aircraft.  The visual 
observers conduct communications checks with the pilot in command and scan for intruder aircraft and 
unexpected persons or obstacles in the containment zone. 
Takeoff and Climb 
When all elements of the system are ready, the pilot in command clears the vehicle for takeoff.  The UA 
is given the command to lift to a hover and does so automatically.  Final systems checks are conducted to 
confirm stability and flight readiness.  When checks are complete, the pilot in command clears the aircraft 
to initiate the preprogrammed navigation path and pressurize the spray system. 
Flight (Prescriptive navigation and spraying) 
During the flight phase, the UA operates at an altitude consistent with the spraying requirements, 
typically 10-20 ft above the ground.  The UA’s navigation system directs the UA to the first spray 
location avoiding obstacles along the way. For the envisaged operation, the pilot cannot fly the UA via 
direct stick-to-servo control.  Once at the first spray location, chemicals are applied according to the 
prescription map while the UA maintains an airspeed chosen to control chemical dispersion and reduce 
fuel consumption.  By approaching the spray location from downwind, the ground speed of the UA can be 
minimized. This helps to control application concentration and reduce overspray.  The UA then continues 
to the other spray locations per the flight plan.  The vehicle design and operational procedures include 
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safety measures to ensure that the spray system cannot inadvertently activate or apply chemicals to 
locations other than those designated in the prescription map. 
Ensuring that the UA stays within the containment zone is a key safety function that the pilot performs 
with the assistance of the visual observers. The containment function ensures the UA always stays within 
the containment area.  If the UA breeches the operational area (see Section 3.1.6.1), visual observers (or 
the pilot) will identify this condition and communicate this to the pilot in command, at which time the 
pilot will take corrective action. The pilot’s command, sent via a dedicated link, will activate an 
independent contingency response system to bring the vehicle down immediately, thus ensuring the UA 
remains in the containment zone.  This action may or may not preserve the integrity of the airframe.  
Landing on the crops is assumed to be acceptable.  Otherwise, a designated safe landing spot may be 
used.   
The C2 link might fail anytime during flight.  To address this possibility, the C2 link is continuously 
monitored.  If the link is lost for longer than a defined duration, the independent contingency response 
system is activated.  Other failure events that affect the navigation, guidance, control, or safety systems 
will also cause the UA to land at its current location (assuming the absence of obstacles).  The 
contingency response system described above may be used at any time to mitigate UA failure conditions, 
such as loss of positioning data. 
Detecting other aircraft that may enter the containment zone is an important safety activity accomplished 
with the help of visual observers.  The observers monitor the local airspace for low-flying aircraft and 
potential obstacles. When another aircraft that could pose a conflict is detected, that information is 
communicated to the pilot in command.  The pilot in command then sends a command to the UA to 
execute a preprogrammed avoidance maneuver (e.g., to land or go into a low hover).  When the 
conflicting traffic has passed, a command to resume is sent from the GCS.  A ground-based aircraft 
detection system could also be designed to automatically send a command to the UA. In that case, the 
pilot would serve as a backup. 
Obstacles are avoided during operations in two ways.  First, known (static) obstacles are avoided based on 
“no fly” zones established during mission planning.  Unanticipated obstacles within the containment zone 
are detected by the visual observers or, if available, by an on-board obstacle detection system4.  It is 
unlikely that a UAS in a rural environment would need to perform complex obstacle avoidance or return-
to-path maneuvers.   
Visual observers also watch for changes in the weather. Observers communicate significant changes in 
weather to the pilot in command, who orders contingency maneuvers if they are warranted. 
Descent and Landing 
When the UA has completed the programmed path, reached minimum fuel or payload levels, detected an 
onboard failure, or is commanded by the pilot, the UA returns to the designated landing spot.  Upon 
arrival, the UA executes an automatic approach and landing to allow refueling and chemical re-supply 
and any necessary inspection and maintenance. 
3.1.7.2. Scenario 2 – Daytime Operations Near an Aviation Activity 
In Scenario 2, daytime operations are conducted within three miles of an airport or aviation activity (e.g., 
aerial chemical application).  In this scenario, the required capabilities and protocols are the same as 
Scenario 1 except for communication and notification.  Communication and notification involve 
                                                     
4  It may be possible to implement an on-board obstacle detection system using lidar, radar, infrared cameras, or visible light 
detectors, or combinations of sensors as permitted by size, weight, and power (SWAP) and cost constraints. 
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conveying information about the UAS operations to nearby aviators and operators, as well as monitoring 
communications from those activities. 
In this scenario, the airport and any other aviators and operators within three miles are notified of the 
planned UAS operations.  This might be accomplished by filing a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) or posting 
a notice at a non-towered airport notifying manned aircraft operators of the dates and times of the planned 
UAS operations.  The preflight briefing for the pilot and visual observers should include information 
about nearby aviation activities.  
During UAS operations, the pilot in command is responsible for monitoring very high frequency (VHF) 
communications on the appropriate air traffic frequencies, if available.  When operations are in progress, 
the pilot in command maintains a listening watch on the local Unicom or other appropriate frequency and 
notifies manned aircraft if the UAS breaches the containment zone.  If the airport has an operating control 
tower, the pilot in command monitors the control tower frequency to be responsive to any 
communications from the tower. 
These communications protocols do not substitute for the requirement to detect other aircraft, but do help 
provide “alerted see and avoid” for other airspace uses and remote crew.  The procedures to be followed 
in the event of a potential conflict with another aircraft are the same as Scenario 1. 
3.1.7.3. Scenario 3 – Nighttime Operations 
Aerial spraying operations at nighttime5 have potential benefits and limitations both from an operational 
and agricultural perspective.  Winds at night are typically lower, which allows easier and more accurate 
aircraft control and positioning for precise spraying.  There is substantially less general aviation traffic at 
night and the potential exposure to other low-level aircraft is minimal because of restrictions on nighttime 
aerial work for manned aerial applicators.  On the agriculture side, some crops are more amenable to the 
application of certain chemicals at night. 
However, it is harder to see aircraft (traditionally piloted or otherwise) at night.  The use of strobes on the 
UA can increase the likelihood that other aircraft will see it and that it will be seen by its pilot and 
observers.  Noise restrictions may present a challenge for nighttime operations.  Detecting ground-based 
obstacles is more difficult at night.  Increased emphasis on strategic measures (e.g., mapping of obstacles) 
would be needed to maintain safe separation.     
Scenario 3 involves nighttime operations that may or may not occur near an aviation activity.  In this 
ConOps, night operations differ from day operations primarily in three ways.  Because the pilot and 
observers may fail at nighttime to notice (1) whether the UA remains in its containment area, (2) whether 
other aircraft have entered the area, and (3) the presence of obstacles on the ground, there must be an 
automated means to mitigate these hazards.  The contingency response is largely the same as Scenario 1 
except that the contingency action could be initiated by automation in addition to pilot action. Due to the 
significant safety role of the containment function, all parts of this system, including location sensors, 
must operate with high integrity.  If the pilot determines that the UA violates the operational area without 
triggering the containment system, the pilot has the means to bring the aircraft down through the 
contingency action.  In this case, all operations cease until the cause of failure of the automated 
containment function is determined.  
Using visual observers to detect other aircraft at night is not generally applicable to this scenario.  
Nighttime operations require an additional approach to detecting other aircraft.  A low-cost, automated 
detect and avoid system is not currently available for the civil UAS market, though one could be 
developed using existing technology.  It is possible to imagine a Ground-Based Detect-and-Avoid System 
                                                     
5  Night, per FAR Part §1.1, means the time between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil 
twilight, as published in the Air Almanac, converted to local time. 
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(GBDAA) that is a small, portable, and radar-based.  The GBDAA system could operate continuously 
during flight operations and provide the pilot in command with a distinctive warning if an intruder aircraft 
is detected within a predetermined range of the operation.  Given a warning from the GBDAA system, the 
pilot in command would activate the independent contingency response system (e.g., land immediately or 
hover), just as he or she would when warned by a visual observer.  Once the intruder has passed, the UA 
would be permitted to resume normal operations.     
Finally, day and night operations also differ with respect to active obstacle detection on the ground.  
Ground intruders (e.g., livestock or people) become difficult to detect at nighttime; even if they also 
become less likely.  Obstacles such as mobile irrigation systems that might not have appeared on original 
maps of the field are also more difficult to detect at nighttime.  For night operations, an approach other 
than visual observers is needed to detect unexpected obstacles in the field.  If that approach uses an on-
board detection system, the sensor for the system must be shown to be capable of detecting obstacles at 
night.  Any ambient light requirements for the sensor to operate should be specified in the operations 
manual as operational limitations. 
There are other, more minor, differences between day and night operations.  The UA must be equipped 
with position and anticollision lights to permit visual confirmation of UA position and orientation.  
Lighting is also needed on the ground to support refueling, reloading, and inspecting the UA. 
3.1.7.4. Scenario 4 – Operations Beyond Visual Line-of-sight 
Scenario 4 is for operations beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS), but within radio line-of-sight (RLOS) 
that may or may not be near an aviation activity.  BVLOS operations include those where visual contact 
cannot be reliably maintained with an unmanned aircraft due to distance, obstructions, or atmospheric 
conditions.  Early morning fog or low lying clouds are examples of low visibility conditions relevant to 
aerial spraying operations. There are some advantages to operating in degraded visual conditions. For 
example, it is unlikely that other aircraft will be operating at low altitudes under visual flight rules (VFR).  
Required capabilities (for detecting and avoiding other aircraft and obstacles and remaining within the 
containment volume) remain the same as in the other scenarios, except the means to provide those 
capabilities cannot rely solely on human vision.   
VFR minima for conventionally-piloted rotorcraft per 14 CFR §91.115, shown in Table 1, differ 
depending on whether operations are conducted in Class D, E or G airspace.   
Table 1.  VFR Weather Minima for Rotorcraft 
Airspace Flight Visibility Distance from Clouds 
Class A None None 
Class B 3 statute miles Clear of clouds 
Class C 3 statute miles 500 feet below 
1,000 feet above 
2000 feet horizontal 
Class D 3 statute miles 
Class E 
less than 10,000 MSL 3 statute miles 
at or above 10,000 MSL 5 statute miles 
1,000 feet below and above 
1 statute mile horizontal 
Class G 
1,200 feet or less AGL 
Day .5 statute mile Clear of clouds 
Night 1 statute mile 500 feet below 
1,000 feet above 
2000 feet horizontal 
more than 1,200 AGL but less 
than 10,000 MSL 
Day 1 statute mile 
Night 3 statute miles 
more than 1,200 AGL and at or above 
10,000 MSL 
5 statute miles 
1,000 feet below and above 
1 statute mile horizontal 
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Agricultural operations will presumably take place in Class G airspace, where air traffic control does not 
provide clearance from other aircraft, but VFR minimums are known by pilots.  VLOS operations 
covering quarter sections would require less than one mile visibility.  In theory, VLOS operations could 
be conducted in Class G airspace with one mile visibility and clear of clouds except for the requirement to 
detect other aircraft at a range sufficient for the UA to conduct an avoidance maneuver.  Procedures for 
operations with visibility below one statute mile are virtually the same as night operations: a means to 
detect other aircraft (such as a GBDAA system) will be needed.   
The active obstacle detection system should be shown to operate successfully in restricted visibilities if 
observers cannot see the boundaries of the operational area.  Low visibility operations might also 
necessitate some means to establish when visibility is above or below approved minima. 
3.2. Operational and Airworthiness-Related Observations Regarding ConOps 
Design parameters and level of automation needed for UAS are strongly influenced by operational, 
environmental, and economic considerations. The subsections below describe how these considerations 
for aerial application may impact the design for an unmanned agricultural sprayer. This information 
provides background data for some of the assumptions underlying the type certification basis. 
3.2.1. Operational and Environmental Influence on UAS Design Variables 
3.2.1.1. Tank Volumes (Fuel and Chemical Capacity) 
The fuel and chemical tanks affect the weight, balance, and endurance of the UA, as well as the potential 
energy available to cause damage in case of an accident.  The tanks’ contents are part of the vehicle’s 
payload and are subject to weight limits.  
Different fields will have different transit and spray requirements, depending on the size and condition of 
the field.  Ideally, the design of the fuel and chemical tanks would allow for variable fuel and chemical 
loadings. An optimal design for the tanks would minimize the number of refueling and resupply 
operations for the targeted fields, while having minimal effect on balance as the fuel and chemical tanks 
are depleted.  Ideally, the fuel remaining would be just sufficient to return the UA to the ground transport 
vehicle with appropriate reserves. 
3.2.1.2. Guidance and Navigation 
The precision with which the chemicals will be applied is a critical factor in the UAS design. Precision 
aerial application will likely require greater navigation accuracy and control than that needed to meet 
safety requirements (e.g., to stay clear of obstacles and boundaries).  The guidance, navigation and control 
systems must have sufficient accuracy to navigate to and spray targets with the precision required to 
achieve cost savings and avoid (over-) spraying unnecessary areas. Insomuch as the guidance and 
navigation equipment does not affect safety requirements or constraints, its accuracy and reliability 
impacts only the profitability of the operation (e.g., through repair, lost operational time, wasted 
chemicals, or damaged crops). 
3.2.1.3. Visual Observers and Electronic Surveillance 
Tradeoffs exist between using visual observers in VLOS conditions and relying upon electronic 
surveillance equipment to ensure that the UA remains in its containment zone and clear of ground 
obstacles and other aircraft.  Because the cost of certifying electronic surveillance systems might be 
substantial, the cost to use visual observers (including training costs) might be less burdensome in the 
short term. The cost of employing visual observers will depend on the number needed, duties assigned, 
and the level of training required. If the quality of surveillance provided by visual observers and certified 
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electronic equipment is equivalent, a straightforward cost-benefit analysis can be made between the two.  
The analysis should take into account that electronic surveillance will enable aerial application at 
nighttime, in inclement weather, and at beyond VLOS maximums (Scenarios 3 and 4).  Operating under 
these conditions may provide significant benefits, especially in terms of timeliness of application, and 
overall increased yield. 
3.2.2. Business Models 
The business model impacts UAS design parameters, especially regarding the degree to which the design 
needs to accommodate operators and maintenance personnel at a variety of training and skill levels.  This 
ConOps assumes a service-provider model, but an owner-operated model could also be considered.  The 
benefit to the farmer of the service provider model is that the farmer does not need to invest the time and 
capital upfront and, perhaps more importantly, does not need to employ skilled workers to operate the 
aerial spray equipment.  The advantages of owning the equipment are the elimination of the operator’s 
profit as a cost and (perhaps more importantly) the ability to deploy the equipment on the farmer’s own 
schedule.   
3.2.3. Summary of Scenario Differences 
Some scenarios in the ConOps will require automated equipment that is not necessary in other scenarios. 
Visual conditions and proximity to other aviation activities affect the level of automation required for the 
UAS.  In the VLOS conditions in Scenarios 1 and 2, visual observers may be sufficient for ensuring 
containment and detecting intruder aircraft or ground-based obstacles within the containment zone.  The 
limited visibility conditions in Scenarios 3 and 4 (nighttime and low visibility conditions) will require 
automated systems to ensure that the UA stays within its containment zone, to detect intruder aircraft, and 
to detect unanticipated ground-based obstacles.  Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 assume the need for an aviation 
radio to communicate with aviators and operators external to the spraying operation.  Table 1 summarizes 
differences among the four scenarios.   
 
Table 1. Primary Differences in Approach to Meeting Functional Capabilities 
Functional Capability 
Scenario 1 
Daytime Operations 
Away from other 
Aviation Activities 
Scenario 2 
Daytime Operations 
Near an Aviation 
Activity 
Scenario 3 
Nighttime 
Operations 
Scenario 4 
Operations Beyond 
Visual Line-of-sight 
Ensuring containment Visual observers Visual observers 
Automated 
containment system 
Automated 
containment system 
Detecting intruder 
aircraft 
Visual observers Visual observers 
Automated detection 
system (e.g., GBDAA) 
Automated detection 
system (e.g., GBDAA) 
Detecting ground-based 
obstacles 
Visual observers Visual observers 
Automated detection 
system (e.g., ground-
based obstacle 
detection system) 
Automated detection 
system (e.g., ground-
based obstacle 
detection system) 
External communication 
(e.g., with local airport) 
N/A Aviation Radio Aviation Radio Aviation Radio 
3.2.4. Assumptions Regarding the UAS and Precision Aerial Application Service 
Understanding the assumptions underlying the operation of a UAS is necessary to properly identify 
potential hazards and requirements necessary to mitigate them.  Listed below are the key assumptions 
about the aerial application operation and the unmanned rotorcraft for this ConOps.  These assumptions 
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are derived directly from the information in Section 3.1 and represent key airworthiness-related 
requirements.   
1. The UA will have no people on board. 
2. The UA will be capable of safe takeoff, flight and landing in the designated operational environment, 
including the ability to operate in the relevant elevations, winds, wind gusts, and temperatures.  
Operations will not be conducted during high winds, thunderstorms, or icing conditions. 
3. Operations will be conducted in rural, agricultural areas.  However, these areas might be near some 
human presence (e.g., farmhouse or field in which people are working) or other aviation activities. 
4. Chemicals will be applied only to designated areas within the field.  The probability of unintended 
application of chemicals on any other agricultural field, or stream, roadway, or populated parcel of 
land will be minimized.  
5. The UA will be a rotorcraft with weight and operating characteristics that would preclude operation 
under forthcoming FAA small UAS rules [2]. 
6. The UA will have only one pilot in command and the pilot in command will only be responsible for 
one UA during a flight. The pilot is required to participate in the management of the flight using the 
GCS. Autonomous operations, defined here as where pilot intervention is not allowed in the 
management of the flight [21], are not permitted. 
7. The UA will navigate automatically to the areas designated for spot treatment. The UA will follow a 
flight plan based on the prescription map.  Direct stick-to-servo control (comparable to a model 
aircraft) is not required in any mode of operation (e.g., nominal, emergency, etc.). 
8. The UA will typically operate a few feet over the crops.  Maximum altitude is set at 400 feet above 
ground level, sufficient to avoid ground-based obstacles (e.g., stand of trees). 
9. The UA will operate only within a predefined, bounded area or containment zone over the fields to be 
sprayed.  The UA will not be required or permitted to operate at airports or in corridors between a 
base location and the application area. 
10. The containment zone will be cleared of people prior to operation and monitored to ensure that no one 
enters during the operation. 
11. The UA crashing (commonly referred to as hull loss) within the containment zone is not considered a 
safety concern except in instances where energetic departure of any parts, pieces, or chemicals could 
harm people or property outside of the containment zone.  
12. Operations will be conducted initially in daylight with good visibility conditions. With increasing 
experience and maturation of the activity and appropriate equipage, operations may be extended to 
night and in limited visibility conditions. 
13. Operations will be conducted only within RLOS.  The edges of the containment zone must be within 
RLOS of the GCS.  
14. A means of detecting and avoiding other aircraft, permanent obstacles (e.g., silos or sheds), and other 
obstacles, animals or persons on the ground (e.g., livestock and farm equipment) in all operational 
conditions will be needed.  
15. Communication and notification about the aerial application operation will be provided as needed 
when operations are conducted in the vicinity of an aeronautical activity (e.g., glider port, aerial 
applicator field, etc.).     
16. Operations will not occur in Class A.  Operations will not occur in Class B or C airspace, without an 
airspace specific approval.  
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4. Approach  
Airworthiness standards for new or novel CPA (e.g., a tilt-rotor aircraft) are typically derived from 
applicable parts of existing standards (e.g., FAR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, and 33) with any additional 
requirements for unique features crafted as special conditions.  The standards focus on the aircraft 
systems and equipment, with minimal consideration of the operational context.  Operational limitations, if 
any, are typically associated with operational conditions such as icing and oceanic operations.  For a 
UAS, however, considering the concept of operations (ConOps) and associated operational limitations 
was unavoidable from the start. The operational context strongly influences the severity of the 
consequence of failure of the UAS, especially for short range operations such as those associated with 
agriculture. 
There were three major tasks involved in investigating airworthiness requirements for the specimen 
unmanned aerial applicator, following the development of the ConOps.  Figure 4 shows those tasks, the 
products produced by each, and how these products relate to the content of the mock type certification 
basis.  Each task is explained in the following subsections. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of Research Approach 
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4.1. Task 1: Identifying Hazards  
The approach to developing content for the mock type certification basis taken here is hazard-based; that 
is, the requirements in the certification basis are largely determined by the hazards and associated risks 
that need to be managed. Hazard and risk assessment processes are, by their nature, subjective.  
Alternative hazard and risk assessment techniques exist, and the discovery of new hazards or safety 
insights could alter the proposed certification basis.  
Identifying hazards associated with the unmanned aerial applicator and its operation is fundamental to the 
approach used here.  The first task was to identify hazards that could cause harm to people or property.  
These include UAS-specific hazards associated with the failure of aircraft functions and operational 
hazards associated with the mission and crew.  Traditional aircraft hazards such as loss of control and loss 
of navigation were considered. New hazards related to the ConOps, such as loss of containment (i.e., 
exceeding the virtual boundary for the operation) were also considered.     
To the extent possible, conventional system safety processes and tools from the civil aircraft domain were 
used to identify hazards for the unmanned aerial applicator.  Guidance for operational safety assessment 
from RTCA DO-264 [22] was used to help identify and classify operational hazards based on the 
ConOps. DO-264 was written to support the use of data communication services such as data link, but its 
guidelines are fitting for UAS operational safety. The standard can be tailored for UAS requirements in a 
straightforward manner.  Guidance on functional hazard assessment from SAE ARP 4761 [23] was used 
to help identify failure conditions and functional hazards specific to the UAS.  ARP 4761 describes 
various assessment and analysis methods (e.g., functional hazard assessment, preliminary system safety 
assessment, and fault trees) useful for understanding and managing risks on a new aircraft program.  
These methods allow an aircraft developer to systematically examine the aircraft’s functions, classify 
proposed failure conditions according to their severity, and suggest ways to mitigate expected hazards.   
Traditional hazard categories (catastrophic, hazardous, major, minor, and no effect) are defined in FAA 
Advisory Circulars for different aircraft categories (e.g., FAA Advisory Circular 23.1309-1E for general 
aviation aircraft [24]).  Because loss of life is a realistic expectation with loss of a CPA, hull loss is 
directly tied to the definition for catastrophic hazards. For UAS, a hull loss event is not necessarily 
catastrophic.  Depending on the operational context, hull loss of a UAS may not present a safety risk to 
life at all. Consequently, the severity definitions were tailored for use in this study, as shown in Table 3.     
The severity definitions in Table 3 are similar to those recently offered by JARUS [25] and EASA [26], 
but emphasize the safety role of the pilot and crew and replace emphasis on hull loss with language 
specific to safety margins.  Per these definitions, hull loss without consequence to people would not be 
considered a loss or reduction of safety margin. Hull loss would be a loss of safety margin in operational 
environments where fatality is possible. Any event that would incapacitate the crew to the extent that they 
could not perform an assigned safety role, such as issuing a command for a contingency maneuver, would 
also be considered catastrophic.   
The goal of the hazard assessment for this research was not a definitive assessment of severity for each 
hazard associated with the UAS, but a broader evaluation of whether the potential consequences of a 
hazard necessitate a design or performance standard comparable to those in Part 27.  Only those hazards 
whose consequence was considered major or worse (hazardous or catastrophic) were included on a list of 
hazards that should be mitigated by requirements in a certification basis for an unmanned aerial 
applicator.  Those hazards and the rationale for them (based on the severity of their consequence) are 
shown in Table 4.   
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Table 2. Proposed Definitions of Hazards Categories for UAS 
Catastrophic: Failure conditions that are expected to result in:  
1. fatality or fatal injury to any person; 
2. complete loss of safety margins (e.g., hull loss for a manned aircraft or fly away6 for an unmanned aircraft); 
or  
3. complete loss of the UAS crew’s ability to perform their safety role (e.g., from incapacitation).   
Hazardous: Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope 
with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be the following: 
1. serious injury to any person;  
2. a large reduction in safety margins (e.g., loss of separation) or functional capabilities; or 
3. serious impairment of the crew’s ability to perform their safety role (e.g., failure inducing a high workload). 
Major: Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the crew’s ability to cope with 
adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be: 
1. physical distress, possibly including injuries, to any person; 
2. a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; or 
3. a significant impairment of the crew’s ability to perform their safety role (e.g., failure inducing a significant 
workload). 
Minor: Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce aircraft safety and involve crew actions that are 
within their capabilities.  Minor failure conditions may include:  
1. discomfort to any person; 
2. a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; 
3. a slight reduction in the crew’s ability to perform their safety role (e.g., minor distraction or use of emergency 
procedures). 
No Safety Effect: Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety (that is, failure conditions that would not 
affect the operational capability of the aircraft or impact the crew’s ability to perform their safety role). 
 
Because hull loss is not catastrophic under the ConOps, a number of traditional CPA hazards, such as loss 
or degradation of thrust or inadequate fuel, are not considered primary hazards.  Hazards relevant to 
security (such as failure to prevent unauthorized access to command/control link), or crew (such as failure 
to verify communication between UAS crew and pilot), were considered beyond the scope of 
airworthiness requirements. The list of hazards and hazard severity definitions strongly influence the 
design and performance criteria specified in the mock type certification basis, but are not explicitly 
included in it, as per Figure 4. 
  
                                                     
6 The term “fly away” is used in this report to mean “an interruption or loss of the control link, or when the pilot is unable to 
effect control of the aircraft and, as a result, the UA is not operating in a predicable or planned manner” [27].  A fly away event 
typically involves a UA that leaves its designated operational boundaries. 
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Table 3. Primary Hazards for the Unmanned Precision Agriculture Operations 
Hazard Rationale (for why it should be addressed by regulation) 
1. Loss of C2 link used for contingency 
management (e.g., flight termination command 
issued from the ground control station) 
Potential for large loss of functional capability and reduction in safety margin. 
For example, the pilot will not be able to issue a flight termination command if 
needed.  
2. Loss of or degraded electrical power in the 
ground control station for contingency and 
emergency functions 
Potential for large loss of functional capability and reduction in safety margin. 
For example, the pilot will not be able to issue a flight termination command if 
needed.   
3. Loss of or degraded electrical power 
subsystems on UA for contingency and 
emergency functions 
Potential for large loss of functional capability and reduction in safety margin. 
For example, a command for flight termination, if needed, may not be executed 
on the UA.  
4. Loss or degradation of ground control 
station capability (e.g., loss of displays) 
required for  contingency and emergency 
functions 
Potential for large loss of functional capability and reduction in safety margin. 
For example, the pilot will not be able to issue a flight termination command if 
needed.  
5. Loss of UAS position and anti-collision 
lights (loss of means to be seen by other 
aircraft and observers) 
Potential for large or complete loss of functional capability affecting safety. 
For example, other aircraft may not see and hence, avoid the UA, and the crew 
may not be able to track the UA. Lighting is not relevant for daytime, VLOS 
operations. 
6. Loss of or inadequate structural integrity, 
especially of the rotor system 
Potential for fatality or fatal injury from high energy parts exiting the 
containment zone. 
7. Loss of or degraded communication 
between pilot and crew 
Potential for significant loss of functional capability and safety margin. For 
example, observers cannot communicate effectively or promptly with the pilot 
in cases where they need to provide safety alerts (about obstacles, incoming 
aircraft, or breach of boundary, etc.) in VLOS operations. 
8. Failure to detect, alert or warn, and avoid 
intruder aircraft 
Potential for complete loss of safety margin, leading to fatality or fatal injury.  
This includes observers failing to detect and warn about intruder aircraft, pilots 
failing to act to avoid the aircraft, or failure of an automated system to do so. 
9. Failure to detect, alert or warn, and avoid 
dynamic or other obstacles on the ground 
Potential for complete reduction in safety margin, leading to fatality or fatal 
injury.  For example, crew may fail to detect a person or unplanned obstacle 
such as a tractor that may enter field in VLOS operations, or supporting 
onboard instrumentation may fail to detect and avoid obstacles. 
10. Failure to recognize and avoid adverse 
environmental conditions (e.g., low visibility 
or high winds) beyond operational limits 
Potential for large or complete reduction in safety margin.  For example, crew 
may be unable to see the UA, intruder aircraft, or ground-based obstacles in 
poor visibility conditions and act as needed to avoid collisions.  
11. Failure or degradation of the flight 
containment function 
Potential for complete reduction in safety margin. For example, observers may 
fail to detect and notify pilot of impending violation of the containment 
boundary in VLOS operations or an automated system may fail to detect and 
avoid breach of the containment boundary. 
12. Loss of situational awareness by the pilot  Potential for large or complete loss of safety margin.  For example, without 
appropriate situational awareness, the pilot may not act when needed, or may 
take an inappropriate action.  Loss of situational awareness may be due to 
inadequate or misleading flight data.   
13. Interference of spray system  with required 
UAS function 
Potential for large or complete loss of functional capability or safety margin, 
on the UA or ground control station. For example, the spray system may affect 
the UA’s aerodynamics and controllability. 
14. Explosion in the powerplant or fuel system Potential for fatality or fatal injury from high energy parts exiting the 
containment zone. 
15. Failure to maintain adequate 
controllability, maneuverability, and stability 
Potential for a significant loss of functional capability and safety margin, 
especially when operating near the edge of the containment volume.  For 
example, loss of controllability may affect the UAs ability to stay within the 
containment boundary.   
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4.2. Task 2: Evaluating Applicability of Part 27  
The second task was to specify reasonable design and performance criteria for the unmanned aerial 
applicator.  The Part 27 standards for normal category rotorcraft and the UAS-tailored version from 
JARUS provided a practical starting point.  Ideally, those standards mitigate airworthiness hazards for 
rotorcraft that are similar in many respects to the specimen unmanned rotorcraft.  The need to prevent hull 
loss, however, is a significant difference.  For this task, each paragraph in Part 27 was evaluated for 
applicability to the unmanned aerial applicator, with respect to the hazards in Table 4.  That effort 
identified Part 27 regulations that apply “as is” to mitigate the primary hazards, those that apply with 
some simple modifications, and those that may not be applicable at all. As shown in Figure 4, the 
paragraphs accepted “as is” and those that were modified constitute the main set of requirements in the 
mock type certification basis for the unmanned rotorcraft.   
Many of the Part 27 paragraphs, however, were not easy to place in one of those three categories.  In 
particular, several Part 27 requirements that address controllability, maneuverability, and stability (CMS), 
structural integrity (SI), and powerplant and supporting systems (PPS) seemed applicable to some degree, 
but not as written nor easily modified.  In some cases, the original requirement serves primarily to protect 
onboard crew and passengers, but might also protect crewmembers or others on the ground (e.g., from 
high energy debris).  In other cases, the original requirement contains details very specific to normal 
category rotorcraft (e.g., limit load factors) that could not be easily modified without subject matter 
expertise and UAS-specific data.  To address these issues, the relevant content from Part 27 requirements 
for CMS, SI, and PPS was generalized or “rolled up” into broad sets of requirements that focus on 
preservation of the rotor system to prevent harm from release of high energy debris and explosion.  Each 
“roll-up” (CMS, SI, and PPS) allows all of the requirements on a topic to be considered in a holistic way 
in the context of the details of the design.  The roll-up process resulted in three new technology issue 
papers included in the mock certification basis.  Each Part 27 requirement included in one of those issue 
papers is explicitly enumerated in the corresponding issue paper.  Requirements may appear in multiple 
new information issue papers. 
Table 5 shows the disposition of the Part 27 regulations.   
 
Table 4. Disposition of Part 27 Regulations for the Mock Type Certification Basis 
Part 27 Included as 
Written 
Included with 
Simple 
Modifications 
Rolled Up Excluded 
Subpart A:  General 0 0 0 2 
Subpart B:  Flight 1 1 14 11 
Subpart C:  Strength Requirements 0 2 10 25 
Subpart D:   Design and Construction 2 8 20 32 
Subpart E:   Powerplant 4 7 24 23 
Subpart F:   Equipment 1 22 1 16 
Subpart G:   Operating Limitations and Information 1 13 5 8 
Appendix A:  Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 2 2 0 0 
Appendix B:   Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter 
 Instrument Flight 
0 0 0 1 
Appendix C: Criteria for Category A 0 0 0 1 
Appendix D:   HIRF Environments and Equipment HIRF 
 Test Levels  
0 1 0 0 
TOTAL 11 56 74 119 
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Altogether, of the 260 regulations contained in Part 27, only 11 are included as written in the certification 
basis: 119 regulations from Part 27 are outright excluded.  Of the residual 130 regulations, 56 have had 
their text modified for inclusion in the certification basis, while the remaining 74 have had their intent 
abstracted into the three special issue papers for CMS, SI, and PPS.  Thus, less than 5% of Part 27 was 
deemed applicable verbatim to the derived mock certification basis, with only an additional 22% suitable 
for textual modification.   
The evaluation process is subjective by nature. As part of the evaluation process, rationale was 
documented for the disposition of each Part 27 paragraph.  The rationale attempts to capture the reasoning 
used to determine the applicability of each Part 27 paragraphs to the unmanned rotorcraft with its 
ConOps.  Rationale is not typically included in a type certification basis, but is provided with requests for 
exemptions.  Here, the rationale helps shed light on why a paragraph was included, modified, or rolled up, 
in addition to reasons why a paragraph was not recommended for inclusion in the certification basis.  The 
Appendix contains the rationale. 
4.3. Task 3: Generating UAS-unique Requirements  
Lastly, the primary hazard list was reviewed to identify those hazards for which there are no applicable 
requirements from Part 27.  The review identified four primary hazards that are not covered by 
paragraphs in Part 27: 
 Loss of containment (i.e., a failure causing a fly away event where the UA leaves the operational 
area) 
 Failure to detect and avoid people on the ground 
 Failure of safety-critical C2 links 
 Failure to detect and avoid other aircraft 
The first three hazards are not addressed in any of the FARs, but the last hazard is related to standards for 
aircraft operators.  FAR Part §91.113 requires an aircraft operator to use vigilance to see and avoid other 
aircraft.  Because there is no onboard operator on a UAS, some systems and equipment will be required to 
accomplish that function. Those systems and that equipment would be subject to airworthiness regulation.   
The third task involved drafting new requirements to address the containment system, systems for 
detecting and avoiding people and other aircraft, and for safety-critical datalinks.  New Information Issue 
Papers were proposed for each of those and included in the mock type certification basis.  Each of those 
issue papers explains why additional guidance is needed, provides background information explaining the 
hazard, and offers a mock regulatory position with high-level requirements aimed at mitigating the 
hazard.  Like the G-1U Issue Paper, each of the new information issue papers is intended to serve as a 
starting point for discussion.  None of the issue papers represents official FAA guidance. 
The content of the mock type certification basis is given in the next Section. 
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5. Mock Type Certification Basis  
Type certification is the foundation for most regulatory approvals related to airworthiness.  A type 
certificate is issued when the regulator determines that a product’s design complies with applicable 
regulations.  The type design of an aircraft product is the engineering definition of the product, including 
(1) drawings and specifications, (2) dimensions, materials, and processes, (3) airworthiness limitations, 
and (4) other data to describe the product design [28].  The regulating body compares design documents 
and processes to determine if the design meets requirements established for the type of equipment. For 
example, FAR Part 27 contains the standards for normal-category rotorcraft.  Once the type certificate is 
issued, the aircraft “type” is considered to meet appropriate requirements. Neither standards nor aircraft 
types have been established yet for UAS. 
The FAA recommends starting a certification program with a set of plans to foster teamwork and an 
agreement on how product certification will be conducted. This agreement sets out general 
expectations, operating norms, communications protocols, schedule, and required deliverables [29]. The 
type certification process starts when an applicant submits FAA Form 8110-12 (“Application for Type 
Certificate, Production Certificate, or Supplemental Certificate) to the FAA. A UAS certification project 
in the US would likely start in the same way.   
The FAA uses Issue Papers as a means to formally communicate with an applicant about their 
certification program.  The Issue Paper process, as described in FAA Order 8110.112 [15], provides a 
means of tracking certification requirements and issues requiring resolution throughout an aircraft 
certification process. There are several different types of issues papers.  The most germane to this study 
are the G-1 Certification Basis Issue Paper and New Information Issue Papers.  The G-1 Issue Paper 
designates the applicable airworthiness and environmental (i.e., noise, fuel venting and exhaust 
emissions) regulations that constitute a type certification basis.  New Information Issue Papers address 
new or novel technology that is not covered or covered adequately in existing regulation.   
The mock type certification basis for the unmanned aerial applicator that follows is formatted like a G-1 
Issue Paper with some minor deviations. The issue paper format was adopted because it is familiar to civil 
aircraft certification specialists and regulatory authorities.  The mock type certification basis is labeled 
“G-1U” to indicate that the subject aircraft is unmanned.  The G-1U includes a brief description of the 
concept of operations.  This is atypical of a G-1 Issue Paper, but serves to provide operational information 
pertinent to airworthiness.  Because there are no established airworthiness standards specific to UAS, the 
G-1U calls out requirements from Part 27 that apply in part or in whole to the applicant’s aircraft.  Text 
for each requirement can be found in the Appendix of this report.  New Information Issue Papers are also 
included in the G-1U.  These address the rolled-up requirements for CMS, SI, and PPS, and the UAS-
unique systems described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
For this mock certification basis, the Acme-XYZ company is the fictitious name of the applicant for the 
type certificate and developer of the specimen unmanned aerial applicator (the AgR-1).  The URA-123 is 
the fictitious name for the regulatory approval authority for the UAS.  The content of the mock type 
certification basis does not represent the official position of the FAA or any other certification authority. 
As a companion to the mock type certification basis, rationale for decisions made regarding the 
applicability of the Part 27 requirements to the AgR-1 was documented and included in the Appendix. 
The Appendix offers informal reasoning about each Part 27 requirement: why it is included in the mock 
type certification basis, why it is modified, why it is “rolled up”, or why it is excluded.  The intent, like 
the intent of the mock type certification basis, is to support debate about potential changes to existing 
regulations.   
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5.1. G-1U Issue Paper  
Project: Acme-XYZ   
 Model AgR-1  
 Project No. TBD 
 
Item: G-1U 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.17(b), Designation of Applicable Regulations  
 
Date: TBD 
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 FAA AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft [30] 
FAA, Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National 
Airspace System, Concept of Operations, v2.0 [31] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Type Certification Basis 
 
Branch Action: URA-123 UAS Certification Branch  
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
*** 
 
TYPE CERTIFICATION BASIS 
Statement of Issue 
Acme-XYZ submitted an application (FAA Form 8110-12, dated MMDDYYYY, with cover letter Acme-
XYZ-xxx-TBD) for Type Certification of the Acme AgR-1 unmanned rotorcraft. Project Number TBD has 
been assigned to the AgR-1 program. The following is the URA-123 position on the certification basis of 
the AgR-1 and those associated systems required for dispatch and aerial application operations within a 
defined volume of airspace. 
In accordance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 21 requirements, the certification basis 
for the Acme-XYZ Model AgR-1 is established within this document. The certification basis, in addition 
to the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations, may include additional Issue Papers, Special Conditions, 
Equivalent Safety Findings, Exemptions, additional design requirements associated with any unsafe 
conditions operating requirements, and proposed amendments under review by the URA-123 and industry 
groups. 
This certification basis is tightly coupled with the AgR-1’s concept of operations for aerial application 
within a defined volume of airspace. In that concept, the UA is restricted to operating within a defined 
volume of airspace, referred to herein as a containment volume. No people are allowed within the 
containment volume when the UA is in flight.  The pilot and other crew are located close to the 
containment volume, but not within it.   
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In this context, operational and functional hazards differ from those for manned aircraft.  Consequently, 
many of the certification requirements in 14 CFR Part 27 for normal category rotorcraft are inappropriate 
as written for the AgR-1 in its intended operational environment.  The requirements under this Type 
Certificate are contained in this Issue Paper, which is heavily based on Part 27. Additional issues and 
requirements, to be addressed under the Type Certificate, have been identified in supplemental issue 
papers for novel or unusual systems. 
Background 
Acme-XYZ has provided the following description of its unmanned aircraft system and its concept of 
operations. 
The AgR-1, depicted below, is an unmanned rotorcraft with the following configuration and characteristics.  
 Tandem rotors 
 Single turbine powerplant 
 Physical envelope of 21 feet by 13 feet by 5.5 feet   
 Maximum gross takeoff weight of approximately 1000 pounds (including max payload weight) 
 Maximum endurance of 5 hours with no payload, 2.4 hours with 430-pound (maximum) payload 
 Maximum airspeed of 100 knots 
 Highly automated primary systems, including operator's ground control station 
 
 
 
The concept of operations for the AgR-1 is for precision aerial application of chemicals to treat crops.  
The following operational characteristics are relevant to this type certification. 
 The rotorcraft will operate only within a pre-defined containment volume.  
 Operations will be conducted over farmland in rural, sparsely populated areas.  
 The typical operational area will be ½ mile by ½ mile.  
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 Operations will typically be conducted only a few feet over crop height.  Operation at more than 400 
ft above ground level is prohibited. 
 Operations will occur under visibility conditions including daytime, nighttime, and reduced visibility, 
both within and beyond visual line-of-sight. 
 Inner loop control and normal outer loop control is provided by onboard automated systems. The 
remote pilot has final authority and responsibility for operation and safety of flight and can override 
outer loop control provided by the autopilot. 
 Operations will recognize that other aircraft and people may enter the containment volume.   
Certification schedule 
Month Year [ed. note: nominally, application date + three years] 
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
As the applicant, Acme-XYZ is responsible for meeting all regulatory requirements contained in this 
Issue paper.   
Applicable FARs 
The following list includes those regulations from Part 27, by number and title, that apply to the Acme 
AgR-1.  Some of those regulations have been modified as noted 7 to address unique aspects of the AgR-1 
with respect to its intended operation.     
 
Subpart B—Flight 
 General  
  §27.21    Proof of compliance -modified 
  §27.241 Ground resonance 
 
Subpart C—Strength Requirements 
 Control Surface and System Loads 
  §27.411 Ground clearance: tail rotor guard -modified 
  §27.427 Unsymmetrical loads -modified 
 
Subpart D—Design and Construction 
 General 
  §27.601 Design -modified 
  §27.602  Critical Parts -modified 
  §27.603  Materials 
  §27.609 Protection of structure -modified 
  §27.610 Lightning and static electricity protection -modified 
  §27.611    Inspection provisions -modified  
  §27.629    Flutter  
 Control Systems 
  §27.691    Autorotation control mechanism -modified 
 Fire Protection 
  §27.861    Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts -modified 
  §27.863    Flammable fluid fire protection -modified 
 
                                                     
7 The wording of proposed modifications to the requirements would be included in a type certification basis.  To avoid 
replication in this document, the text and modifications are shown in the Appendix. 
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Subpart E—Powerplant 
 General 
  §27.903 Engines -modified  
  §27.907  Engine vibration -modified 
 Rotor Drive System 
  §27.917   Design -modified 
  §27.921 Rotor brake 
  §27.931 Shafting critical speed 
  §27.935    Shafting joints 
  §27.939    Turbine engine operating characteristics -modified 
 Fuel System 
  §27.969    Fuel tank expansion space 
  §27.973    Fuel tank filler connection -modified 
  §27.975    Fuel tank vents -modified 
 Oil System 
  §27.1027 Transmission and gearboxes -modified 
 
Subpart F—Equipment 
 General 
  §27.1301    Function and installation -modified 
  §27.1303    Flight and navigation instruments -modified 
  §27.1305 Powerplant limitations -modified 
  §27.1307   Miscellaneous equipment -modified 
  §27.1309   Equipment, systems, and installations -modified 
  §27.1317    High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection -modified 
 Instruments: Installation   
  §27.1321    Arrangement and visibility -modified  
  §27.1322    Warning, caution, and advisory lights -modified  
  §27.1325    Static pressure systems -modified  
  §27.1329    Automatic pilot system -modified  
 Electrical Systems and Equipment 
  §27.1351    General -modified  
  §27.1353 Storage battery design and installation -modified 
  §27.1357  Circuit protective devices -modified 
  §27.1361  Master switch -modified 
  §27.1365    Electric cables -modified  
  §27.1367   Switches -modified 
 Lights  
  §27.1381    Instrument lights -modified  
  §27.1383    Landing lights -modified  
  §27.1397    Color specifications  
  §27.1401    Anticollision light system -modified  
 Safety Equipment 
  §27.1411 General -modified 
  §27.1459    Flight data recorders -modified 
  §27.1461    Equipment containing high energy rotors -modified 
 
Subpart G—Operating Limitations and Information 
  §27.1501    General -modified 
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Operating Limitations 
  §27.1523    Minimum flight crew -modified 
  §27.1525    Kinds of operations -modified 
  §27.1527    Maximum operating altitude -modified 
  §27.1529    Instructions for Continued Airworthiness - modified 
 Markings and Placards 
  §27.1541    General –modified 
  §27.1555    Control markings -modified 
  §27.1557    Miscellaneous markings and placards -modified 
  §27.1559 Limitations placard -modified 
  §27.1561 Safety equipment -modified 
  §27.1565    Tail rotor 
 Rotorcraft Flight Manual and Approved Manual Material 
  §27.1581    General -modified 
  §27.1583    Operating limitations -modified 
  §27.1585    Operating procedures -modified 
 
Appendix A—Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
 A§27.1    General -modified 
 A§27.2    Format 
 A§27.3    Content -modified 
 A§27.4    Airworthiness Limitations section 
 
Appendix D—HIRF Environments and Equipment HIRF Test Levels -modified 
 
Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Powered Aircraft [reworked Part 34, 
through Amendment TBD, as appropriate] 
Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification [reworked Part 36, through Amendment 
TBD, as appropriate (see also Title 49, USC, Section 44715, “Noise Control Act of 1972”)] 
 
Issue Papers 
The following issue papers apply to the AgR-1 type certification: 
 Issue Paper U-1 Controllability, Maneuverability, and Stability 
 Issue Paper U-2 Structural Integrity 
 Issue Paper U-3 Powerplant and Supporting Systems 
 Issue Paper U-4 Containment 
 Issue Paper U-5 Detect and Avoid Intruder Aircraft 
 Issue Paper U-6 Detect and Avoid Persons and Objects within the Containment Area 
 Issue Paper U-7 Safety-critical Command and Control Datalinks 
 
Special Conditions 
Special Conditions will be issued as appropriate in accordance with 14 CFR Part 21, Section 21.16.  
 
Equivalent Safety Findings 
Equivalent Safety Findings (ESFs) will be administered in accordance with 14 CFR Part 21, Section 21.21. 
The URA-123 expects Acme-XYZ to submit a request and justification for each proposed ESF after more 
detailed design discussions with the URA-123 have taken place. If ESFs are submitted, the URA-123 will 
generate subsequent Issue Papers documenting agency findings. 
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Exemptions 
Acme-XYZ may petition the URA-123 to grant relief from current regulatory requirements. Petitions are 
to be submitted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 11, Sections 11.61 through 11.101. 
Voluntary regulatory compliance 
Acme-XYZ may request that additional or optional design requirements be included in the AgR-1 
certification basis. 
Additional Design Requirements and Conditions 
Compliance with the established basis for Type Certification notwithstanding, 14 CFR 21.21(b)(2) 
precludes issuance of Type Certificate if any feature or characteristic of the product would make the 
product unsafe. Should the URA-123 determine that such an unsafe feature or characteristic exists, 
approval of the Type Certificate will be withheld pending acceptable corrective action by the applicant. 
Unsafe features or characteristics will be identified and resolved using Issue Papers. The requirements or 
conditions used to address unsafe features will be identified in the Type Certificate Data Sheet in a section 
immediately following specification of the certification basis. 
Operating Certificate Requirements 
From time to time, amendments to the operating rules of 14 CFR can specify retroactive compliance under 
the relevant airworthiness requirements. Compliance with such amendments is mandatory for operation 
under the applicable operating rules. If not already included in the above certification basis, any such 
applicable airworthiness requirement may be added to the Type Certification Basis of the AgR-1 by 
mutual agreement between Acme-XYZ and the URA-123. The applicant should note, however, that 
compliance with any such retroactive mandate can affect the AgR-1 operator regardless of the contents of 
this G-1U Issue Paper. 
Changes to the certification basis 
It is the URA-123's intent to define the AgR-1 certification basis by closing this G-1U Issue Paper early in 
the certification program. Any changes to the certification basis due to addition of new Special 
Conditions, Equivalent Safety Findings, Exemptions, or additional design requirements will be 
coordinated with Acme-XYZ by Issue Paper and added to the G-1U Issue Paper before issuance of the 
Type Certificate. The final certification basis will be summarized in the conclusion of this Issue Paper. 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD 
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5.1.1.  U-1 Issue Paper: Controllability, Maneuverability, and Stability 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-1  
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.17(b), Designation of Applicable Regulations  
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 FAA AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft [30] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Controllability, Maneuverability, and Stability 
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch 
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue   
Existing certification requirements in 14 CFR Part 27 for controllability, maneuverability, and stability 
(CMS) of a rotorcraft are inappropriate as written for the AgR-1 in its intended operational environment.  
Modifications to Part 27 are necessary to ensure the requirements related to CMS are appropriate for the 
AgR-1 and its operation under this Type Certificate. 
Background 
Part 27 is concerned with protection of flight crew and passengers.  Conventional airworthiness 
requirements generally relate to such protection, though many requirements relate to protection indirectly.  
For example, traditional focus on vehicle damage and hull loss is invariably a proxy for underlying 
concern with the safety of all occupants aboard an aircraft.  The hazards associated with operation of an 
unmanned aerial applicator, however, differ greatly from those addressed by Part 27.  In particular, the 
possibility of injury to or death of bystanders from high-energy debris becomes a key concern.   
Several failure conditions can result in high-energy debris.  This Issue Paper addresses one family of 
those conditions: inadequate controllability and maneuverability of the UA in circumstances that can lead 
to rotor, hub, or drive system damage and subsequent release of high-energy debris (e.g., rotor blades) 
near humans. 
The Type Design must incorporate provisions, design features, and characteristics that reduce to 
acceptable levels the risks associated with, for example, (a) loss of control during takeoff, leading to 
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vehicle rollover and destruction of the main rotors near ground personnel, or (b) loss of control during 
hover near the containment boundary, leading to uncontrolled descent into terrain near UAS observers or 
even unrelated bystanders outside the containment zone. 
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
As the applicant, Acme-XYZ is responsible for meeting all regulatory requirements, both existing 
requirements and those requirements unique to AgR-1 Type Certification, as agreed to between the URA-
123 and the applicant.  Acme-XYZ must address the concerns expressed in this Issue Paper as they 
pertain to the specified vehicle characteristics. 
The applicant must meet the regulatory intent of requirements related to controllability, stability, 
maneuverability, and control system design and installation, notably those requirements embodied in 14 
CFR Part 27, Subparts B and C indicated in Notes 1 and 2.  The URA-123 recognizes that tradeoffs exist 
between operational mitigations and traditional handling of functional capabilities, integrity, and design 
assurance, and that improvements in one area can compensate for deficiencies in the other.  The URA-123 
encourages the applicant to clarify and to make explicit such tradeoffs in its proposed type design. 
The applicant must: 
(a) establish controllability and maneuverability design margins that prevent (i) contact of the vehicle 
rotors with the ground, other parts of the vehicle structure, or obstacles in normal and non-normal 
operations and (ii)  any other condition that could compromise rotor system integrity.  The applicant must 
demonstrate that the proposed control system design and installation meets or exceeds these requirements. 
Considerations include but are not limited to the following: 
 critical values of design parameters including weight, center of gravity, rotor speed, speed, density 
altitude, and height-speed envelope, 
 normal operations such as takeoff, landing, and spraying and critical values of operational parameters 
such as winds, slopes, etc. for which operational approval is sought, and  
 non-normal operations such as autorotation and contingency maneuvers. 
Note 1:  The following requirements from Part 27 are relevant to (a):  §27.25, §27.27, §27.33, §27.51, §27.75, 
§27.87, §27.141, §27.143, §27.151, §27.173, §27.175, §27.177, §27.231, §27.321, §27.337, §27.672, §27.1151(a) 
only, §27.1519, §27.1583, §27.1587, and §27.1589. 
(b) ensure that flight control commands from all sources (stability augmentation system, autopilot, GCS, 
etc.) are passed to the appropriate flight control surfaces without hazardous flexure, slop, friction, 
jamming, interference or other hazards that would lead to loss of rotor system integrity. This requirement 
must cover all normal and non-normal operational conditions that may reasonably be expected in service. 
This requirement includes the electrical and mechanical aspects of the control system, and includes 
control of engines, rotor brakes, and other elements of the design that involve automated or remote 
operation of the vehicle controls. 
Note 2:  The following requirements from Part 27 are relevant to (b):  §27.307, §27.309, §27.391, §27.395, §27.605, 
§27.607, §27.621, §27.623, §27.625, §27.671, §27.675, §27.679, §27.681, §27.683, §27.685, §27.687, and §27.695. 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1): 
TBD  
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5.1.2. U-2 Issue Paper: Structural Integrity 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-2  
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.17(b), Designation of Applicable Regulations  
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 FAA AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft [30] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Structural Integrity  
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch  
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue   
Existing certification requirements in 14 CFR Part 27 for structural integrity of rotor and hub assemblies, 
supporting structure, and drive systems are inappropriate as written for the AgR-1 in its intended 
operational environment.  Modifications to relevant paragraphs of Part 27 are necessary to ensure the 
requirements related to structural integrity are appropriate for the AgR-1 rotor, hub, and drive systems. 
Background 
Part 27 is concerned with protection of flight crew and passengers.  Conventional airworthiness 
requirements generally relate to such protection, though many requirements relate to protection indirectly.  
For example, traditional focus on vehicle damage and hull loss is invariably a proxy for underlying 
concern with the safety of all occupants aboard an aircraft. 
The hazards associated with operation of an unmanned aerial applicator, however, differ in many respects 
from those addressed by Part 27.  In particular, the possibility of injury to or death of crew or bystanders 
from high-energy debris becomes a key concern.   
Several failure conditions can result in high-energy debris.  This Issue Paper addresses one family of 
those conditions: inadequate structural integrity of the UA’s rotor system in circumstances that can lead to 
rotor, hub, or drive system failure and subsequent release of high-energy debris near humans. 
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URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
As the applicant, Acme-XYZ is responsible for meeting all regulatory requirements, both existing 
requirements and those requirements unique to AgR-1 Type Certification, as agreed to between the URA-
123 and the applicant.  Acme-XYZ must address the concerns expressed in this Issue Paper as they 
pertain to the specified vehicle characteristics. 
The applicant must meet the regulatory intent of structural requirements, notably those requirements 
embodied in 14 CFR Part 27, Subpart C (see Note).  The URA-123 recognizes that tradeoffs exist 
between operational mitigations and traditional structural requirements, and that improvements in one 
area can compensate for deficiencies in the other.  The URA-123 encourages the applicant to clarify and 
to make explicit such tradeoffs, if included, in its proposed type design. 
The Type Design must incorporate provisions, design features, and characteristics that provide acceptable 
levels of protection against rotor, hub, and drive system failures.   
The applicant must establish design margins and limitations of the structure of the rotor, hub, and drive 
systems to prevent loss of rotor system integrity (including primary load paths affecting the rotor system).  
The design margins and limitations should cover all conditions likely to be encountered in normal and 
non-normal operations.  Considerations include but are not limited to static analysis, dynamic analysis, 
and fatigue analysis and testing at critical conditions of weight, center of gravity, engine/rotor speed, 
engine/rotor torque, ground resonance, and sudden stoppage of rotor and hub assemblies due to internal 
failure or seizure of internal components. 
Note:  The following requirements are relevant: §27.25, §27.27, §27.33, §27.51, §27.75, §27.141, §27.251, §27.307, 
§27.309, §27.321, §27.337, §27.391, §27.547, §27.549, §27.571, §27.605, 27.607, §27.621, §27.623, §27.625, 
§27.653, §27.659, §27.661, §27.663, §27.681, §27.1151 (a only), §27.1193, §27.1509, and §27.1583. 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD  
 
 
 36 
5.1.3. U-3 Issue Paper: Powerplant and Supporting Systems 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-3 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.17(b), Designation of Applicable Regulations  
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 FAA AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft [30] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Powerplant and Supporting Systems 
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch 
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue 
Existing certification requirements in 14 CFR Part 27 for the powerplant and supporting systems (e.g., 
fuel, oil, cooling, exhaust, and induction systems) of a rotorcraft are overly prescriptive for the AgR-1 in 
its intended operational environment.  Modifications to Part 27 are necessary to ensure the requirements 
related to the powerplant and supporting systems are appropriate for the AgR-1 under this Type 
Certificate. 
Background 
Part 27 requires high levels of powerplant reliability in order to protect occupants of the rotorcraft.  By 
contrast, hull loss of an AgR-1 operating in accordance with approved operations has no safety effect.  
Thus, correspondingly lower reliability of the powerplant and its associated systems and the absence of an 
autorotation capability are generally acceptable under this type certificate.  As such, many of the Part 27 
requirements for the powerplant and supporting systems are not applicable to the AgR-1. 
Lower levels of powerplant reliability, however, could expose the ground crew or the general public to 
harm. For example, flying debris might escape the containment area if a powerplant failure or seizure 
causes loss of rotor system integrity near a containment boundary. 14 CFR §27.917 requires the 
incorporation of a unit (e.g., a clutch) to automatically disengage the engine from the main and auxiliary 
rotors if the engine fails. The purpose of this requirement is to protect the rotor drive system, which 
includes any part necessary to transmit power from the engine to the rotor hubs including “gear boxes, 
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shafting, universal joints, couplings, rotor brake assemblies, clutches, supporting bearings for shafting, 
attendant accessory pads or drives, and any cooling fans that are part of, or attached to, or mounted on the 
rotor drive system.”  This Issue Paper assumes the inclusion of this requirement in the Type Certification 
Basis for the AgR-1, and addresses additional requirements on the powerplant and supporting systems 
necessary to preserve rotor system integrity. 
URA-123 Position (Stage 1): 
As the applicant, Acme-XYZ is responsible for meeting all regulatory requirements, both existing 
requirements and those requirements unique to AgR-1 Type Certification, as agreed to between the URA-
123 and the applicant.  Acme-XYZ must also address the concerns expressed in this Issue Paper as they 
pertain to the specified vehicle characteristics. 
The Type Certification Basis for the AgR-1 must include 14 CFR §27.917 requiring a device that 
prevents engine failure or seizure from adversely affecting rotor system integrity.  The applicant must also 
meet the regulatory intent of powerplant and supporting systems requirements, notably those 
requirements embodied in 14 CFR Part 27, Subpart E (see Note).  The URA-123 recognizes that tradeoffs 
exist between operational mitigations and traditional handling of functional capabilities, integrity, and 
design assurance, and that improvements in one area can compensate for deficiencies in the other.  The 
URA-123 encourages the applicant to clarify and to make explicit such tradeoffs in its proposed type 
design. 
For the rotorcraft powerplant, powerplant installation, and associated systems (e.g., fuel, oil, ventilation, 
exhaust, and air induction systems), including relevant elements of the ground support equipment, the 
applicant: 
(a)  must provide adequate protection to the ground crew during servicing and inspection of the rotorcraft 
for preflight, postflight, and thru-flight servicing,   
(b) may include credit for ground crew safety equipment, training, and operational procedures, and 
(c)  may not include credit for ground-based protective barriers that only protect the crew. 
Note:  The following requirements are relevant:  §27.963, §27.993, §27.995, §27.1121, §27.1183, §27.1185, 
§27.1187, §27.1189, §27.1191, §27.1193, §27.1521, and §27.1583.  
 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1): 
TBD  
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5.1.4. U-4 Issue Paper: Containment 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-4 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.16, Special Conditions  
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Containment  
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch 
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue 
The concept of operations for the Acme AgR-1 is based on the provision of a geospatial containment 
function to confine operations to a defined volume of airspace.  Geospatial containment systems are not 
addressed by existing regulation.  New requirements are needed. 
Background 
The applicant has proposed a high-confidence geospatial containment function (that is, a means of 
ensuring that UA operations are confined within defined geospatial boundaries) to address hazards to 
other airspace users and people on the ground, especially in a loss of control event.  For manned aircraft, 
highly reliable systems, equipment, and crew are relied upon to mitigate those hazards.  Avionics systems 
for many unmanned aircraft do not meet the same levels of reliability or integrity.  Consequently, 
alternative approaches to hazard mitigation might be needed to provide an acceptable level of safety.  
When combined with systems and procedures for ensuring that the containment volume remains clear of 
all persons, this approach is expected to provide sufficient mitigation of catastrophic hazards. 
Availability and integrity requirements for normal category rotorcraft systems and equipment are 
specified in 14 CFR §27.1309.  Paragraphs (a) and (c) of this regulation state: “(a) The equipment, 
systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter must be designed and installed 
to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition” and “(c) 
The equipment, systems, and installations of single-engine rotorcraft must be designed to minimize 
hazards to the rotorcraft in the event of a probable malfunction or failure.” 
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Commercially available avionics systems that satisfy those requirements do not typically meet the size, 
weight, volume, and power limitations of the AgR-1 design. Consequently, the reliability level of systems 
and equipment on board the AgR-1 might not be sufficient to mitigate hazards, especially those associated 
with a fly-away event, without the addition and proper functioning of an independent, high-confidence 
containment system.   
The following definitions relevant to containment apply: 
 The containment area is a geographic area over which all UAS flight operations will be conducted. 
 The containment boundary is a virtual surface defined around the containment area.  The containment 
boundary is defined by the horizontal dimensions of the containment area and by a vertical height.  
Depending on system implementation, this boundary could be a simple geometric shape (e.g., 
cylinder or dome) or a complex multipoint closed surface. 
 The containment volume is the volume of airspace enclosed by the boundary. 
 The containment system is some combination of people, systems, and equipment used to confine the 
operation of a UA to a defined geospatial area. 
Geofencing is a proposed means of confining the operation of a UAS to a defined area.  Geofences are 
primarily implemented via software and the UA’s autopilot, using the same sensors, actuators and 
processor as the vehicle’s primary autopilot/control system. Such geofences generally suffer from 
multiple single points of failure, including the autopilot and global positioning system (GPS), making it 
difficult to achieve levels of reliability and design assurance adequate to meet typical airworthiness 
standards.  
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
The URA-123 recognizes that the applicant may, in order to prevent fly-away events, make trade-offs 
among procedures, operational limitations, and the functional capabilities of systems and equipment.  The 
applicant must provide a containment system that addresses hazards associated with fly-away events.  
Any containment system must have the ability to detect impending violations of any containment 
boundary and take timely action to ensure the boundary is not crossed.  
The applicant must provide a means to detect and avoid transgression of any containment boundaries 
established for the operation.  This includes the following considerations: 
(a) The accuracy of the UAS’s estimation of the UA’s position relative to the containment boundaries 
must be sufficient to ensure that the aircraft will not exit a containment boundary. 
(b) Situational awareness of the UA’s location relative to the containment boundaries should be 
maintained at all times during all flight operations. 
(c) Failure of infrastructure not part of the UAS (e.g., GPS, cellular telephone) must not significantly 
interfere with the determination of the location of the aircraft. 
(d) Means of detection should:  
(1) have complete and unobstructed surveillance of any established containment boundaries, at all 
times during all flight operations in all weather conditions (e.g., lighting and visibility conditions) 
for which operations are approved; and 
(2) be able to determine impending violations of any established boundary, in sufficient time for 
action to avoid crossing the boundary. 
(e) If action by the pilot in command is required to ensure the UA does not cross any established 
containment boundary, quick acting means must be provided to alert the pilot in command. 
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(1) Timing thresholds for alerts should consider the time needed (i) to transmit data via radios or 
other means of communication, (ii) for ground control station processing and annunciation, and 
(iii) for human response, as relevant. 
(f) Means of avoidance must be sufficient to ensure the UA remains within the established containment 
boundaries at all times. 
(1) Latency and availability of any command and control datalink or other communication links 
required for avoidance should be considered in establishing timing thresholds for avoidance 
maneuvers and shown to be acceptable for ensuring an avoidance maneuver can be executed to 
maintain containment. 
(2) Activation of an avoidance maneuver from on board the UA must be communicated to the pilot in 
command in a timely manner. 
(3) Confirmation of the completion of any avoidance maneuver must be communicated to the pilot in 
command in a timely manner.  
(g) The containment system design must consider events wherein release of high energy parts may 
constitute a hazard to bystanders outside the containment area. 
(h) The performance of the containment system must not be degraded by any form of interference under 
any foreseeable operating condition.  Considerations should include, but are not limited to: 
(1) electromagnetic interference caused by any other UA systems, 
(2) electromagnetic interference external to the UA, and 
(3) interference via acoustic, thermal, vibrational, chemical, or metallurgical means. 
 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD  
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5.1.5. U-5 Issue Paper: Detect and Avoid Intruder Aircraft 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-5 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.16, Special Conditions   
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Detect and Avoid Intruder Aircraft  
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch  
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue 
The AgR-1 must comply with the intent of 14 CFR Part §91.111(a), Operating Near Other Aircraft, and 
Part §91.113(b), Right-of-way Rules.  Because there is no pilot on board the AgR-1 who can see and 
avoid other aircraft, additional systems, equipment, and procedures may be required to detect and avoid 
other aircraft that might enter the containment volume or come within close proximity to the AgR-1. An 
intruder aircraft detection and avoidance system is not addressed by existing regulation.  New 
requirements are needed. 
Background 
14 CFR Part §91.111 (a) states that no person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to 
create a collision hazard and Part §91.113(b) states that vigilance shall be maintained by each person 
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.   
For manned aircraft, the pilotwith the assistance of systems such as air traffic control (ATC) and the 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)is relied upon to keep the aircraft well clear of other 
aircraft. For unmanned aircraft, no equivalently safe and cost-effective civil airborne system exists at this 
time.  The applicant has thus proposed a ground-based intruder aircraft detection and avoidance system to 
address hazards to other airspace users.  To provide a cost-effective solution, this ground-based detect and 
avoid system might not provide the full functionality of human see and avoid.  To compensate for this 
inadequacy, larger safety margins for the detect and avoid function should be provided.  Requirements 
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appropriate for this alternative approach to avoiding other aircraft are needed to provide an acceptable 
level of safety.     
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
The URA-123 recognizes that the applicant may, in order to ensure separation, make trade-offs among 
procedures, operational limitations, and the functional capabilities of systems and equipment.  The 
applicant must provide a system that addresses hazards associated with loss of separation.  Any such 
system must have the ability to detect imminent intrusion or close proximity and take timely action to 
ensure separation is not lost.  
The applicant should provide a means to detect and avoid other aircraft that may intrude on the 
containment volume or otherwise pose a threat to loss of separation. All other airborne vehicles, including 
other UA, should be given priority. The AgR-1 is responsible for remaining well clear of all other aircraft.  
(a) Means of detecting other aircraft will:  
(1) be able to detect other airborne vehicles at a sufficient range from the containment area to allow 
time for an avoidance maneuver,  
(2) have complete and unobstructed coverage of the containment area,  and 
(3) be active at all times during all flight operations in all weather, lighting, and visibility conditions 
for which operations are approved. 
(b) If action by the pilot in command is required to avoid loss of separation with an airborne vehicle, 
quick acting means must be provided to alert the pilot in command. 
(1) Timing thresholds for alerts should consider the time needed (i) to transmit data via radios or 
other means of communication, (ii) for ground control station processing and annunciation, and 
(iii) for human response, as relevant.  
(c) Means of avoidance must be sufficient to ensure the UA maintains sufficient separation from other 
aircraft at all times.  
(1) Latency and availability of any command and control datalink or other communication links 
required for avoidance should be considered in establishing timing thresholds for avoidance 
maneuvers and shown to be acceptable for ensuring an avoidance maneuver can be executed to 
maintain separation. 
(2) The avoidance maneuver must maintain separation throughout its execution duration. 
(3) Confirmation of any avoidance maneuver must be communicated to the pilot in command. 
(4) Clearance distances from containment boundaries should be established and maintained for 
avoidance maneuvers to ensure that no harm is done to persons on the ground. 
(5) Operations may only resume when the UA is well clear of all other aircraft.  
(d) The performance of the aircraft detection and avoidance system must not be degraded by any form of 
interference under any foreseeable operating conditions. Considerations include, but are not limited 
to: 
(1) electromagnetic interference caused by any other UA systems, 
(2) electromagnetic interference external to the UA, and  
(3) interference via acoustic, thermal, vibrational, chemical or metallurgical means. 
 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD  
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5.1.6. U-6 Issue Paper: Detect and Avoid Persons and Objects within the Containment Area 
Project:  Acme-XYZ   
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-6 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.16, Special Conditions 
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Detect and Avoid Persons and Objects within the Containment Area 
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch  
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
 
*** 
Statement of Issue 
Although operational procedures are required to clear the containment area prior to flight operations, a 
system for detecting and avoiding people or obstacles within the containment area or that might enter the 
containment area during flight operations is required to avoid injuring persons or causing an impact that 
releases high energy part that could harm others.  However, such a system is not addressed by existing 
regulation.  New requirements are needed. 
Background 
Low-altitude flight such as that expected with aerial application operations poses hazards to people who 
might inadvertently enter the containment area defined for those operations.  A low-altitude flight path 
might also encounter objects such as livestock or tractors that have been left in the field that could cause 
damage and potential release of high energy parts if struck with a rotorcraft.  Because there is no pilot on 
board the AgR-1 who can see and avoid these obstacles, additional operational procedures, systems, and 
equipment not covered in Part 27 are required to monitor the containment area for people and obstacles 
and ensure that the AgR-1 does not collide with them. 
Static obstacles (e.g., barns or silos) are mapped in advanced and loaded into a database a priori to 
operations for the purpose of path planning.  Trajectories that are flown by the UA are designed to avoid 
these static obstacles.  The proposed system can compensate for accuracy errors in the static object database 
or in path-following logic.  Other obstacles such as mobile irrigation equipment may not be identified in 
static obstacle databases.  Collision with sizable obstacles could cause release of high energy parts that 
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could pose harm to people beyond the containment zone.  Unanticipated ground objects that have the 
potential to damage the rotor system of the AgR-1 on impact should be detected and avoided.   
Dynamic objects (e.g., people wandering into the containment area, ground vehicles, livestock, or wildlife) 
cannot be planned for and must be avoided as they are detected. 
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
The URA-123 recognizes that the applicant may, in order to prevent collisions with people or obstacles 
within the containment area, make trade-offs among procedures, operational limitations, and the 
functional capabilities of systems and equipment. 
The applicant must provide an appropriate detection and avoidance system that addresses hazards 
associated with harming any third parties resulting from colliding with objects within the containment 
area.  Any such system must have the ability to detect persons or objects within the containment area and 
take timely action to ensure the UA does not collide with them or come within sufficient proximity to 
cause harm. 
The applicant must provide a means to detect and avoid persons and objects within the defined 
operational area during flight operations. 
(a) Means of detection will:  
(1) have sufficient range in the direction of UA travel to permit a simple avoidance maneuver (e.g., 
hovering or landing), and 
(2) provide detection during all flight operations in all weather, lighting, and visibility conditions for 
which operations are approved. 
(b) If action by the pilot in command is required to avoid collision or remain a safe distance from persons 
or objects to prevent harm, quick acting means will be provided to alert the pilot in command. 
(1) Timing thresholds for alerts should consider the time needed (i) to transmit data via radios or 
other means of communication, (ii) for ground control station processing and annunciation, and 
(iii) for human response, as relevant.  
(c) Means to suspend operation or provide an otherwise safe state shall be provided. 
(1) Latency and availability of any command and control datalink or other communication links 
required for avoidance should be considered in establishing timing thresholds for avoidance 
maneuvers and shown to be acceptable. 
(2) Minimum clearances should be established.  
(3) Confirmation of any avoidance maneuver should be communicated to the pilot in command in a 
timely manner. 
(4) Operations may only resume when the operational area has been cleared. 
(d) The performance of the detection and avoidance system must not be degraded by any form of 
interference under any foreseeable operating conditions.  Considerations include, but are not limited 
to: 
(1) electromagnetic interference caused by any other UA systems, 
(2) electromagnetic interference external to the UA, and  
(3) interference via acoustic, thermal, vibrational, chemical or metallurgical means. 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD 
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5.1.7. U-7 Issue Paper: Safety-critical Command and Control Datalinks 
Project:  Acme-XYZ  
                      Model AgR-1  
                     Project No. TBD 
 
Item:    Issue Paper U-7 
 
Stage: 1 
 
Date: TBD 
 
Regulatory Reference: 14 CFR §21.16, Special Conditions 
 
National Policy Reference: FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [28] 
 
Issue Status: Open 
 
Subject: Safety-critical Command and Control Datalinks  
 
Date:   TBD 
 
Branch Action:     URA-123 UAS Certification Branch 
 
Compliance Target: Pre-TC 
 
Type of Issue Paper New Information 
*** 
Statement of Issue 
Airworthiness of the UAS will be dependent on the quality of the command and control (C2) links. The 
quality of the C2 links is strongly influenced by the operational coverage and the various quality-of-
service parameters of the communication media used.  C2 link communications are necessary for a 
remote pilot to command the UA, especially to execute a safety role (e.g., by commanding safety-related 
maneuvers).  A safety-critical C2 link is defined as a link which passes commands relevant to safety-
critical functions.  Currently, safety-critical C2 links are not addressed by existing regulation.  New 
requirements are needed. 
Background 
Within the US, telecommunications services for the purposes of ATC are operated by the FAA. This will 
likely not be the case for UAS operations. Telecommunications services might be furnished by a broad 
variety of service providers.  The frequency asset being used might be shared among radio 
communication providers over the operational area and might not be protected against interference (i.e., it 
might not be an aeronautical safety allocation).  
Only UAS with remote pilots are currently eligible for certification consideration.  Because C2 links are 
not standard equipment for manned aircraft, Part 27 does not include requirements for them.  A UAS 
might include any number of datalinks, but not all datalinks have safety significance.  This issue paper 
addresses only those datalinks that have a safety-critical role.  As an aircraft’s airworthiness can be rated 
with different capabilities based on the certification of the various components (e.g., for extended oceanic 
operations), it is conceivable that this might hold true with respect to the various types and 
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implementations of safety-critical C2 links. The URA-123 position is predicated on the following 
assumptions: 
 There is a unique pairing between the ground control station and the aerial vehicle. That is, each 
vehicle is controlled by one unique ground control station (no handoffs between ground control 
stations, or simultaneous control over multiple ground control stations), and each ground control 
station only controls one unique vehicle (no control of multiple vehicles by a single ground control 
station or operator). 
 The UA is within radio line-of-sight (RLOS) of the ground control station at all times during the 
operation, thus requiring no signal relays or repeaters. 
URA-123 Position (Stage 1) 
The applicant must include at least one safety-critical C2 link in the design of the AgR-1 for use by the 
pilot to command the UA to a safe state and for providing safety-critical data from the UA to the pilot.  
Any datalink referred to below is assumed to be safety-critical. 
(a) The C2 link shall:  
(1) be available in all vehicle attitudes under all foreseeable operating conditions throughout the 
containment volume, and  
(2) enable radio line-of-sight communication for safety-critical data at all points throughout the entire 
containment volume.  
(b) Uplink and downlink status shall be indicated to the pilot during all flight operations. 
(c) The uplink(s) used to communicate the pilot commands to the UA will:  
(1) adhere to appropriate standards8 of integrity, availability, continuity, reliability, and security; 
(2) cause operations to cease if thresholds for latency or for error rates are not met; and 
(3) be active at all times during all flight operations, including during all weather, lighting, and 
visibility conditions for which operations are approved. 
(d) The downlink(s) used to communicate safety-critical vehicle information to the pilot in command 
will:  
(1) adhere to standards of integrity, availability, continuity, reliability, and security; 
(2) meet established standards for error rates; and  
(3) be capable of communicating data from the UA at all times during all flight operations in all 
weather, lighting, and visibility conditions for which operations are approved. 
(e) The performance of the C2 link (e.g., availability and quality of service) must not be degraded by any 
form of interference under any foreseeable operating conditions. Considerations include, but are not 
limited to: 
(1) electromagnetic interference caused by any other UA system, 
(2) electromagnetic interference external to the UA, 
(3) ionospheric, atmospheric, or rain attenuation, 
(4) malicious interference/spoofing or link takeover, 
                                                     
8 Specification of standards for integrity, availability, continuity, reliability, and security are beyond the scope of this effort.  
Such standards may be developed by the FAA or standards groups such as the RTCA. 
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(5) frequency access scheme, link budget, bandwidth characteristics and frequency assignment 
planning criteria of the C2 link, 
(6) adjacent or shared frequencies, and  
(7) interference related to shared resources (e.g., power). 
Acme-XYZ Position (Stage 1) 
TBD  
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6. Potential Systems and Equipment Implementation 
The ConOps and mock type certification basis are useful only if UAS technology exists that can meet the 
objectives of the ConOps and can comply with the proposed design and performance standards.  This 
section describes one possible UAS configuration that could meet those requirements. The example 
configuration is based in large part on Dragonfly Pictures’ DP-14 model unmanned rotorcraft.  This 
example configuration is used for illustrative purposes only and is not meant as an endorsement in any 
way.  The DP-14 is currently under development by DPI. As such, some of the subsystems necessary to 
safely perform the aerial spray application are hypothesized (e.g., the containment system).  Details of the 
example implementation are provided here to confirm the feasibility of developing a UAS with existing 
technology that can accomplish the aerial application mission and meet the speculated safety 
requirements.  
The example configuration is described in terms of the following subsystems: 
 DP-14 unmanned rotorcraft 
 Ground control station 
 Command and control datalink 
 Positioning system 
 Containment system 
 Ground-based detect and avoid system  
 Active obstacle avoidance system 
 Payload and Spray Equipment 
 Support Equipment 
6.1. DP-14 Unmanned Rotorcraft 
An unmanned, tandem-rotor, turbine-powered aircraft is one possible option for meeting the payload, 
transportability, and maneuverability requirements of the ConOps. The DP-14, shown in Figure 5, is one 
such rotorcraft.  The rotorcraft has folding or removable blades to allow transportation by road between 
application sites and external hard points to allow installation of a spray system.  An artist’s conception of 
this rotorcraft with spray attachment is shown in Figure 6.  The DP-14 is expected to have a payload 
capacity of approximately 430 lb and a total vehicle gross weight of 900 lb. 
 
Figure 5.  DP-14 Model Rotorcraft from Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. 
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Figure 6.  Unmanned Tandem-Rotor Precision-Spray Aircraft 
 
The systems on the UA are typical of those used on midsize UAS they have limited size, weight, and 
power (SWAP).  The UA is equipped with onboard sensors and an autopilot system that allow it to 
operate semi-autonomously. These onboard elements enable onboard position determination, onboard 
guidance computations, automatic stabilization, and fully automatic inner- and outer-loop vehicle control. 
Direct operator control of the vehicle is not available as a primary or backup control mode, but the 
operator can intervene via the activation of predetermined commands.   
Automatic takeoff and landing (also referred to as launch and recovery) are required for all modes of 
operation. Automatic takeoffs include a departure from the location of engine start to the first waypoint 
that defines the commencement of the intended spray operation.  Automatic landing will return the UA to 
the intended point of landing from the last waypoint of the flight plan.  The UA uses a ground-based 
multi-lateration system (see Section 6.4) to determine position and recognizes position relative to pre-
defined containment boundaries (see Section 6.5). The UA’s control system automatically lands if 
impending violation of the containment boundary is detected.  The spray system is also disabled during 
such contingency maneuvers to ensure that chemicals are not sprayed outside of the containment zone. 
Flight path control is fully automatic in accordance with a preloaded prescription spray map.  During 
flight, the UA uses direct height measurement from a radar or laser altimeter to provide precise altitude 
control above the crops in the field. The direct height measurement is bank angle compensated to ensure 
accurate control of altitude during normal maneuvering.  The UA includes a backup barometric altimeter 
for contingency management of altitude.  The barometric setting for the backup altimeter is set prior to 
flight and updated between flights. 
The UA does not carry a transponder, but a low-cost automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-
B)-out unit may be incorporated to provide VFR traffic data to other aircraft (if permitted by SWAP 
limitations and cost).  Aircraft position and state data is provided to the ground control station by datalink 
radios operating on frequencies approved for UAS operations or on frequencies approved for commercial 
or farm use, as appropriate.  All operations are conducted within RLOS and most operations conducted 
within VLOS.  If operations are conducted close to an airport with an operating control tower or other 
FAA facility, the ground control station will incorporate aviation band radios to maintain contact with the 
proximate facilities. 
The UA design includes attributes to minimize the possibility of explosion or structural failure that 
releases high-energy parts.  This includes the design, fabrication, and installation of fittings, valves, filler 
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tubes, drains, vents, and supporting structure for the fuel, oil, and other systems containing flammable 
fluids.  The turbine engine installation includes containment rings around the turbine and compressor 
sections to ensure that an engine structural failure does not allow high-energy parts to escape from the 
engine compartment. The vehicle design includes a clutch or similar device that allows the rotor system to 
freewheel in the event of engine failure or seizure. Based on these design features, certification of the 
engine under Part 33 of 14 CFR may not be required. 
An onboard vehicle health management system is incorporated into the design to automatically monitor 
safety-critical components and command a contingency landing in the event of a failure. The health 
monitor may also activate contingency maneuvers such as a return to takeoff location for less critical 
failures. The pilot is alerted over the datalink of any health monitor interventions.  The pilot may also 
activate similar preprogrammed interventions via datalink if there are external indications of a non-
normal state (e.g., smoke) that has not been detected onboard. 
In the event of an engine failure or activation of the fuel cutoff valve associated with the contingency 
systems at very low altitudes, the vehicle is designed to descend slowly from spray height, settling to the 
surface in such a manner that the rotors will not impact the ground or any parts of the vehicle. If the 
vehicle must ascend above spray height, the autopilot is programmed to maintain a forward velocity 
proportional to altitude consistent with the height-velocity (“deadman’s”) curve [32] established during 
flight testing.  This ensures that the vehicle can safely land from any normal operational condition and the 
vehicle and all of its parts will stay within the containment zone. 
6.2. Ground Control Station 
The ground control station is integral to the ground support vehicles that transport, launch, and recover 
the UA. The ground control station is portable so that its location can be optimized with respect to VLOS 
considerations, radio coverage, operational efficiency, and protection by the containment system.  The 
ground control station incorporates man-portable displays and controls that allow the pilot in command to 
directly observe the operation of the UA from takeoff through landing when operating within VLOS.  
When operating beyond VLOS (BVLOS), the ground control station includes an enclosure that provides 
controlled lighting, weather protection, and additional displays as required.  The enclosed ground control 
station is designed to be compliant with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
requirements that provide for the safety of its occupants. 
The ground control station supports the following: 
 downloading and converting the prescription map to an aerial application overlay on a geospatial 
database such as Google Earth, 
 converting the geospatial overlay into a series of waypoints that can serve as the basis for a lateral 
navigation plan for loading into the UA’s onboard flight management system/autopilot, 
 associating spray commands with each waypoint, 
 entering “no-fly” regions into the database or flight plan to protect known obstacles or human 
habitation areas within the operational zone, 
 assigning precision altitudes to the waypoint plan to adjust spray distribution patterns or provide 
vertical separation from small obstacles, 
 running the flight plan in simulation mode to verify the viability of the plan 
 loading the tested flight plan into the UA’s computers and verifying proper loading, 
 running diagnostic vehicle tests to validate flight readiness, 
 communicating with visual observers (where utilized) dispatched to key locations to clear the airspace 
and the containment zone for the flight, 
 activating and monitoring the containment and active obstacle detection systems, 
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 monitoring the progress of the flight visually or electronically, as needed for the operation being 
conducted, 
 sending specific commands to the UA that bring it into a safe state (e.g., low hover, land, or return to 
base) if non-normal conditions exist that are not automatically detected and compensated, 
 monitoring critical on-board systems of the UA or monitoring commands from the onboard health 
monitoring system, and 
 bringing operations to a safe conclusion in the event of a power loss at the ground control station. 
6.3. Command and Control Datalinks 
The C2 datalinks operate in approved spectrum allocated for UAS conducting commercial agricultural 
operations. Operational frequencies come from spectrum designated for farm operations, UAS operations, 
or other relevant spectrum. Receivers and transmitters are tunable to allow for changing frequency 
requirements in different areas. Bandwidth requirements are minimized by the highly automated design of 
the vehicle. 
The datalink operates at a power level appropriate to the range requirements for each mission.  The 
datalink is frequency agile to minimize the possible effects of electromagnetic interference and provide 
link security.  While operations may be conducted BVLOS, they will not be conducted beyond RLOS to 
avoid the latency and dropout issues associated with satellite relay systems.  RLOS covers quarter-section 
fields at the low flight altitudes embodied in this ConOps.  Signal strength is tested at startup for each 
operation.   
The UAS will have at least one C2 link for safety-critical information such as commands required for 
contingency maneuvers.  Other datalinks may be used for telemetry and other non-safety-critical 
information.  The vehicle incorporates automated contingency actions to execute for lost-link events.   
6.4. Positioning System 
To achieve the navigation accuracy required by the ConOps, the onboard GPSs are designed to use 
proprietary differential signals from a dedicated, high accuracy, ground-based receiver such as those 
typically used in survey applications. If a differential system is already available for use with ground-
based farm equipment, that system may also be used for the UA provided the reliability and design of the 
ground system meets the requirements of the type certificate. A real-time kinematic GPS is another 
alternative that can be used to provide the required level of accuracy. 
Wide area augmentation system (WAAS)-capable receivers may be used when the required precision for 
a given application job is around 3 meters or greater.  The service provider will carry out preflight surveys 
to ensure the availability of WAAS signals. 
The differential GPS is monitored from the ground control station and onboard the UA, so that operations 
may be terminated if GPS signals are lost or the required level of accuracy is not available. 
6.5. Assured Containment System 
An assured containment system is a localization system, independent of the autopilot, that acts to keep the 
UA within given bounds. A containment system comprises sensors to determine the vehicle state 
information, decision logic to detect an anticipated breach of containment, and the means to control the 
breach of containment (e.g., flight termination).  The assured part of the concept comes from design 
attributes intended to ensure that the UA will remain in a specified area in the presence of common 
vehicle, autopilot, sensor and actuator failures. The UA design includes an assured containment system in 
part to offset reliability requirements on the UA autopilot. As posited here, an assured containment 
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system can be realized by a smaller set of functions than a typical autopilot provides. Keeping the system 
simple facilitates certification-quality safety arguments.  
An assured containment system is not currently available on the market, though one could be developed 
using existing technology.  For this application, the containment system would incorporate an 
independent system for determining the location of the UA based on three or more low power transmitters 
prepositioned to provide good multi-lateration geometry over the operational area. The UA would contain 
two receiver/processors preloaded with lateral and vertical containment boundaries, including buffers as 
necessary to allow for operation at and near boundaries. The receiver/processors would receive signals 
from antennas on the vehicle and continuously triangulate to determine current lateral and vertical 
position. The current position would be differentiated to determine a velocity vector.  The position and 
velocity data would be processed to determine a projected time to crossing of the boundary.  If the UA 
does not take action to adjust its path or speed to stay within the boundaries, the containment system 
would force the vehicle to land by closing an emergency fuel shutoff valve. The valve would operate 
independently of the ship’s systems, autopilot, and primary and backup power sources.  An activation 
signal would be sent to the operator via datalink and the operator would back up the automatic action with 
a command to close the normal fuel shutoff valve.   
A number of alternative system designs can provide independent positioning capability: eLoran, radars, 
acoustic systems, and people who serve as spotters.  An automated system was proposed to support 
BVLOS operations. Ideally, automation reduces staffing requirements and error from fallible human 
judgments of positions, speeds and boundary locations. 
6.6. Ground-Based Detect and Avoid (GBDAA) System 
Some capability to detect and avoid other aircraft is needed despite the fact that most aerial application 
will occur just above crop height.  During VLOS operations, the pilot in command and visual observers 
can provide the detect and avoid function. To support BVLOS operations, a system that can detect aircraft 
by non-visual means will be needed. An automated detect and avoid system is not currently available on 
the market, though one could be developed using existing technology.  One possible option is a system 
that includes a portable ground or radar-based detect and avoid system to provide the pilot in command 
with a warning if another aircraft approaches the containment area. Upon notification of an intruder, a 
signal would be sent to the UA automatically or by the pilot in command (or both) that initiates a 
contingency response such as an immediate landing or low hover.  A GBDAA system could be reset 
remotely by the pilot in command to resume UA operations once the hazard has passed.  The GBDAA 
system would only be required to detect intruder aircraft, not compute avoidance maneuvers.  For the 
ConOps, the avoidance maneuver is a single pre-programmed response that can be initiated by a single 
command from the ground control station. 
A GBDAA system might use a variety of sensors such as acoustic detectors and various forms of radar.  
A particularly interesting option is a commercial-off-the-shelf marine radar modified to detect low flying 
aircraft at a minimum range of 5 miles. This range requirement supports a buffer around the planned area 
of operations of about 3 miles, assuming the radar is centrally located. This range provides sufficient time 
for the UA to execute a contingency action. The system could operate in the background and send 
automatic commands to the UA and alerts to the pilot in command when a conflict is detected.  The 
system would not capable of providing resolution maneuvers but only detection alerts.  
6.7. Active Obstacle Avoidance System 
The primary responsibility for avoiding known obstacles (e.g., barns or silos in the field) is functionally 
allocated to the onboard precision navigation system. The locations and boundaries of known obstacles 
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are determined during pre-mission planning and entered into the UA flight management system. The 
flight path of the UA is compared to these locations and adjusted to provide clearance from them. 
To avoid unknown or dynamic obstacles as required by the ConOps, the pilot in command and visual 
observers can provide the detect and avoid function during VLOS operations.  For BVLOS operation, an 
active onboard obstacle detection and avoidance system would need to be included in the system design.  
Such a system is not currently available on the market, though one could be developed using lidar, 
acoustics, radar, or other technologies.  For this application, the hypothetical system could use an 
adaptation of an automotive camera-based pattern recognition system such as those produced by 
Mobileye, Inc. [33] to keep cost and power requirements low. When an obstacle is detected, the 
avoidance system would send a command to the autopilot and thrust systems to execute a contingency 
landing and power down the vehicle.  After any contingency landing, a crew member would be required 
to clear the hazard and reset the system. 
6.8. Payload and Spray Equipment 
The hypothetical system design assumes that the agricultural spray system is a permanent part of the 
vehicle and, as such, the certification of the spray system is included in the vehicle type certification. 
Agricultural requirements established by 14CFR Part 137 are not considered in this assessment. 
The hypothetical system is designed to dispense liquid chemicals using a pressurized spray system. The 
available fuel and payload tankage is such that full loads of both will exceed maximum gross weight 
limitations. Thus, the amounts of fuel and chemical payload carried are chosen such that the vehicle’s 
mission endurance in fuel and payload are proportionate for each mission. The design and operation of 
the vehicle leaves adequate fuel reserves to return to the landing location any time during the mission 
with adequate margins of safety. 
The vehicle structure, control systems, and spray system design take into consideration the stiffness of the 
spray booms and takeoff, landing, and maneuvering requirements.  Height and bank angle compensation, 
or coordination, is provided to ensure that the spray system does not contact the ground during low 
altitude spraying just above the crop canopy. Spraying at low altitude is a necessary design requirement to 
minimize overspray resulting from wind and rotor wash entrainment. 
As a safety consideration, the spray system design includes two methods of shutting off the spray. The 
primary shutoff is operated by the normal spray system and allows activation and deactivation of all or 
individual nozzles according to the requirements of the prescription map.  A second independent shutoff 
system is capable of emergency shut off of all spray regardless of the status of the primary system.  Such 
a system allows positive shut off by on-board or off-board activation of the containment or other 
contingency systems. 
6.9. Support Equipment 
The vehicle design includes support vehicles that are needed for transportation, launch, servicing, and 
recovery of the UA, as well as providing support for the agricultural service (e.g., loading chemicals). The 
specimen configuration includes one vehicle capable of transporting the UAS over roads and highways in 
the U.S., including secondary roads typically found in rural farm areas.  The vehicle design complies with 
all federal and state motor vehicle regulations regarding weight and size and incorporates required safety 
features. The transport vehicle also incorporates leveling and rotor wash protection features that allow it 
to serve as the initial launch and final recovery platform.  A separate vehicle with off-road capabilities 
provides a capability to retrieve the UA from a field in the event of a contingency landing that does not 
allow continued flight. This vehicle is also used to deploy observers and any necessary field equipment. 
Another vehicle carries fuel, oil, and chemical supplies to allow field replenishment of the vehicle and 
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spray system. This vehicle incorporates safety features for fire and explosion suppression consistent with 
the liquids being carried. 
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7. Conclusions 
This report provides an example of the first major product in a civil aircraft’s type certification process, 
namely, the type certification basis—in this case, for an unmanned rotorcraft performing an aerial 
application operation.  The purpose of this effort is to determine, in a general sense, plausible 
airworthiness requirements for an unmanned rotorcraft in a low-risk operation.  Due to the narrow scope 
of this effort—a specific UA performing a specific type of operation—this work does not provide 
definitive information applicable to all UAS in all possible operational contexts.  The narrow scope, 
however, allows for serious, in-depth consideration of real-world concerns, peculiarities, and special 
mitigations for a particular UA and operation.  If a larger variety of vehicles had been chosen or a wider 
range of operations, then this work would either have been either too general to be useful or, since all 
potential hazards must be mitigated, too restrictive to be a practical/economic operation.  The intent was 
to suggest a strawman set of design and performance requirements, based on Part 27, to use as a starting 
point for establishing a reasonable certification basis for similar UA performing similar low-risk 
operations.  Approximately 25% of the regulations in Part 27 were directly applicable to this type 
certification basis without significant modification.  In total, approximately 55% of the regulations in Part 
27 were useful in addressing primary hazards associated with the UAS and its operation. 
One key observation from this activity is that there is a fundamental connection between the aircraft, its 
ConOps, and the safety of the system.  Regulatory requirements for most CPA are developed implicitly 
around an operational model of transporting people and cargo from one point to another.  No specific 
documentation of that operation is required in the aircraft certification process.  Many UAS operations do 
not fit the CPA transportation model.  UAS operations for tasks like surveillance, inspection, and 
agriculture, involve taking off and landing from the same point, while other UAS operations involve 
significant time loitering in a designated area—all different from the transportation model. Different 
operational models have the potential to introduce different hazards that affect requirements for UA 
systems and equipment. By providing details about the operation, special considerations inherent to the 
safety of the UA are revealed.  In this case study, for example, operation within a defined geospatial 
containment volume that contains no people is a special consideration that significantly impacts design 
and performance considerations.  Other operations may have different hazards, necessitating different 
safety considerations.  In any case, the operation and operational environment have a non-trivial effect on 
design requirements.  So, for UAS, documentation of the ConOps may become an essential artifact for 
type certification.   
Another key observation of this work is that one hazard may mask a secondary hazard.  Consequently, 
efforts to mitigate a hazard must ensure that secondary hazards are also mitigated.  For example, a crash 
of an unmanned aerial applicator, in a field cleared of people, would not be considered by most to be a 
safety concern. Such a crash would have economic implications, but no direct safety implications.  
Further consideration of such an event, however, resulted in identifying hazards related to (a) detecting 
people who may enter the field during the operation and (b) release of high-energy parts that could exit 
the containment area.  Hazards, especially those relevant to people on the ground, might be different from 
those on a typical CPA project, and might not be obvious at first glance.    
The final key observation is that hazards in UAS might be best identified by considering ways in which 
the public (i.e., people on the ground or in other aircraft) might be injured.  The transitive notion of safety, 
that is, the idea that protecting the aircraft will, in turn, protect the public, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for many UAS and their intended operations.  For agricultural operations and perhaps many 
other UAS operations, the regulations need only be concerned with protecting the public.  For many UAS 
operational models, economic considerations and insurance, not airworthiness regulation, will become 
primary drivers for requirements to protect the UA from hull loss.   
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Further work in the form of additional case studies and operational experience is needed to substantiate or 
refute these observations and provide data needed to inform the development of regulatory policy and 
standards for different UAS types and operations. 
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Appendix.  Rationale for the Mock Type Certification Basis 
Just as the intent behind a regulation is not always obvious, neither is the reasoning for why a requirement 
might or might not be considered applicable in a different context.  The rationale provided in Table A.1 
attempts to provide insight into the assessment of each of the Part 27 requirements for applicability to the 
AgR-1 and inclusion in the mock type certification basis.  Table A-1 lists each of the Part 27 requirements 
and indicates whether each requirement is included in the mock type certification basis, excluded from the 
mock type certification basis, or “rolled up” into one of the supplemental issue papers (CMS, SI, or PPS).  
For requirements included in the mock type certification basis, the text of the proposed requirement is 
given, along with rationale for why it is included or modified.  Additions to the original text are indicated 
in blue italic face and deletions are indicated by striking through the text.  For requirements that are rolled 
up, a brief summary of the requirement is given, along with rationale for why it has been rolled up.   
The rationale, by its nature, is subjective.  The intent is to offer a starting point for discussing potential 
changes to existing regulations to better define the desired safety characteristics of a UAS and its 
ConOps.  A few common themes appear in the rationale, including the following reasons for excluding a 
requirement from the type certification basis: 
(1) Out of vehicle scope.  This means that the Part 27 requirement is intended for a rotorcraft whose 
characteristics are not consistent with those of the AgR-1, e.g., piston engines and multiple engines.  
Vehicles with tandem rotors and a single turbine engine and vehicles with a single rotor, a tail rotor, 
and a single turbine engine are in scope.  
(2) Out of ConOps scope.  This means that the operational aspects specified in the Part 27 requirement 
are not relevant to the ConOps; e.g., icing conditions, lightning, operation beyond radio line-of-sight, 
presence of a manual reversion mode (.e.g., stick-to-surface control), taxiing, and skis and floats. 
(3) Does not map to a hazard.  This means that the Part 27 requirement is not directly relevant to a 
primary (catastrophic, hazardous, or major) hazard identified in the hazard analysis.  For example, an 
event resulting in hull loss is not a hazard under the ConOps.  There are, however, hazards associated 
with loss of rotor system integrity; e.g., shedding of high energy parts.   
(4) Not UAS relevant.  This means that the Part 27 requirement is irrelevant to a UAS by the design or 
operational characteristics of unmanned vehicles. For example, requirements related to crew or 
occupant protection, such as seat belts, are not UAS relevant. 
(5) Secondary hazard.  This means that the hazard that underlies the Part 27 requirement is relevant to the 
AgR-1 under its ConOps, but not to the same degree as for a Part 27 rotorcraft. For example, engine 
seizure is not catastrophic unless coupled with the failure of a disconnect device for the rotor system. 
(6) Mitigated by other regulation.  For some systems (e.g., the rotor system) for the provision of a device 
to protect the system obviates the need for other regulations.  For example, loss of fuel pressure 
causing engine flameout is not catastrophic even if a hull loss occurs as long as the device that 
disconnects the engine from the drive system protects the drive system integrity. 
The rationale in Table A.1 is intentionally informal and uses a shorthand description of the common 
themes.  The terms “crew” and “crewmember” used herein include pilots, sensor/payload operators, 
visual observers, and other persons as appropriate or required to ensure safe operation and maintenance of 
the aircraft 
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Table A.1. Applicability of Part 27 Paragraphs to an Unmanned Aerial Applicator 
Part 27 
Paragraph 
Action Paragraph text or Summary 
Rationale for Action 
Subpart A—General 
§27.1    
Applicability 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph describes the types of rotorcraft subject to Part 27.  
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope. Out of ConOps scope. The UAS and ConOps are 
different from conventional Part 27 rotorcraft. 
§27.2    
Special 
retroactive 
requirements 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph describes special considerations for (a) rotorcraft 
manufactured after Sept 16, 1992 related to seats and (b) type certified prior to October 
18, 1999. 
Rationale:  Not UAS relevant.  The UAS will not need seats.  Furthermore, any vehicle 
operating under the G-1U will be certified after October 18, 199. 
Subpart B—Flight 
General 
§27.21 
Proof of 
compliance 
Modified Each requirement of this subpart G-1U 
Issue Paper must be met. at each 
appropriate combination of weight and 
center of gravity within the range of 
loading conditions for which certification 
is requested. This must be shown 
(a) Bby tests upon a rotorcraft of the type 
for which certification is requested, or by 
calculations based on, and equal in 
accuracy to, the results of testing; and  
(b) By systematic investigation of each 
required combination of weight and center 
of gravity if compliance cannot be 
reasonably inferred from combinations 
investigated. 
Rationale: “Subpart” was changed to “issue 
paper” because the original subpart, as a 
whole, is not applicable.  The intent of this 
paragraph is that requirements included in 
the issue paper must be verified by testing 
and analysis of the rotorcraft as applicable.   
Only those loading conditions that could 
lead to loss of structural integrity of the 
rotor system are of concern.  The 
requirement for test and/or analysis for all 
of the weight and center of gravity 
combinations called for in Part 27 was 
simplified because the unmanned rotorcraft 
has fewer loading conditions that are safety 
critical.  Therefore, language requiring test 
and/or analysis at all weight/cg 
combinations was deleted. 
Furthermore, weight and center of gravity 
are not the only important parameters that 
may affect loading conditions. The 
applicant should determine which 
parameters, including weight and center of 
gravity, are critical to structural integrity of 
the rotor system and demonstrate through 
test and analysis that the aircraft can handle 
these parameters with adequate safety 
margins.  Weight and center of gravity are 
rolled up along with other critical 
parameters in separate issue papers for 
structural integrity and for controllability, 
maneuverability, and stability.   
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§27.25    
Weight limits 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
& SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for determining maximum, 
minimum, and total weights including jettisonable payloads for manned helicopters.  
Rationale: Weight, weight distribution, and inflight changes in weight can affect vehicle 
moments of inertia and control margins, affecting CMS.  For a single purpose UAS 
design, detailed establishment of all of the weights called for in Part 27 might be 
unnecessary. The CMS rollup requires that the applicant determine which weight and 
loading conditions are critical to vehicle CMS and to demonstrate that the vehicle 
control system can handle these weights with adequate safety margins. 
These weights also have a direct effect on structural strength requirements for the rotor 
system, the drive system, and supporting structure.  The SI rollup requires that the 
applicant determine which weight and loading conditions are critical to vehicle 
structural requirements, affecting rotor system integrity, and demonstrate that the 
vehicle design and fabrication can handle these weights with adequate safety margins. 
§27.27    
Center of 
gravity limits 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary: This paragraph requires the applicant to establish various centers of gravity, 
especially at the extremes (forward, aft, lateral). 
Rationale:  The requirements of this paragraph are reasonable for a UAS design in a 
restricted operational context.  However, because the requirements are tied to the 
weights established under §27.25, this paragraph was rolled up with §27.25. The 
generalized requirement is for the applicant to establish which center of gravity limits 
are critical and ensure that the vehicle is safely controllable and maneuverable for this 
range of values. 
Because the loading on each rotor of a tandem rotor design is affected by center of 
gravity locations and the center of gravity is generally related to the weights established 
under §27.25, a generalized requirement was included in the SI rollup for the applicant 
to establish which center of gravity limits are critical and ensure that the vehicle design 
provides adequate safety margins for this range of values. 
§27.29    
Empty weight 
and 
corresponding 
center of 
gravity 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires establishing empty weight and center of gravity used 
for stability analysis. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. Loss of the vehicle within containment is not 
hazardous. 
§27.31    
Removable 
ballast 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph allows the use of removable ballast to help with center of 
gravity 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope. 
§27.33    
Main rotor 
speed and pitch 
limits 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary: This paragraph requires the applicant to establish main rotor speed and pitch 
limits used in determining centripetal, bending, and other critical loads applied to the 
rotors. 
Rationale: Main rotor speed and pitch limits relate primarily to structural integrity 
requirements of the rotor system and are rolled up in the issue paper on structural 
integrity. However, main rotor speed and pitch limits can also affect CMS 
considerations at limiting conditions, such as at max gross weights, takeoffs and 
landings at max slope limits, and at the never exceed speed (Vne). This paragraph was 
rolled up into the CMS issue paper to require the applicant to consider these factors in 
designing the vehicle control and stabilizations systems. 
Performance 
§27.45  
General  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph prescribes how performance requirements are to be 
interpreted. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. Not UAS relevant. 
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§27.49    
Performance at 
minimum 
operating 
speed 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires an applicant to determine performance at minimum 
operating speed. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.51    
Takeoff  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes minimum requirements for controllability and 
performance of the vehicle during takeoff with critical values of weight and center of 
gravity.  
Rationale: While the controllability requirement is stated in terms of pilot skill 
requirements, that are not applicable for the UAS, the requirement that the takeoff not 
require exceptionally favorable conditions is applicable to the UAS autopilot design.  
Therefore this requirement was included in the rollup. Subparagraph (b) that requires 
that the vehicle be capable of a safe landing following an engine failure during the 
takeoff profile also was deemed applicable but only where the inability to land safely 
represents a risk to persons or property on the ground. The rollup includes language that 
makes clear that requirements such as this paragraph are only applicable under some 
circumstances, thus opening the door for operational or other mitigations to the hazards 
to persons and property on the ground. 
§27.65    
Climb: all 
engines 
operating 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph requires an applicant to establish the steady rate of climb 
under various conditions. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. Note: Requirements for avoiding obstacles are in 
the Detect & Avoid Dynamic Obstacles issue paper included in the G-1U. 
§27.67    
Climb: one 
engine 
inoperative 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph, applicable to multiengine rotorcraft, requires establishing 
steady rate of climb with one engine out. 
Rationale: Out of vehicle scope. 
§27.71    
Autorotation 
performance 
Excluded Summary:  This requires the establishment of the best angle of glide and minimum rate 
of sink speeds in autorotation. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.75    
Landing 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary: This paragraph, similar in intent to paragraph §27.51, requires the vehicle to 
be capable of being landed smoothly without exceptional pilot skill or exceptionally 
favorable conditions during both a normal approach and an autorotative approach.   
Rationale:  Using the same logic as the takeoff case, the pilot skill requirement does not 
apply since there is no direct inner loop control by a pilot, but the requirement that a 
smooth landing be made without exceptionally favorable conditions may be directly 
applicable to the autopilot design.  The general sense of the paragraph was included in 
the CMS rollup. 
§27.87    
Height-speed 
envelope 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a)  
Summary:  This paragraph requires that any combinations of height and forward speed 
for which a safe landing cannot be made must be established for the relevant power 
failure condition. This limiting condition is sometimes known as the “Dead Man’s 
Curve”.   
Rationale:  Engine failure from a height/speed combination that does not allow a 
successful autorotation would likely result in destruction of the rotor system and release 
of high energy parts. This paragraph, especially (b)(1) which requires full autorotation 
for a single engine helicopter, was included in the rollup as one of the critical conditions 
that the applicant must identify and mitigate. 
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Flight Characteristics 
§27.141 
General 
 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that the vehicle be capable of maintaining any 
required flight condition and be able to transition smoothly between flight conditions 
without exceptional pilot skill and without danger of exceeding limiting load factors. A 
list of parameters for which critical conditions must be tested, including weights, center 
of gravity, altitudes, temperatures, engine failure conditions, etc., are specified.  
Rationale: While the exceptional piloting skill requirement would not be applicable to a 
vehicle with no provisions for inner loop pilot control, the same requirements would 
apply to the autopilot design and implementation.  Subparagraph (c) also requires that 
the vehicle possess any required flight characteristic necessary for night or instrument 
flight, if certification for such conditions is requested. Since the ConOps includes night 
and limited visibility operations, this subparagraph was included in the CMS and SI 
rollups. 
§27.143 
Controllability 
and maneuver-
ability  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that the vehicle be safely controllable and 
maneuverable for a specified set of normal operations, such as takeoff, landing, and 
steady flight, and for non-normal conditions, such as autorotation (if implemented) and 
power-on recoveries. The paragraph also specifies that adequate control margins exist at 
Vne for critical values of relevant parameters. The paragraph further specifies wind and 
density altitudes for which the vehicle must be safely controllable and maneuverable and 
critical values of other parameters.  
Rationale:  Under the ConOps, neither Vne, nor 7000 ft will likely be reached.  However, 
the general requirement that the vehicle be safely controllable and maneuverable over a 
relevant set of conditions with critical values of other parameters, such as weight, center 
of gravity, rotor speed, and power condition would be a necessary precondition for 
maintaining rotor system integrity.   
§27.151 
Flight controls  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph sets limits on breakout forces, friction, and preloads, and 
requires that the control system be designed and installed such that the vehicle responds 
directly and smoothly to control system inputs.  
Rationale: Although the UAS has no inner-loop control by a human operator, this 
requirement may be applicable to the autopilot design and was included in CMS(a). 
§27.161 
Trim control  
 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph requires that the rotorcraft be trimmable for the longitudinal, 
lateral, and collective controls.  
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope.  Since the AgR-1 inner loop is controlled exclusively 
by an autopilot, trim forces are not relevant.  
§27.171 
Stability: 
general 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph requires an applicant to consider pilot fatigue and strain in 
designing stability characteristics. 
Rationale: Not UAS relevant, because the remote pilot would not be subject to stability 
characteristics. 
§27.173 
Static 
longitudinal 
stability  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for design and testing for static 
longitudinal stability throughout the full range of altitude allowed under the rotorcraft’s 
certification.   
Rationale: There should be no requirements on static stability for a completely 
automatic control system.  The requirement for testing across the full range of altitude is 
overly burdensome.  However, this requirement may be applicable to the autopilot 
design and testing should be considered with §27.175 and §27.177 for CMS. 
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§27.175 
Demonstration 
of static 
longitudinal 
stability  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for testing static longitudinal stability 
in different phases of flight, under different conditions. 
Rationale:  Same logic as §27.151.  There should be no requirements on static stability 
for a completely automatic control system.  However, this requirement may be 
applicable to the autopilot design and demonstration and considered for CMS.   
§27.177 
Static 
directional 
stability  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary: This paragraph relates to sense and direction of motion of the vehicle in 
response to movement of the directional controls. 
Rationale:  There should be no requirements on static directional stability for a 
completely automatic control system.  However, this requirement may be applicable to 
the autopilot design and considered for CMS. 
Ground and Water Handling Characteristics 
§27.231 
General  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph relates primarily to “handling characteristics.” Most handling 
characteristics are pilot perceptions of the controllability and maneuverability of the 
vehicle. 
Rationale:  Handling characteristics are not applicable to a UAS that is not under direct 
control of a human operator. However, the paragraph also states that the vehicle must be 
free from uncontrollable tendencies in any condition expected in operation.  This may be 
a relevant requirement for protecting rotor system integrity and was included in the 
rollup. 
§27.235    
Taxiing 
condition  
Excluded Summary: This paragraphs deals with withstanding loads related to taxiing the 
rotorcraft. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.239    
Spray 
characteristics  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph deals with mitigating the possibility of spray (from water 
operation) that can obscure a pilot’s vision. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.241    
Ground 
resonance  
As is The rotorcraft may have no dangerous 
tendency to oscillate on the ground with 
the rotor turning. 
Rationale:  This paragraph was included 
because of potential hazards from ground 
resonance to the (ground) crew in proximity 
during takeoff and landing. 
Miscellaneous Flight Requirements 
§27.251    
Vibration  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that the vehicle be free of excessive vibration for 
applicable speed and power conditions.   
Rationale:  While vibration can affect structural strength and fatigue requirements the 
requirement is of interest only as it might affect rotor system integrity. Since the 
relationship between vibration and rotor system structural integrity might have many 
dimensions, including inspection types and frequencies, lifetime limits on parts, etc., this 
requirement would best be addressed as a part of the overall considerations to ensure 
rotor system integrity. 
Subpart C—Strength Requirements 
General 
§27.301   
Loads  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires loads affecting structural strength requirements to be 
in equilibrium with inertia forces. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.303    
Factor of 
safety  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies the factor of safety to be used with loads. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard.   The requirement in §27.602 addresses design 
requirements for critical parts. 
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§27.305    
Strength and 
deformation  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires tests to ensure that structure does not permanently 
deform or fail under load conditions. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard.  
§27.307    
Proof of 
structure  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
& SI 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that an applicant show by analysis or other tests that 
the structure meets the strength and deformation requirements of the subpart.   
Rationale: Since the requirements specifically include limit load tests of the control 
system including control surfaces, this paragraph was rolled up into the CMS issue 
paper. 
§27.309    
Design 
limitations  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b)  
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph sets values for parameters considered critical for showing 
compliance with the structural requirements.  
Rationale:  Parameters such as rotor speed and forward, rearward, and sideward speeds, 
affect the control system requirements and should be considered in the rolled up CMS 
requirements. The roll-up allows the applicant to establish which parameters are critical, 
as opposed to specifying them in the requirement. 
Flight Loads 
§27.321    
General 
 Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies assumptions about flight load factors and provides 
general guidance for complying with flight load requirements in Part 27.   
Rationale:   Since load factors are induced by control movements, the general 
requirement to address flight loads with respect to controllability and structural integrity 
should be considered.  This may drive design requirements on the autopilot.  This 
requirement was included in the CMS and SI rollups. 
§27.337    
Limit 
maneuvering 
load factor  
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies a range of limiting load factors in terms of the 
probability of being exceeded as shown by analysis and flight tests.   
Rationale:  Since load factors are induced by control movements this may be considered 
as a design requirement on the autopilot and thus was included in the rollups. 
§27.339    
Resultant limit 
maneuvering 
loads. 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes assumptions about how loads from limit 
maneuvering load factors should act and defines a rotor tip speed ratio.   
Rationale:  This paragraph provides supporting information for §27.337. Because 
§27.337 may be interpreted or applied in different ways for UAS, this paragraph is not 
necessary for the type certification basis. 
§27.341    
Gust loads 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires rotorcraft to withstand loads from vertical wind 
gusts. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard. 
§27.351    
Yawing 
conditions 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for designing for loads under various 
conditions in unaccelerated flight with zero and maximum achievable yaw. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard.  
§27.361    
Engine torque 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies minimum values for limit torque for different 
engine types to protect the engine from mechanical overload. 
Rationale: Secondary hazard. 
Control Surface and System Loads 
§27.391 
General  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
& SI 
Summary: This paragraph establishes what elements of the control system fall under 
subsequent paragraphs which specify design requirements.   
Rationale:  The elements specified (auxiliary rotors, fixed or movable control surfaces, 
and each system operating any flight control) might apply in some form and thus were 
rolled up to CMS(b) and SI. 
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§27.395    
Control system  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes the maximum loads that the control system must 
be designed to handle.  
Rationale:  The requirements are expressed primarily in terms of pilot-applied loads, 
which would not be relevant but the requirements also covers loads from power 
actuators and these are relevant.  The paragraph also specifies other conditions that must 
be considered in control system design. These include friction, jamming, fatigue, 
inertias, and gusts, which would be relevant to maintaining the integrity of the rotor 
control system. This paragraph was rolled up into the CMS Issue Paper to ensure that 
the applicant addresses power actuator loads and the various other design requirements 
that would ensure rotor system integrity. 
§27.397    
Limit pilot 
forces and 
torques  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies limit pilot forces. 
Rationale: Not UAS relevant. 
§27.399    
Dual control 
system  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph places requirements on dual flight control systems to 
withstand loads associated with specified pilot forces. 
Rationale: Not UAS relevant. 
§27.411 
Ground 
clearance: tail 
rotor guard  
Modified 
 
For rotorcraft with tail rotors: 
(a) It must be impossible for the tail rotor 
to contact the landing surface during a 
normal landing.  
(b) If a tail rotor guard is required to show 
compliance with paragraph (a) of this 
section— 
(1) Suitable design loads must be 
established for the guard; and  
(2) The guard and its supporting structure 
must be designed to withstand those loads. 
Rationale:  This paragraph was modified to 
increase the applicability of the type 
certification basis to non-tandem rotorcraft. 
Impact of the tail rotor with the ground may 
lead to loss of integrity of the tail rotor and 
result in high energy parts being ejected 
from the containment zone.   
 
Additionally, the crew is in proximity to the 
rotorcraft during landing. Thus a loss of 
rotor hub integrity may result in crew 
impact from any ejected parts (high energy 
or not). Furthermore, since there is likely a 
physical connection between the tail rotor 
and the main rotor, damage to the tail rotor 
might cause damage to the main rotor, 
leading to a further ejection of high energy 
parts.    
§27.427 
Unsymmetrical 
loads  
Modified For rotorcraft with tail rotors: 
(a) Horizontal tail surfaces and their 
supporting structure must be designed for 
unsymmetrical loads arising from yawing 
and rotor wake effects in combination with 
the prescribed flight conditions. 
(b) To meet the design criteria of paragraph 
(a) of this section, in the absence of more 
rational data, both of the following must be 
met: 
(1) One hundred percent of the maximum 
loading from the symmetrical flight 
conditions acts on the surface on one side 
of the plane of symmetry, and no loading 
acts on the other side. 
(2) Fifty percent of the maximum loading 
from the symmetrical flight conditions acts 
Rationale: This paragraph was modified to 
increase the applicability of the type 
certification basis to non-tandem rotorcraft.   
 
(a) Given the critical loading profile 
determined in §27.21 and/or CMS(a) and 
(b), a demonstration of structural integrity 
of the rotor hub under maximal loading 
applied at both full and half moments of 
inertia for the rotor disc is regarded as being 
sufficient to prevent the frequent ejection of 
high energy parts from the containment area 
under asymmetric loading conditions. 
 
(b) Given the critical loading profile 
determined in §27.21 and/or CMS(a) and 
(b), empennage tail rotor surfaces must 
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on the surface on each side of the plane of 
symmetry but in opposite directions. 
(c) For empennage arrangements where the 
horizontal tail surfaces are supported by 
the vertical tail surfaces, the vertical tail 
surfaces and supporting structure must be 
designed for the combined vertical and 
horizontal surface loads resulting from 
each prescribed flight condition, 
considered separately. The flight 
conditions must be selected so the 
maximum design loads are obtained on 
each surface. In the absence of more 
rational data, the unsymmetrical horizontal 
tail surface loading distributions described 
in this section must be assumed. 
further assure structural rotor hub integrity 
under combined longitudinal and lateral 
maximal loading profiles for each critical 
flight condition, unless it can be 
demonstrated that lower values are only 
ever achieved.  This will sufficiently 
mitigate the ejection of high energy parts 
from the containment area under maximal 
lateral and longitudinal loading conditions. 
Ground Loads 
§27.471    
General  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph provides general guidance for what is meant by limit ground 
loads (external loads), and guidance for selecting critical centers of gravity with respect 
to maximum load on the landing gear. 
Rationale: Secondary hazard. 
§27.473    
Ground 
loading 
conditions and 
assumptions  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph sets requirements for establishing design maximum weight 
used in determining strength requirements for ground loads. 
Rationale: Secondary hazard. 
§27.475    
Tires and 
shock 
absorbers  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph states assumptions on tire and shock absorber positions for 
landing, to be used in determining strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.477    
Landing gear 
arrangement  
Excluded Summary: This paragraph specifies how the wheels of a landing gear should be arranged 
with respect to the center of gravity for paragraphs related to taxiing and some load 
characteristics. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.479    
Level landing 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies landing load conditions to be considered in 
establishing strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.481    
Tail-down 
landing 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies tail down landing conditions to be considered in 
establishing strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.483    
One-wheel 
landing 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies one wheel landing conditions to be considered in 
establishing strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
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§27.485    
Lateral drift 
landing 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph specifies lateral drift landing conditions to be considered in 
establishing strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.493    
Braked roll 
conditions  
Excluded  Summary:   This paragraph specifies braked roll conditions to be considered in 
establishing strength requirements. 
Rationale:   Secondary hazard. 
§27.497    
Ground 
loading 
conditions: 
landing gear 
with tail 
wheels  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies ground loading conditions for rotorcraft with tail 
wheels. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.501    
Ground 
loading 
conditions: 
landing gear 
with skids  
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph specifies ground loading conditions for rotorcraft with 
landing gear with skids. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
§27.505    
Ski landing 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph specifies ground loading conditions for rotorcraft with skis. 
Rationale:  Out of ConOps scope. 
Water Loads 
§27.521    
Float landing 
conditions 
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph specifies loading conditions for rotorcraft certificated for 
float operation. 
Rationale:  Out of ConOps scope. 
Main Component Requirements 
§27.547    
Main rotor 
structure  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary: This paragraph specifies conditions and values for which each main rotor 
system must be designed.  
Rationale:  The specific conditions and values should be screened with respect to the 
specific risks associated with an unmanned vehicle in an agricultural application in rural 
areas, especially given that the safety issue is limited to rotor system integrity under a 
very narrow set of operating conditions. Thus, the paragraph was relegated to the issue 
paper where critical conditions related to rotor system integrity could be substituted for 
the specific requirements of the paragraph. 
§27.549    
Fuselage, 
landing gear, 
and rotor pylon 
structures  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies conditions and values for which the fuselage, 
landing gear, and rotor pylons must be designed by reference to numerous other 
paragraphs.  
Rationale:  As in §27.547, Specific conditions and values should be screened with 
respect to the specific risks associated with an unmanned vehicle in an agricultural 
application in rural areas, especially given that the safety issue is limited to rotor system 
integrity under a very narrow set of operating conditions. Thus, the paragraph, like 
§27.547, was relegated to the issue paper. 
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Emergency Landing Conditions 
§27.561    
General 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies load factors that must be considered in structural 
design to protect rotorcraft occupants during emergency landings. 
Rationale: Not UAS relevant. Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.562    
Emergency 
landing 
dynamic 
conditions  
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph specifies many factors related to occupants seats and 
restraints that must be considered in structural design to protect occupants during 
emergency landings. 
Rationale:  Not UAS relevant. Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.563    
Structural 
ditching 
provisions  
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph describes factors that must be considered in structural design 
during emergency landings that take place in water (ditching). 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
Fatigue Evaluation 
§27.571    
Fatigue 
evaluation of 
flight structure  
 
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary: This paragraph establishes requirements for the elements of the flight 
structure that must be identified and evaluated with respect to fatigue considerations, 
including rotor system and drive components. The paragraph further specifies 
procedures and measurement techniques that must be used to determine loads and 
stresses and fatigue tolerances.  
Rationale:  While fatigue considerations were considered important in ensuring the rotor 
system integrity, the specifics of this paragraph were considered too detailed to be 
applicable as written to an unmanned rotorcraft in a very limited operational 
circumstance. Thus, the requirements of the paragraph were rolled up to SI. 
§27.573    
Damage 
Tolerance and 
Fatigue 
Evaluation of 
Composite 
Rotorcraft 
Structures  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements and methodology for evaluating 
composite rotorcraft structures for with damage tolerance standards. 
Rationale:  The ConOps requires flying very low over crops.  The possibility of 
entrainment of ground debris into the rotor wake and subsequent impingement on 
rotorcraft structure must be considered.  The specifics of this paragraph were considered 
too detailed to be applicable as written to an unmanned rotorcraft in a very limited 
operational circumstance. Thus, the requirements of the paragraph were rolled up into 
the more general statement of requirements in the issue paper. 
Subpart D—Design and Construction 
General 
§27.601 
Design  
Modified (a) The UAS rotorcraft may have no design 
features or details that experience has 
shown to be hazardous or unreliable.  
(b) For each questionable design detail 
whose failure could adversely affect safety, 
the suitability of each questionable design 
detail and part must be established by tests.   
Rationale:  The entire system (i.e., the GCS 
and other components, not just the UA) 
must be free from hazardous features and 
details.  A feature is hazardous if, during 
operations as described in the ConOps, it 
could lead to death of serious injury of any 
person or lead to a large reduction in safety 
margin. UAS design details that may be 
deemed conventionally questionable, such 
as the unqualified use of commercial-off-
the-shelf components, pedigreed sensors 
and actuators etc., must only be considered 
with respect to their safety effects.   
§27.602 
Critical Parts 
Modified  (a) Critical part. A critical part is a part, the 
failure of which could have a catastrophic 
effect upon the rotorcraft UAS, and for 
which critical characteristics have been 
Rationale:  A critical part is one whose 
failure results in a catastrophic failure for 
the UAS.  Critical parts might be found in 
the containment system, ground control 
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identified which must be controlled to 
ensure the required level of integrity. 
(b) If the type design includes critical parts, 
a critical parts list shall be established. 
Procedures shall be established to define 
the critical design characteristics, identify 
processes that affect those characteristics, 
and identify the design change and process 
change controls necessary for showing 
compliance with the quality assurance 
requirements of part 21 of this chapter. 
station, receivers, etc.  A critical parts list 
should include those parts whose failure is 
considered catastrophic, for example 
because it would result in the ejection of 
high energy parts from containment area or 
a fly away event. 
§27.603 
Materials 
As is The suitability and durability of materials 
used for parts, the failure of which could 
adversely affect safety, must— 
(a) Be established on the basis of 
experience or tests;  
(b) Meet approved specifications that 
ensure their having the strength and other 
properties assumed in the design data; and  
(c) Take into account the effects of 
environmental conditions, such as 
temperature and humidity, expected in 
service. 
Rationale:  Only safety critical systems 
need to meet this standard (all other systems 
need not comply and/or degrade gracefully).  
The provision that this only applies “for 
parts, the failure of which could adversely 
affect safety” is part of the Part 27 text.  
This phrase is included elsewhere since it is 
particularly relevant to this G-1U issue 
paper. 
§27.605    
Fabrication 
methods  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph relates primarily to production methods, requiring methods 
that produce consistently sound structures and a test program to substantiate those 
methods.   
Rationale: This requirement is felt to be applicable to control system fabrication as well 
as other structures and so is included in the CMS rollup. 
§27.607    
Fasteners 
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes a requirement for locking devices for bolts, 
screws, nuts, pins, etc. used in any critical application that could jeopardize safe 
operations.  
Rationale:  This paragraph was felt to be particularly applicable to control systems and 
so was rolled up into the CMS Issue Paper to force consideration of fasteners and their 
role in maintaining rotor system integrity.  
§27.609 
Protection of 
structure 
Modified Each part of the structure, whose failure 
could adversely affect safety, must— 
(a) Be suitably protected against 
deterioration or loss of strength in service 
due to any cause, including— 
(1) Weathering;  
(2) Corrosion; and  
(3) Abrasion; and  
(b) Have provisions for ventilation and 
drainage where necessary to prevent the 
accumulation of corrosive, flammable, or 
noxious fluids. 
Rationale:  Only parts of the UAS structure 
that affect overall UAS system safety need 
meet this standard. However, parts of the 
system other than the UA might also affect 
safety and thus need to be considered. 
Safety considerations should include effects 
on the crew. 
§27.610 
Lightning and 
static 
electricity 
protection  
Modified (a) The rotorcraft must be protected against 
catastrophic effects from lightning. 
(b) For metallic components, compliance 
with paragraph (a) of this section may be 
shown by— 
(1) Electrically bonding the components 
Rationale:  The ConOps does not allow for 
operations during conditions in which 
lightning occurs. 
(a-c) are not applicable as the lightning 
strike hazard is controlled operationally. 
(d) is mostly kept because details relevant 
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properly to the airframe; or 
(2) Designing the components so that a 
strike will not endanger the rotorcraft. 
(c) For nonmetallic components, 
compliance with paragraph (a) of this 
section may be shown by— 
(1) Designing the components to minimize 
the effect of a strike; or 
(2) Incorporating acceptable means of 
diverting the resulting electrical current so 
as not to endanger the rotorcraft. 
(d) The electrical bonding and protection 
against lightning and static electricity 
must— 
(1) Minimize the accumulation of 
electrostatic charge; 
(2) Minimize the risk of electric shock to 
crew, passengers, and service and 
maintenance personnel using normal 
precautions; 
(3) Provide an electrical return path, under 
both normal and fault conditions, on 
rotorcraft having grounded electrical 
systems; and 
(4) Reduce to an acceptable level the 
effects of static electricity on the 
functioning of essential electrical and 
electronic equipment. 
to static electricity must be considered.  
Static electricity can electrocute a 
crewmember, so buildup must be mitigated.  
Neither lightning nor passengers need to be 
considered in (d). 
§27.611 
Inspection 
provisions  
Modified There must be means to allow the close 
examination of each part, whose failure 
could adversely affect safety, that 
requires— 
(a) Recurring inspection;  
(b) Adjustment for proper alignment and 
functioning; or  
(c) Lubrication. 
Rationale:  Only safety-critical UAS parts 
need meet this standard (all other systems 
parts need not comply). 
§27.613    
Material 
strength 
properties and 
design values  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies the materials and structural strength required for the 
vehicle. 
Rationale: Material strength would likely be a factor in maintaining rotor system 
integrity.  This paragraph was included in the SI roll-up. 
§27.619    
Special factors  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph increases the factor of safety prescribed for bearings, fittings 
and castings for parts whose strength is variable, uncertain, or likely to deteriorate in 
service before normal replacement. 
Rationale: Secondary hazard. The requirement in §27.602 addresses design 
requirements for critical parts.  
§27.621    
Casting factors  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes manufacturing, inspection, and testing 
requirements for critical castings.  
Rationale:  Since any castings used in the control system would likely be critical to 
maintaining rotor system integrity, this paragraph was included in the CMS rollup. 
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§27.623    
Bearing factors  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for parts which have clearances and 
are subjected to pounding or vibration.   
Rationale:  Rotorcraft are known to have such forces in their control systems and the 
bearing surfaces are also known to require specific clearances to control friction and 
binding in the system. The requirements of this paragraph were rolled up to CMS(b) and 
SI Issue Papers. 
§27.625    
Fitting factors  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes a fitting factor of 1.15 and specifies the parts to 
which the factor applies if strength is not established in other acceptable ways.   
Rationale:  Because the control system requires fitting of parts but the exact fitting 
factor may be different, this requirement was rolled up. 
§27.629  
Flutter 
As Is Each aerodynamic surface of the rotorcraft 
must be free from flutter under each 
appropriate speed and power condition. 
Rationale:  Flutter must not impact rotor 
system integrity.   
Rotors 
§27.653    
Pressure 
venting and 
drainage of 
rotor blades  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for rotor blade pressure relief and 
drainage for rotor blades that are not sealed.   
Rationale:  This paragraph relates to rotor system integrity and could be relevant 
depending on rotor blade design.  
§27.659    
Mass balance  
 
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements (1) for rotor mass balance to 
prevent excessive vibration at speeds out to the maximum forward speed and (2) for 
substantiation of the structural integrity of the mass balance.  
Rationale:  Rotor mass balance affects structural integrity, but the definitions of 
“excessive” and “maximum forward speed” for a UAS under the ConOps may differ 
from Part 27 rotorcraft.  The paragraph was included in the more generalized 
requirements of the SI Issue Paper. 
§27.661    
Rotor blade 
clearance 
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes a requirement that the rotor blades not contact 
any part of the structure during any operating condition.   
Rationale:  While this requirement relates to maintaining rotor system integrity under 
most conditions, there might be exceptions related to autorotations away from the 
operational boundaries where the vehicle could sustain damage or loss without hazard to 
persons or property.  The requirement was included in the rollup to allow discussion of 
tailoring the requirement to the specific design and operations of the UAS. 
§27.663    
Ground 
resonance 
prevention 
means  
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements on the means incorporated in the 
rotorcraft design to avoid ground resonance and a requirement that failure of any single 
means will not cause ground resonance.  
Rationale:  Avoidance of ground resonance was considered an important aspect of 
maintaining rotor system integrity, particularly near (ground) crewmembers involved in 
the servicing the vehicle.  The requirements for establishing the reliability of such 
systems, however, might be different for unmanned vehicles than for manned vehicles, 
so the paragraph was rolled up. 
Control Systems 
§27.671    
General  
 
Rolled up 
to CMS (a 
and b) 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements on smoothness of the control 
systems and a requirement that they be designed or marked to minimize probability of 
incorrect assembly.   
Rationale:  Requirements for smoothness of the control system are dictated by the 
design and power of the automatic control system and its servos, which must satisfy the 
flight requirements of CMS(a).  The design and marking requirements to minimize 
incorrect assembly are covered in CMS(b). 
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§27.672    
Stability 
augmentation, 
automatic, and 
power-
operated 
systems  
 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that any automatic stabilization or automatic control 
systems must be able to continue to a safe landing after any single failure in the system. 
The paragraph further specifies that the controllability and maneuverability 
requirements previously specified continue to be met within a “practical operational 
envelope”. Other parts of the paragraph relate to warning systems and pilot skill and 
strength requirements. 
Rationale:  Although pilot-related requirements are not applicable under this ConOps, 
the requirements for controllability and maneuverability were rolled up with the 
expectation that the applicant and regulatory authority will determine the applicable 
requirements for the automatic flight control system of the AgR-1. 
§27.673    
Primary flight 
control  
Excluded Summary: Defines what a primary flight control is relative to a pilot. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Pilot does not have inner-loop control. 
§27.674   
Interconnected 
controls  
Excluded Summary: Ensures that safe flight can continue after a jam or other malfunction of an 
auxiliary interconnected flight control. 
Rationale: Out of vehicle scope.  AgR-1 does not use interconnected auxiliary controls. 
§27.675    
Stops  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies that the control system must contain stops that limit 
the range of control motion and conditions that must be considered in setting the stops.   
Rationale:  While a UAS will not have traditional pilot controls and thus the need for 
stops to limit pilot control inputs, there still exists a requirement to ensure that the 
control system actuators cannot produce commands that would cause a failure condition 
in the control system and thus jeopardize rotor system integrity. This requirement 
generally applies and was included in the CMS(b). 
§27.679   
Control system 
locks  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for control system locks if they are 
part of the design.  
Rationale:  Although the operational concept would not likely dictate a requirement for 
control system locks, the requirement for ground transportability could possibly dictate a 
requirement and was included in the rollup. 
§27.681    
Limit load 
static tests  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
and SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes the conditions under which compliance with 
control system limit loads must be shown.   
Rationale: Since the integrity of the control system is essential to maintaining the 
integrity of the rotor system, this paragraph may be generally applicable and was 
included in the rollup for CMS(b). 
§27.683    
Operation tests 
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies that the control system must be free of jamming, 
excessive friction, and excessive deflection when operated from the pilot compartment 
to the loads specified for the system.  
Rationale: While the UAS does not have an on board pilot compartment, the spirit of the 
rule is that the control system be free of the specified characteristics when operated by 
power actuators. What constitutes “excessive” might vary for an automatic control 
system compared with a manual control system and would probably be limited by 
required control system performance. 
§27.685    
Control system 
details  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies a number of miscellaneous requirements for control 
system functioning to prevent jamming, chafing, and interference from cargo, 
passengers, loose objects or the freezing of moisture.  This applies primarily to pulley 
and cable systems. Special design factors for push-pull and cable systems are also 
specified.   
Rationale:  The general intent that the control system design should consider jamming, 
chafing and interference applies in general. Applicability of the specific details in the 
paragraph will depend on implementation of the control system. 
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§27.687    
Spring devices  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that spring devices whose failure could compromise 
safe flight need to be reliable and must be shown as such by demonstrations simulating 
service conditions.  
Rationale:  Failure of spring devices in the control system could result in flutter or other 
unsafe conditions and thus could represent a threat to control system and rotor system 
integrity.  The paragraph was rolled up to ensure that the applicant considers the 
requirements on spring devices to the extent they are included in the design. 
§27.691 
Autorotation 
control 
mechanism  
Modified If autorotation capability is implemented, 
each main rotor blade pitch control 
mechanism must allow rapid entry into 
autorotation after power failure 
Rationale:  The autorotation function may 
not be required by the ConOps (e.g., max 
altitude restrictions and acceptability of hull 
loss). 
§27.695    
Power boost 
and power-
operated 
control system  
Rolled up 
to CMS(b) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for an alternate control system to 
provide continued safe flight in the event of a failure of a power actuator or any of the 
elements supporting the actuator, such as pumps, valves, and lines.  The paragraph 
includes requirements on the reliability of mechanical parts and actuators.   
Rationale:  The requirements of this paragraph are generally applicable given the use of 
servos in the primary flight control system of the AgR-1, although only to the extent that 
failure to meet the requirements would jeopardize rotor system integrity. The paragraph 
was rolled up in CMS(b) as a consideration in control system design and installation. 
Landing Gear 
§27.723    
Shock 
absorption 
tests 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes conditions for executing the required shock 
absorption tests. 
Rationale: Secondary hazard. 
§27.725    
Limit drop test  
Excluded Summary: This paragraph describes the impulsive load the landing gear is capable of 
withstanding without collapse. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.727    
Reserve energy 
absorption 
drop test 
Excluded  Summary:  This paragraph describes the amount of impact energy the landing gear must 
be capable of absorbing without collapse. 
Rationale:  Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.729    
Retracting 
mechanism 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes the requirements for retractable landing gear. 
Rationale:   Does not map to a hazard.   This assumes there are no other hazards 
associated with retractable landing gear beyond ground resonance 
§27.731    
Wheels 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes wheel requirements for the landing gear. 
Rationale:   Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.733    
Tires 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes the performance requirements of the tires in the 
landing gear. 
Rationale:   Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.735    
Brakes 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:   This paragraph establishes functional requirements for the brakes including 
design requirements related to startup, shutdown, landing, and while parked on a 10 
degree slope. 
Rationale:   If equipped with a wheel system, this requirement mitigates the hazard of 
the vehicle unintentionally moving under the required conditions.   
§27.737    
Skis 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph describes limit loading for landing on skis. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
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Floats and Hulls 
§27.751    
Main float 
buoyancy 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes buoyancy requirements on the vehicle. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.753    
Main float 
design 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes design requirements on buoyancy elements. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.755    
Hulls 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes the buoyancy requirements on the vehicle in the 
case of hull damage. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
Personnel and Cargo Accommodations 
§27.771    
Pilot 
compartment 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for an onboard 
pilot. 
Rationale:  Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.773    
Pilot 
compartment 
view 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for an onboard 
pilot. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.775   
Windshields 
and windows 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations (windshields and windows) 
necessary for an onboard pilot to see outside of the aircraft. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.777    
Cockpit 
controls 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations (cockpit controls) necessary 
for an onboard pilot to control the aircraft. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.779   
Motion and 
effect of 
cockpit 
controls 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for motion relevant 
to cockpit controls for an onboard pilot. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.783    
Doors 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph deals with external doors necessary for onboard persons to 
safely exit the aircraft. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.785    
Seats, berths, 
litters, safety 
belts, and 
harnesses 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the seating accommodations (e.g., seatbelts, seats, 
or harnesses) necessary for onboard persons. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.787    
Cargo and 
baggage 
compartments 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the cargo and baggage compartments to stow 
articles for onboard persons. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.801    
Ditching 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for the safety 
onboard persons in the event of ditching. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
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§27.805    
Flight crew 
emergency 
exits 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for emergency 
exits (onboard) for the flight crew. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.807    
Emergency 
exits 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for emergency 
exits for onboard passengers. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.831    
Ventilation 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with the accommodations necessary for the ventilation 
system to prevent fuel fumes and carbon monoxide from harming onboard persons. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.833    
Heaters 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph requires approval of any combustion heaters necessary for the 
accommodation of onboard persons. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
Fire Protection 
§27.853    
Compartment 
interiors 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with onboard fire protection for compartments used by 
crew or passengers. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.855    
Cargo and 
baggage 
compartments 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with onboard fire protection for cargo and baggage 
compartments. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.859    
Heating 
systems 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph deals with onboard fire and carbon monoxide protection 
related to heating systems. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.861    
Fire protection 
of structure, 
controls, and 
other parts 
Modified Each part of the structure, controls, rotor 
mechanism, and other parts essential to 
preventing loss of containment or ejection 
of high energy parts a controlled landing 
that would be affected by powerplant fires 
must be fireproof or protected so they can 
perform their essential functions for at least 
5 minutes under any foreseeable 
powerplant fire conditions. 
Rationale:  Need fire protection sufficient to 
mitigate safety-critical hazards.  The time 
requirement may need further consideration. 
§27.863 
Flammable 
fluid fire 
protection  
Modified (a) In each area where flammable fluids or 
vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid 
system, there must be means to minimize 
the probability of ignition of the fluids and 
vapors, and the resultant hazards if ignition 
does occur.  
(b) Compliance with paragraph (a) of this 
section must be shown by analysis or tests, 
and the following factors must be 
considered:  
(1) Possible sources and paths of fluid 
leakage, and means of detecting leakage.  
(2) Flammability characteristics of fluids, 
including effects of any combustible or 
absorbing materials.  
(3) Possible ignition sources, including 
electrical faults, overheating of equipment, 
Rationale: The control of the flammable 
fluid hazard is not related to the act of fire 
protection for onboard crew and passengers 
of the rotorcraft, but instead centered 
around fire protection for the UAS crew and 
bystanders.  Hence, subparagraph (b)(4) 
was kept because it pertains to having 
sufficient means for fire control (equipment, 
access to electrical cutoffs, operational 
procedures etc.) available to UAS crew. 
 
The loss of hull integrity of the rotorcraft 
within the containment region is not a 
hazard, so the rotorcraft structure itself need 
not be protected from flammable fluid 
ignition. 
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and malfunctioning of protective devices.  
(4) Means available for controlling or 
extinguishing a fire, such as stopping flow 
of fluids, shutting down equipment, 
fireproof containment, or use of 
extinguishing agents provided either by the 
type design or through operational 
requirements and provisions.  
(5) Ability of rotorcraft components that 
are critical to safety of flight to withstand 
fire and heat.  
(c) If action by the flight crew is required 
to prevent or counteract a fluid fire (e.g. 
equipment shutdown or actuation of a fire 
extinguisher) quick acting means must be 
provided to alert the crew.  
(d) Each area where flammable fluids or 
vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid 
system must be identified and defined. 
External Loads 
§27.865    
External loads. 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph deals with the requirements for attaching external loads to 
the vehicle. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope. Secondary hazard.  The spray system is assumed to be 
an external load (but not a jettisonable one).   
Miscellaneous 
§27.871    
Leveling 
marks 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires marking in order to level the rotorcraft to affect 
stability (for loading conditions) 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.873    
Ballast 
provisions 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires preventative measures so that ballast does not shift 
in flight 
Rationale:  Does not map to a hazard. 
Subpart E—Powerplant 
General 
§27.901 
Installation  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph defines powerplant installation and establishes high-level 
safety requirements for continued operations between inspections/overhauls, electrical 
connections, accessibility, etc., and requires installation in accordance with Part 33 
requirements. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope. Secondary hazard. The high-level safety requirements 
were, in part, established to provide safety for onboard occupants, which would not 
apply to a UAS.  Use of a Part 33 certified engine is not required, and thus Part 33 
installation requirements would not apply. Minimum safety requirements relevant to the 
UAS powerplant are covered adequately in other paragraphs and the PPS rollup. 
§27.903 
Engines 
Modified (a) Engine type certification. Each engine 
must have an approved type certificate. 
Reciprocating engines for use in 
helicopters must be qualified in accordance 
with §33.49(d) of this chapter or be 
otherwise approved for the intended usage.  
(b) Engine or drive system cooling fan 
blade protection. (1) If an engine or rotor 
Rationale:  Subparagraph (a) is deleted 
because a certified engine is not required, as 
hull loss inside the containment region is 
not catastrophic. 
Subparagraph (b) is deleted because the 
unmanned rotorcraft does not need to be 
protected if a fan blade fails, as hull loss in 
the containment area is not catastrophic. 
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drive system cooling fan is installed, there 
must be a means to protect the rotorcraft 
and allow a safe landing if a fan blade fails. 
This must be shown by showing that—  
(i) The fan blades are contained in case of 
failure;  
(ii) Each fan is located so that a failure will 
not jeopardize safety; or  
(iii) Each fan blade can withstand an 
ultimate load of 1.5 times the centrifugal 
force resulting from operation limited by 
the following:  
(A) For fans driven directly by the 
engine— 
(1) The terminal engine r.p.m. under 
uncontrolled conditions; or  
(2) An overspeed limiting device.  
(B) For fans driven by the rotor drive 
system, the maximum rotor drive system 
rotational speed to be expected in service, 
including transients.  
(2) Unless a fatigue evaluation under 
§27.571 is conducted, it must be shown 
that cooling fan blades are not operating at 
resonant conditions within the operating 
limits of the rotorcraft.  
(c) Turbine engine installation. For turbine 
engine installations, the powerplant 
systems associated with engine control 
devices, systems, and instrumentation must 
be designed to give reasonable assurance 
that those engine operating limitations that 
adversely affect turbine rotor structural 
integrity will not be exceeded in service. 
(d) Restart capability: A means to restart 
any engine in flight must be provided. 
(1) Except for the in-flight shutdown of all 
engines, engine restart capability must be 
demonstrated throughout a flight envelope 
for the rotorcraft. 
(2) Following the in-flight shutdown of all 
engines, in-flight engine restart capability 
must be provided. 
Subparagraph (c) is kept because it helps 
mitigate hazards associated with high 
energy parts exiting the containment area.  
Subparagraph (d) is deleted because restart 
capability is not required as hull loss in the 
containment area is not catastrophic. 
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§27.907  
Engine 
vibration 
Modified (a) Each engine must be installed to 
prevent the harmful vibration of any part of 
the engine or rotorcraft.  
(b) The addition of the rotor and the rotor 
drive system to the engine may not subject 
the principal rotating parts of the engine to 
excessive vibration stresses. This must be 
shown by a vibration investigation.  
(c) No part of the rotor drive system may 
be subjected to excessive vibration 
stresses. 
Rationale:  Subparagraphs (a) and (b) were 
deleted because engine integrity itself is not 
needed. 
Subparagraph (c) was kept because rotor 
drive integrity must be protected from 
destructive vibration, as this may lead to the 
hazard of high energy parts being ejected 
from the containment area. 
Rotor Drive System 
§27.917 
Design  
Modified (a) Each rotor drive system must 
incorporate a unit for each engine to 
automatically disengage that engine from 
the main and auxiliary rotors if that engine 
fails.  
(b) Each rotor drive system must be 
arranged so that each rotor necessary for 
control in autorotation will continue to be 
driven by the main rotors after 
disengagement of the engine from the main 
and auxiliary rotors.  
(c) If a torque limiting device is used in the 
rotor drive system, it must be located so as 
to allow continued control of the rotorcraft 
when the device is operating.  
(bd) The rotor drive system includes any 
part necessary to transmit power from the 
engines to the rotor hubs. This includes 
gear boxes, shafting, universal joints, 
couplings, rotor brake assemblies, clutches, 
supporting bearings for shafting, any 
attendant accessory pads or drives, and any 
cooling fans that are a part of, attached to, 
or mounted on the rotor drive system. 
Rationale:  Subparagraphs (a) and (d) are 
kept because rotors must be protected from 
engine seizures/failures to prevent high 
energy parts from being ejected from the 
containment area. 
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) were deleted 
because neither autorotation nor a torque 
limiting device are required functions, and 
this hazard may be mitigated via operational 
means (e.g., limited altitude). 
§27.921  
Rotor brake 
As is If there is a means to control the rotation of 
the rotor drive system independently of the 
engine, any limitations on the use of that 
means must be specified, and the control 
for that means must be guarded to prevent 
inadvertent operation. 
Rationale:  A rotor brake engaging 
inadvertently could lead to rotor integrity 
being compromised. 
§27.923    
Rotor drive 
system and 
control 
mechanism 
tests  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes specific hourly or cycle requirements for testing 
of rotor systems and associated components. 
Rationale:  Multiengine requirements of this paragraph are Out of vehicle scope.  Other 
testing requirements would not be directly applicable to the AgR-1 and ConOps given 
that hull loss is acceptable under some circumstances.  
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§27.927    
Additional 
tests 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph defines additional rotor system tests that apply if the torque 
going from the engine to the transmission is not under direct pilot control and other 
conditions specific to multi-engine turbine installations. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope. Mitigated by other regulation.  This paragraph was 
excluded because multiple engines are out of scope and additional tests are 
unnecessarily burdensome for the operational context. 
§27.931 
Shafting 
critical speed 
As is (a) The critical speeds of any shafting must 
be determined by demonstration except 
that analytical methods may be used if 
reliable methods of analysis are available 
for the particular design.  
(b) If any critical speed lies within, or close 
to, the operating ranges for idling, power 
on, and autorotative conditions, the stresses 
occurring at that speed must be within safe 
limits. This must be shown by tests.  
(c) If analytical methods are used and show 
that no critical speed lies within the 
permissible operating ranges, the margins 
between the calculated critical speeds and 
the limits of the allowable operating ranges 
must be adequate to allow for possible 
variations between the computed and 
actual values. 
Rationale:  This requirement is important to 
maintain rotor drive shaft system integrity.  
§27.935 
Shafting joints 
As is Each universal joint, slip joint, and other 
shafting joints whose lubrication is 
necessary for operation must have 
provision for lubrication. 
Rationale:  This requirement is important to 
maintain rotor drive shaft system integrity. 
§27.939    
Turbine engine 
operating 
characteristics 
Modified (a) Turbine engine operating characteristics 
must be investigated in flight to determine 
that no adverse characteristics (such as 
stall, surge, or flameout) are present, to a 
hazardous degree, during normal and 
emergency operation within the range of 
operating limitations of the rotorcraft and 
of the engine. 
(b) The turbine engine air inlet system may 
not, as a result of airflow distortion during 
normal operation, cause vibration harmful 
to the engine. 
(c) For governor-controlled engines, it 
must be shown that there exists no 
hazardous torsional instability of the drive 
system associated with critical 
combinations of power, rotational speed, 
and control displacement. 
Rationale: Subparagraphs (a) and (b) were 
excluded because they do not relate to a 
hazard.  However, subparagraph (c) is 
relevant because the hazard of over-torque 
of the transmission/rotor system from loss 
of governor control should be mitigated to 
prevent loss of rotor system integrity. 
Fuel System 
§27.951 
General  
Excluded Summary: This paragraph establishes requirements for fuel system design and 
installation to ensure continued operation of the engine. 
Rationale: Mitigated by other regulation.   
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§27.952    
Fuel system 
crash 
resistance  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes design and testing requirements for fuel tanks. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard.   The fuel tank does not need to meet crashworthiness 
requirements for manned vehicles. 
§27.953    
Fuel system 
independence  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for single and multiple fuel tanks in 
multiengine rotorcraft. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope.  
§27.954    
Fuel system 
lightning 
protection  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for fuel system protection from 
lightning strikes. 
Rationale:  Out of ConOps scope. The ConOps assumes no operations in thunderstorms.  
Risk associated with the possibility of a lightning strike on the ground and potential 
harm to the crew should be considered in operational procedures. 
§27.955    
Fuel flow  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements to ensure stable fuel flow to the 
engine. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation. 
§27.959    
Unusable fuel 
supply  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements to determine minimum usable fuel. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation. 
§27.961    
Fuel system 
hot weather 
operation  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for fuel system operations at fuel 
temperature up to 110 deg. F. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation. 
§27.963    
Fuel tanks: 
general  
Rolled-up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes general requirements for fuel tank design, 
construction and installation, including such features as baffling, vibration resistance, 
inertia and fuel loading structural requirements, and ventilation requirements.  
Rationale:  These requirements are necessary in some form to mitigate a possible 
explosion hazard should fuel escape from the fuel tank during operations. The 
requirements were rolled up into a general statement that the applicant determines safety 
critical conditions including consideration of fuel tank design, construction, and 
installation. 
§27.965    
Fuel tank tests  
Rolled-up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies conditions under which fuel tanks must be tested to 
show structural integrity, including pressures, times, vibrations, etc.  
Rationale:  As in §27.963, this paragraph relates to ensuring explosion resistance of the 
fuel tank installation and was rolled up into the generalized requirements for the 
powerplant and supporting systems. 
§27.967   
Fuel tank 
installation  
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph requires that fuel tanks be installed in such a way that they 
are properly supported and provided adequate protection against expected loads.   
Rationale:  This paragraph was rolled up for the same reasons as §27.963 and §27.965. 
§27.969 
Fuel tank 
expansion 
space 
As is Each fuel tank or each group of fuel tanks 
with interconnected vent systems must 
have an expansion space of not less than 2 
percent of the tank capacity. It must be 
impossible to fill the fuel tank expansion 
space inadvertently with the rotorcraft in 
the normal ground attitude. 
Rationale:  Fuel tank should not be 
overfilled, because this might lead to 
possible inadvertent ignition. 
§27.971    
Fuel tank sump  
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for a drainable fuel sump and sets 
minimum size to minimize possibility of water or sediment in the fuel which could lead 
to engine malfunction. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation.  
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§27.973 
Fuel tank filler 
connection  
Modified (a) Each fuel tank filler connection must 
prevent the entrance of fuel into any part of 
the rotorcraft other than the tank itself 
during normal operations and must be 
crash resistant during a survivable impact 
in accordance with §27.952(c). In 
addition— 
(1) Each filler must be marked as 
prescribed in §27.1557(c)(1); 
(2) Each recessed filler connection that can 
retain any appreciable quantity of fuel must 
have a drain that discharges clear of the 
entire rotorcraft; and 
(3) Each filler cap must provide a fuel-tight 
seal under the fluid pressure expected in 
normal operation and in a survivable 
impact. 
(b) Each filler cap or filler cap cover must 
warn when the cap is not fully locked or 
seated on the filler connection. 
Rationale:  Fuel must stay in the fuel tank to 
avoid possible inadvertent ignition. This 
protects the ground crew (e.g., when the 
rotorcraft is landing or taking off).  Fuel 
tank filler connections need not preserve 
hull integrity during a crash because the fuel 
system itself is not required to be crash 
resistant.  
Subparagraph (3) was kept because fuel 
vapors leaking from a loose or faulty fuel 
cap could be an inflight or ground fire or 
explosion hazard. Thus the filler cap should 
be required to provide a fuel-tight seal. 
Subparagraph (b) was kept because ground 
crew must be warned if the filler cap is not 
properly locked or seated on the filler 
connection, in order to preserve ground 
crew safety. 
§27.975 
Fuel tank vents  
Modified (a) Each fuel tank must be vented from the 
top part of the expansion space so that 
venting is effective under all normal flight 
conditions. Each vent must minimize the 
probability of stoppage by dirt or ice.  
(b) The venting system must be designed to 
minimize spillage of fuel through the vents 
to an ignition source in the event of a 
rollover during landing or ground 
operation, or a survivable impact. 
Rationale:  Venting is required to preserve 
ground crew safety. Design for survivable 
impact is not necessary because there are no 
humans on board. 
§27.977    
Fuel tank 
outlet 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for fuel outlets and strainers that 
relate to maintaining fuel flow to the engine. 
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. 
Fuel System Components 
§27.991    
Fuel pumps 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes failure conditions that must not jeopardize 
compliance with §27.955. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation. The requirements of §27.955 were also 
excluded. 
§27.993    
Fuel system 
lines and 
fittings 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph sets requirements for fuel lines and fittings that safely 
accommodate high temperatures, vibration, and relative motion of components.  
Rationale:  Failure to comply with the spirit of these requirements in some form could 
result in a fuel system explosion hazard, but the requirement as written might be too 
restrictive for an unmanned system design that could tolerate hull losses under some 
conditions. Thus, the requirement was rolled up as part of the more general requirements 
for the powerplant and supporting systems. 
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§27.995    
Fuel valves 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for the locations, responsiveness, 
and controls for fuel valves.  
Rationale:  As in §27.993, failure to comply with the spirit of these requirements in 
some form could result in a fuel system explosion hazard, but the requirement as written 
might be too restrictive for an unmanned system design that could tolerate hull losses 
under some conditions.  The requirement was rolled up under the more general 
requirements of the powerplant and supporting systems. 
§27.997    
Fuel strainer or 
filter 
Excluded 
except for 
(c), which 
is rolled 
up to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for fuel strainers and filters.  
Subparagraph (c) establishes requirements for structural mounting of any fuel strainer or 
filter installed.  
Rationale:  Failure of the fuel filter/strainer mounting (if installed) could lead to a failure 
to contain fuel within the fuel system and an explosion hazard. Subparagraph (c) was 
rolled up into PPS. 
§27.999    
Fuel system 
drains. 
Excluded 
except for 
(b)(2), 
which is 
rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements on fuel system drains. 
Subparagraph (b)(2) establishes requirements for positive closure of fuel system drains. 
Rationale:  Since leaking fuel from a fuel system drain could represent an explosion 
hazard, this subparagraph was rolled up to PPS for consideration during powerplant and 
supporting systems design. 
Oil System 
§27.1011    
Engines: 
General 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes design requirements for engine oil system(s) that 
ensure adequate oil supply to the engine under continuous operations. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation.   
§27.1013   
Oil tanks 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes general requirements for oil tank design, 
construction and installation.   
Rationale:  These requirements may be necessary in some form to mitigate a possible 
explosion hazard should oil escape from the oil tank during operations. The 
requirements were rolled up into the general requirements of the PPS Issue Paper. 
§27.1015    
Oil tank tests 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies conditions under which oil tanks must be tested to 
show structural integrity.  
Rationale:  As in §27.965 for fuel tank testing, this paragraph was considered to relate to 
ensuring explosion resistance of the oil tank installation and was rolled up into the 
generalized requirements for the powerplant and supporting systems. 
§27.1017    
Oil lines and 
fittings 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph sets requirements for oil lines and fittings that safely 
accommodate high temperatures, vibration and relative motion of components.  
Rationale:  Similar to the reasoning for §27.997 for fuel system lines and fittings, failure 
to comply with the spirit of these requirements in some form could result in an oil 
system explosion hazard. Thus, this requirement was rolled up as part of the more 
general requirements for the powerplant and supporting systems. 
§27.1019    
Oil strainer or 
filter 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for oil strainers, filters, and 
bypasses that ensure uninterrupted flow of oil to the engine. 
Rationale:  Mitigated by other regulation.   
§27.1021    
Oil system 
drains 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  Similar to the requirements of §27.999 for fuel system drains, this 
requirement establishes requirements for positive closure of oil system drains.  
Rationale:  Since leaking oil from an oil system drain could represent an explosion 
hazard, this subparagraph was rolled up to PPS for consideration during powerplant and 
supporting systems design. 
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§27.1027 
Transmission 
and gearboxes  
Modified (a) The lubrication system for components 
of the rotor drive system that require 
continuous lubrication must be sufficiently 
independent of the lubrication systems of 
the engine(s) to ensure lubrication during 
autorotation. 
(b) Pressure lubrication systems for 
transmissions and gearboxes must comply 
with the engine oil system requirements of 
§§27.1013 (except paragraph (c)), 27.1015, 
27.1017, 27.1021, and 27.1337(d).  
(c) Each pressure lubrication system must 
have an oil strainer or filter through which 
all of the lubricant flows and must—  
(1) Be designed to remove from the 
lubricant any contaminant which may 
damage transmission and drive system 
components or impede the flow of 
lubricant to a hazardous degree;  
(2) Be equipped with a means to indicate 
collection of contaminants on the filter or 
strainer at or before opening of the bypass 
required by paragraph (c)(3) of this 
section; and  
(3) Be equipped with a bypass constructed 
and installed so that—  
(i) The lubricant will flow at the normal 
rate through the rest of the system with the 
strainer or filter completely blocked; and  
(ii) The release of collected contaminants 
is minimized by appropriate location of the 
bypass to ensure that collected 
contaminants are not in the bypass 
flowpath.  
(d) For each lubricant tank or sump outlet 
supplying lubrication to rotor drive systems 
and rotor drive system components, a 
screen must be provided to prevent 
entrance into the lubrication system of any 
object that might obstruct the flow of 
lubricant from the outlet to the filter 
required by paragraph (c) of this section. 
The requirements of paragraph (c) do not 
apply to screens installed at lubricant tank 
or sump outlets.  
(e) Splash-type lubrication systems for 
rotor drive system gearboxes must comply 
with §§27.1021 and 27.1337(d). 
Rationale:  Subparagraph (a) was kept 
because lubrication of the rotor drive 
system must continue independently of 
engine lubrication system in order to 
maintain rotor drive system integrity and 
prevent high energy parts from exiting the 
containment area. 
Other than this, lubrication of the 
transmission and gearboxes need not be 
required to maintain hull integrity. 
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Cooling 
§27.1041    
General 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements that the cooling system be capable 
of maintaining the temperatures of powerplant components, including rotor system 
components, within established temperature limits under critical surface and flight 
operating conditions.  
Rationale:  Since compliance with the general requirements of this paragraph could 
affect rotor system integrity the requirement was rolled up for consideration in the 
generalized requirements of the PPS Issue Paper. 
§27.1043    
Cooling tests 
Excluded Summary:  Along with §27.1045, this paragraph establishes conditions and requirements 
for conducting cooling tests on engines. 
Rationale:  Specific tests for cooling are excluded in deference to the general proof of 
compliance requirements in §27.21. 
§27.1045    
Cooling test 
procedures 
Excluded Summary:  Along with §27.1043, this paragraph establishes conditions and requirements 
for conducting cooling tests on engines. 
Rationale:  Specific test procedures for cooling are excluded in deference to the general 
proof of compliance requirements in §27.21. 
Induction System 
§27.1091    
Air induction 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for air induction systems. In 
particular, if fuel can accumulate in the system, the system must have drains that 
discharge fuel clear of the rotorcraft and out of the path of exhaust flames. Additionally, 
for turbine powered rotorcraft, the paragraph requires that there must be means to 
prevent hazardous quantities of fuel leakage or overflow from drains.  
Rationale:  Since compliance with some of the provisions of this paragraph could relate 
to the mitigation of an explosion hazard, the requirement was rolled up into the 
generalized requirements of the PPS Issue Paper. 
§27.1093    
Induction 
system icing 
protection 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes induction icing requirements for reciprocating 
and turbine engines and test conditions for demonstrating compliance.  Preventing 
induction icing helps prevent damage to the engine and loss of performance.   
Rationale:  Secondary hazard. For this application, damage to engine and loss of 
performance may be acceptable under some conditions. 
Exhaust System 
§27.1121    
General 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for the design and installation of the 
rotorcraft exhaust system to prevent ignition of flammable fluids or vapors and 
accommodate vibration, expansion, and other physical characteristics of the rotorcraft 
environment.  
Rationale:  The requirements are applicable, but only to mitigate hazards to 
crewmembers during servicing and loading operations. The requirement was rolled up 
into the general requirements to PPS. 
§27.1123    
Exhaust piping 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for exhaust system design, 
including requirements that the exhaust system must prevent local hot spots and exhaust 
gases must discharge clear of fuel system components and drains. The paragraph also 
requires that exhaust system parts with a surface hot enough to ignite flammable fluids 
or vapors must be located or shielded so that leakage from any system carrying 
flammable fluids or vapors will not result in a fire.  
Rationale: Since this paragraph relates to design features that could prevent explosions, 
it was rolled up under the generalized requirements of the PPS Issue Paper. 
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Powerplant Controls and Accessories 
§27.1141   
Powerplant 
controls: 
general 
Excluded 
except for 
(d) and 
(e), which 
are rolled 
up to PPS 
Summary: This paragraph establishes requirements for design and operation of 
powerplant controls to ensure continued safe operations. 
Rationale: Subparagraph (d) is rolled up because verification of fuel valve position can 
be relevant to the pilot’s safety roll.  Subparagraph (e) is rolled up to ensure that loss of 
governor control for a turbine engine cannot jeopardize transmission or rotor system 
integrity due to over-torque. 
§27.1143    
Engine 
controls 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes design requirements for fuel shutoffs and controls 
for multiple engines. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope.  
§27.1145    
Ignition 
switches 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes design requirements to prevent inadvertent 
activation of ignition switches and gang operation of multiple ignition switches. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope.  
§27.1147  
Mixture 
controls 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements to be able to control mixtures for 
multiple engines both separately and together. 
Rationale:  Out of vehicle scope.  
§27.1151    
Rotor brake 
controls 
Rolled (a) 
up to 
CMS(a) 
and SI 
Summary:  Subparagraph (a) requires that it must be impossible to apply the rotor brake 
inadvertently in flight and that crew notification occur if a rotor brake is not released 
before takeoff  
Rationale:  Inadvertent application of the rotor brake in flight while torque is being 
applied to the rotor would be a significant hazard to rotor system integrity. Thus, 
subparagraph (a) is a requirement on the design of the control system and is rolled up.  
Subparagraph (b) is excluded because a warning system is not required in the ground 
control station. 
§27.1163    
Powerplant 
accessories 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for mounting accessories to prevent 
damage to the engine or dragging on rotor system. 
Rationale:  Requirements related to engine protection are not applicable.  Subparagraph 
(b) establishes accessory drive requirements that relate to protecting the transmission 
and rotor system from excessive accessory drive loads. This requirement is rolled up. 
Powerplant Fire Protection 
§27.1183    
Lines, fittings, 
and 
components 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for fire resistance and fire proofing 
for fuel lines, fittings, and components.  These requirements relate directly to preventing 
onboard fires and/or explosions. 
Rationale:  The requirements as written may be too specific for an unmanned vehicle 
where hull losses can be tolerated under some conditions, so the requirements were 
rolled up into the more general language of the issue paper. 
§27.1185    
Flammable 
fluids 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes design and installation requirements for firewalls, 
fuel tanks, and fuel system components in areas where flammable fluids are present.   
Rationale:  The requirements as written may be too specific for an unmanned vehicle 
where hull losses can be tolerated under some conditions, so the requirements were 
rolled up into the more general language of the issue paper. 
§27.1187    
Ventilation and 
drainage 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for ventilation and drainage for any 
compartment that contains part of the powerplant installation so as not to create a fire 
hazard.  
Rationale:  The details of the paragraph were considered to be too specific for an 
unmanned aircraft, but there still exists a requirement to protect crew when servicing the 
helicopter.  Lack of compliance with the spirit of the paragraph could create an 
explosion hazard, so the specific requirements of this paragraph were rolled up into the 
more general language of the issue paper. 
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§27.1189    
Shutoff means 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for a means to shut off each line 
carrying flammable fluids into the engine compartment, with a number of exceptions 
listed.  
Rationale:  The details of the paragraph were considered too specific for an unmanned 
aircraft, but a lack of compliance with the spirit of this paragraph could present a hazard 
to crew when servicing the helicopter.  The specific requirements of this paragraph were 
rolled up into the more general language of the issue paper. 
§27.1191    
Firewalls 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for firewalls, or equivalents, to 
protect personnel compartments, structures, controls, rotor mechanisms, etc.   
Rationale:  While there are no personnel compartments in the UAS to protect, the 
destruction of systems that could lead to a loss of rotor system integrity were considered 
relevant. The details of the paragraph were considered too specific for an unmanned 
aircraft, so the specific requirements of this paragraph were rolled up into the more 
general language of the issue paper. 
§27.1193    
Cowling and 
engine 
compartment 
covering 
Rolled up 
to PPS and 
SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes requirements for engine compartment covers that 
minimize fire hazards and protect rotor system components in the event of structural or 
mechanical failure of the normal retention means.   
Rationale:  The requirements of the paragraph were considered relevant to protecting the 
integrity of the rotor system and relevant to protecting UAS crew during servicing.  The 
paragraph was rolled up into the requirements of the issue paper. 
§27.1194    
Other surfaces 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires fire resistance on surfaces aft of the engine 
compartment. 
Rationale:  Does not map to a hazard.   
§27.1195   
Fire detector 
systems 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires fire detectors in engine compartments that cannot be 
readily seen by the pilot. 
Rationale:  Does not map to a hazard. Fire detection and warning systems are not 
required because engine fire is not a primary hazard. 
Subpart F—Equipment 
General 
§27.1301 
Function and 
Installation  
Modified Each item of installed equipment, whose 
failure could adversely affect safety, 
must— 
(a) Be of a kind and design appropriate to 
its intended function;  
(b) Be labeled as to its identification, 
function, or operating limitations, or any 
applicable combination of these factors;  
(c) Be installed according to limitations 
specified for that equipment; and  
(d) Function properly when installed 
Rationale:  Since loss of vehicle may not 
have safety implications, this requirement is 
limited to only those pieces of equipment 
whose failure would affect safety. 
 
§27.1303 
Flight and 
navigation 
instruments 
 
Modified 
 
The applicant must demonstrate that 
sufficient information is provided to the 
pilot to monitor and control the flight path 
of the rotorcraft within the approved 
operational envelope. 
The following are the required flight and 
navigation instruments:  
(a) An airspeed indicator.  
(b) An altimeter.  
(c) A magnetic direction indicator.  
Rationale: The original requirements 
presuppose that a pilot will have the ability 
to “hand-fly” the rotorcraft.  This mode is 
not available with the operating limits of the 
AgR-1.  The requirement is rewritten to 
ensure that sufficient information is 
provided to the pilot to monitor and control 
the flight path. We expect that the dominant 
role of the pilot is to monitor and not 
control the flight path. 
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§27.1305 
Powerplant 
limitations  
Modified 
 
 
The following are the required powerplant 
instruments:  
(a) A carburetor air temperature indicator, 
for each engine having a preheater that can 
provide a heat rise in excess of 60 °F.  
(b) A cylinder head temperature indicator, 
for each— 
(1) Air cooled engine;  
(2) Rotorcraft with cooling shutters; and  
(3) Rotorcraft for which compliance with 
§27.1043 is shown in any condition other 
than the most critical flight condition with 
respect to cooling.  
(c) A fuel pressure indicator, for each 
pump-fed engine.  
(d) A fuel quantity indicator, for each fuel 
tank.  
(e) A manifold pressure indicator, for each 
altitude engine.  
(af) An oil temperature warning device to 
indicate when the temperature exceeds a 
safe value in each main rotor drive gearbox 
(including any gearboxes essential to rotor 
phasing) having an oil system independent 
of the engine oil system.  
(bg) An oil pressure warning device to 
indicate when the pressure falls below a 
safe value in each pressure-lubricated main 
rotor drive gearbox (including any 
gearboxes essential to rotor phasing) 
having an oil system independent of the 
engine oil system.  
(ch) An oil pressure indicator for each 
engine.  
(di) An oil quantity indicator for each oil 
tank.  
(ej) An oil temperature indicator for each 
engine.  
(fk) At least one tachometer to indicate the 
r.p.m. of each engine and, as applicable— 
(1) The r.p.m. of the single main rotor;  
(2) The common r.p.m. of any main rotors 
whose speeds cannot vary appreciably with 
respect to each other; or  
(3) The r.p.m. of each main rotor whose 
speed can vary appreciably with respect to 
that of another main rotor.  
(l) A low fuel warning device for each fuel 
tank which feeds an engine. This device 
must—  
(1) Provide a warning to the flightcrew 
when approximately 10 minutes of usable 
fuel remains in the tank; and  
Rationale: Subparagraphs (a-e) were 
removed because they are not relevant to 
the turbine engine on the AgR-1. 
Subparagraphs (f-k,n,r,v) were retained 
since these conditions can result in 
structural failure of the engine, which 
relates to the rotor system integrity hazard. 
Subparagraphs (l-q,s) were removed 
because these requirements were provided 
to avoid in-flight engine shutdowns.  The 
designated operation does not consider an 
in-flight engine shutdown a hazard.  
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(2) Be independent of the normal fuel 
quantity indicating system.  
(m) Means to indicate to the flightcrew the 
failure of any fuel pump installed to show 
compliance with §27.955.  
(gn) A gas temperature indicator for each 
turbine engine.  
(o) Means to enable the pilot to determine 
the torque of each turboshaft engine, if a 
torque limitation is established for that 
engine under §27.1521(e).  
(p) For each turbine engine, an indicator to 
indicate the functioning of the powerplant 
ice protection system.  
(q) An indicator for the fuel filter required 
by §27.997 to indicate the occurrence of 
contamination of the filter at the degree 
established by the applicant in compliance 
with §27.955.  
(hr) For each turbine engine, a warning 
means for the oil strainer or filter required 
by §27.1019, if it has no bypass, to warn 
the pilot of the occurrence of 
contamination of the strainer or filter 
before it reaches the capacity established in 
accordance with §27.1019(a)(2).  
(s) An indicator to indicate the functioning 
of any selectable or controllable heater 
used to prevent ice clogging of fuel system 
components. 
(t) For rotorcraft for which a 30-second/2-
minute OEI power rating is requested, a 
means must be provided to alert the pilot 
when the engine is at the 30-second and the 
2-minute OEI power levels, when the event 
begins, and when the time interval expires. 
(u) For each turbine engine utilizing 30-
second/2-minute OEI power, a device or 
system must be provided for use by ground 
personnel which— 
(1) Automatically records each usage and 
duration of power at the 30-second and 2-
minute OEI levels; 
(2) Permits retrieval of the recorded data; 
(3) Can be reset only by ground 
maintenance personnel; and 
(4) Has a means to verify proper operation 
of the system or device. 
(iv) Warning or caution devices to signal to 
the flight crew when ferromagnetic 
particles are detected by the chip detector 
required by §27.1337(e). 
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§27.1307  
Miscellaneous 
equipment  
Modified The following is the required 
miscellaneous equipment if its whose 
failure could adversely affect safety:  
(a)  An approved seat for each occupant.  
(b) An approved safety belt for each 
occupant.  
(ac) A master switch arrangement.  
(bd) An adequate source of electrical 
energy, where electrical energy is 
necessary for operation of the rotorcraft.  
(ce) Electrical protective devices for those 
items with safety effects. 
Rationale: This miscellaneous equipment is 
only required if its failure would affect 
safety. Since there are no vehicle occupants, 
there is no need for seats or seat belts.  
Ground control station operators are not 
located in moving vehicles. Electrical 
protective devices (e.g., fuses) are required 
to protect safety-critical systems.  Electrical 
protection devices might benefit other 
electrical devices (e.g., spray equipment) 
but are not required for the rotorcraft to be 
airworthy. 
§27.1309 
Equipment, 
systems, and 
installations  
Modified (a) The equipment, systems, and 
installations whose functioning is required 
by this G-1U Issue Paper by this 
subchapter must be designed and installed 
to ensure that they perform their intended 
functions under any foreseeable operating 
condition.  
(b) The equipment, systems, and 
installations of a multiengine rotorcraft 
must be designed to prevent hazards to the 
rotorcraft in the event of a probable 
malfunction or failure. 
(c) The equipment, systems, and 
installations of single-engine rotorcraft 
must be designed to minimize hazards to 
the rotorcraft in the event of a probable 
malfunction or failure. 
Rationale:  Subparagraphs (a) and (c) apply. 
Subparagraph (b) was deleted because 
multiengine rotorcraft are beyond the scope 
of this issue paper.   
§27.1316    
Electrical and 
electronic 
system 
lightning 
protection 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires electronic components to continue to function 
correctly in the presence of lightning. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.1317 
High-intensity 
Radiated 
Fields 
Protection 
Modified (a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of 
this section, Each electrical and electronic 
system that performs a function whose 
failure could adversely affect safety would 
prevent the continued safe flight and 
landing of the rotorcraft must be designed 
and installed so that they comply with 
HIRF considerations (TBD) determined to 
affect UAS. 
(1) The function is not adversely affected 
during and after the time the rotorcraft is 
exposed to HIRF environment I, as 
described in appendix D to this part; 
(2) The system automatically recovers 
normal operation of that function, in a 
timely manner, after the rotorcraft is 
exposed to HIRF environment I, as 
described in appendix D to this part, unless 
Rationale:  The text in subparagraph (a) was 
generalized to make clear that any HIRF-
induced effects that could cause safety 
issues must be mitigated; however, the 
expected level of HIRF environmental 
conditions is not known at this time.  
Subparagraphs (a)(1-4), (b), (c), and (d) 
were excluded for this reason. 
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this conflicts with other operational or 
functional requirements of that system; 
(3) The system is not adversely affected 
during and after the time the rotorcraft is 
exposed to HIRF environment II, as 
described in appendix D to this part; and 
(4) Each function required during operation 
under visual flight rules is not adversely 
affected during and after the time the 
rotorcraft is exposed to HIRF environment 
III, as described in appendix D to this part. 
(b) Each electrical and electronic system 
that performs a function whose failure 
would significantly reduce the capability of 
the rotorcraft or the ability of the 
flightcrew to respond to an adverse 
operating condition must be designed and 
installed so the system is not adversely 
affected when the equipment providing 
these functions is exposed to equipment 
HIRF test level 1 or 2, as described in 
appendix D to this part. 
(c) Each electrical and electronic system 
that performs a function whose failure 
would reduce the capability of the 
rotorcraft or the ability of the flightcrew to 
respond to an adverse operating condition, 
must be designed and installed so the 
system is not adversely affected when the 
equipment providing these functions is 
exposed to equipment HIRF test level 3, as 
described in appendix D to this part. 
(d) Before December 1, 2012, an electrical 
or electronic system that performs a 
function whose failure would prevent the 
continued safe flight and landing of a 
rotorcraft may be designed and installed 
without meeting the provisions of 
paragraph (a) provided— 
(1) The system has previously been shown 
to comply with special conditions for 
HIRF, prescribed under §21.16, issued 
before December 1, 2007; 
(2) The HIRF immunity characteristics of 
the system have not changed since 
compliance with the special conditions was 
demonstrated; and 
(3) The data used to demonstrate 
compliance with the special conditions is 
provided. 
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Instruments: Installation   
§27.1321 
Arrangement 
and visibility  
Modified (a) Each flight, navigation, and powerplant 
instrument for use by any pilot required for 
the pilot by this G-1U Issue Paper must be 
easily visible to him.  
(b) For each multiengine rotorcraft, 
identical powerplant instruments must be 
located so as to prevent confusion as to 
which engine each instrument relates.  
(c) Instrument panel vibration may not 
damage, or impair the readability or 
accuracy of, any instrument.  
(d) If a visual indicator is provided to 
indicate malfunction of an instrument or 
system, it that indicator must be effective 
under all probable cockpit lighting 
operating conditions. 
Rationale:  Subparagraph (a) was kept 
because instruments required by the UAS 
pilot should be easily visible.   
Subparagraph (b) was deleted because 
requirements for multiengine aircraft are 
beyond the scope of this issue paper.  
Subparagraph (c) was deleted because the 
instrument panel is not located inside the 
vehicle;  any vibration of the instrument 
panel is incidental. Thus, no specific 
requirement is provided. 
Subparagraph (d) was kept.  The pilot 
displays are located in a ground control 
station.  The design and operation at this 
station must accommodate different lighting 
and operating conditions. 
§27.1322 
Warning, 
caution, and 
advisory lights  
Modified 
 
 
If warning, caution or advisory lights are 
installed in the cockpit, required by the 
type design are installed in the ground 
control station, they must, unless otherwise 
approved by the Administrator, be— 
(a) Red, for warning lights (lights 
indicating a hazard which may require 
immediate corrective action):  
(b) Amber, for caution lights (lights 
indicating the possible need for future 
corrective action);  
(c) Green, for safe operation lights; and  
(d) Any other color, including white, for 
lights not described in paragraphs (a) 
through (c) of this section, provided the 
color differs sufficiently from the colors 
prescribed in paragraphs (a) through (c) of 
this section to avoid possible confusion. 
Rationale:  Text was modified because the 
warning, caution, and advisory lights, if 
any, will be located in the ground control 
station instead of a cockpit. 
§27.1323    
Airspeed 
indicating 
system 
Excluded Summary:   This paragraph provides various requirements for calibration of airspeed 
instruments. 
Rationale:  Out of ConOps scope.  The UAS pilot does not have inner loop control of 
vehicle, so an airspeed indicator is not required.  A vendor could provide an airspeed 
indicator, but it is not required for continued safe flight and landing. 
§27.1325 
Static pressure 
systems  
Modified  (a) If a static system is installed, each 
instrument with a static air sensor case 
connections must be vented so that the 
influence of rotorcraft speed, the opening 
and closing of windows, airflow variation, 
and moisture or other foreign matter does 
not seriously affect its accuracy.  
(b) Each static pressure port must be 
designed and located in such manner that 
the correlation between air pressure in the 
static pressure system and true ambient 
atmospheric static pressure is not altered 
Rationale:  Some UAS may be designed 
without the need for a system to determine 
static pressure.  Protection of static air 
sensors is related to maintaining 
controllability and stability, which is related 
to maintaining rotor system integrity (see 
CMS Issue Paper).  Subparagraph (b) was 
removed because this requirement only 
applies in icing conditions that are outside 
the defined operational limits.  
Subparagraphs (c) and (d) were removed 
because the vehicle under consideration 
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when the rotorcraft encounters icing 
conditions. An anti-icing means or an 
alternate source of static pressure may be 
used in showing compliance with this 
requirement. If the reading of the altimeter, 
when on the alternate static pressure 
system, differs from the reading of the 
altimeter when on the primary static 
system by more than 50 feet, a correction 
card must be provided for the alternate 
static system.  
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of 
this section, if the static pressure system 
incorporates both a primary and an 
alternate static pressure source, the means 
for selecting one or the other source must 
be designed so that— 
(1) When either source is selected, the 
other is blocked off; and  
(2) Both sources cannot be blocked off 
simultaneously.  
(d) For unpressurized rotorcraft, paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section does not apply if it 
can be demonstrated that the static pressure 
system calibration, when either static 
pressure source is selected is not changed 
by the other static pressure source being 
open or blocked. 
does not have multiple static pressure 
sources. 
 
§27.1327    
Magnetic 
direction 
indicator 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides various requirements for a magnetic director 
indicator (compass). 
Rationale:  Out of ConOps scope. The UAS pilot does not have inner loop control of 
vehicle, so a magnetic direction indicator is not required.  A vendor could provide a 
magnetic direction indicator, but it is not required for continued safe flight and landing. 
§27.1329 
Automatic 
pilot system 
Modified 
 
(a) Each automatic pilot system must be 
designed so that the automatic pilot can— 
(1) Be sufficiently overpowered by one 
pilot to allow control of the rotorcraft; and 
(2) Be readily and positively disengaged by 
each pilot to prevent it from interfering 
with control of the rotorcraft. 
(b) Unless there is automatic 
synchronization, each system must have a 
means to readily indicate to the pilot the 
alignment of the actuating device in 
relation to the control system it operates. 
(c) Each manually operated control for the 
system's operation must be readily 
accessible to the pilots. 
(d) The system must be designed and 
adjusted so that, within the range of 
adjustment available to the pilot, it cannot 
produce hazardous loads on the rotorcraft 
or create hazardous deviations in the flight 
Rationale:  The requirements in §27.1329 
presuppose a pilot is interacting with the 
autopilot to control the rotorcraft.  The 
designated operation does not allow direct 
pilot control of rotorcraft servomechanisms; 
therefore, there is no need for requirements 
related to manual control of rotorcraft. 
The phrase “hazardous deviations of flight 
path” is interpreted to mean hazards to the 
vehicle itself (e.g., hazard of the vehicle 
ejecting high-energy parts) and it does not 
include hazards of the flight path itself (e.g., 
a vehicle exiting the containment region).  
Thus, the inclusion of this requirement does 
not mandate any particular architecture of 
the containment system or other parts of the 
UAS. 
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path under any flight condition appropriate 
to its use, either during normal operation or 
in the event of a malfunction, assuming 
that corrective action begins within a 
reasonable period of time. 
(e) If the automatic pilot integrates signals 
from auxiliary controls or furnishes signals 
for operation of other equipment, there 
must be positive interlocks and sequencing 
of engagement to prevent improper 
operation. 
(f) If the automatic pilot system can be 
coupled to airborne navigation equipment, 
means must be provided to indicate to the 
pilots the current mode of operation. 
Selector switch position is not acceptable 
as a means of indication. 
§27.1335    
Flight director 
systems 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides a requirement to indicate the mode of the flight 
director to the crew. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. The UAS pilot does not have inner loop control of 
vehicle, so a flight director is not needed.  A vendor could provide a flight director, but 
it is not required for continued safe flight and landing. 
§27.1337    
Powerplant 
instruments 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary: This paragraph provides requirements for powerplant instruments, especially 
fuel flow and oil-related instruments. 
Rationale:  Monitoring of some powerplant systems may be necessary to avoid 
explosion hazards, so this paragraph was rolled up.  Subparagraphs (a2), (d), and (e) are 
especially relevant. 
Electrical Systems and Equipment   
§27.1351 
General  
 
Modified  
 
(a) Electrical system capacity. Electrical 
equipment whose failure could adversely 
affect safety must be adequate for its 
intended use. In addition— 
(1) Electric power sources, their 
transmission cables, and their associated 
control and protective devices must be able 
to furnish the required power at the proper 
voltage to each load circuit essential for 
safe operation; and  
(2) Compliance with paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section must be shown by an electrical 
load analysis, or by electrical 
measurements that take into account the 
electrical loads applied to the electrical 
system, in probable combinations and for 
probable durations.  
(b) Function. For each safety-critical 
electrical system, the following apply:  
(1) Each system, when installed, must be— 
(i) Free from hazards in itself, in its method 
of operation, and in its effects on other 
parts of the rotorcraft; and  
(ii) Protected from fuel, oil, water, other 
Rationale:  Loss of electrical power does 
not necessarily lead to a hazardous event.  
Proper functioning of the electrical system 
is only required on the parts of the system 
needed to maintain safety (e.g., the 
independent power source for the 
containment system needs to meet this 
requirement). 
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detrimental substances, and mechanical 
damage.  
(2) Electric power sources must function 
properly when connected in combination or 
independently.  
(3) No failure or malfunction of any source 
may impair the ability of any remaining 
source to supply load circuits essential for 
safe operation.  
(4) Each electric power source control 
must allow the independent operation of 
each source.  
(c) Generating system. There must be at 
least one generator if the system supplies 
power to load circuits essential for safe 
operation. In addition— 
(1) Each generator must be able to deliver 
its continuous rated power;  
(2) Generator voltage control equipment 
must be able to dependably regulate each 
generator output within rated limits;  
(3) Each generator must have a reverse 
current cutout designed to disconnect the 
generator from the battery and from the 
other generators when enough reverse 
current exists to damage that generator; 
and  
(4) Each generator must have an 
overvoltage control designed and installed 
to prevent damage to the electrical system, 
or to equipment supplied by the electrical 
system, that could result if that generator 
were to develop an overvoltage condition.  
(d) Instruments. There must be means to 
indicate to appropriate crewmembers the 
electric power system quantities essential 
for safe operation of the system. In 
addition— 
(1) For direct current systems, an ammeter 
that can be switched into each generator 
feeder may be used; and  
(2) If there is only one generator, the 
ammeter may be in the battery feeder.  
(e) External power. If provisions are made 
for connecting external power to the 
rotorcraft, and that external power can be 
electrically connected to equipment other 
than that used for engine starting, means 
must be provided to ensure that no external 
power supply having a reverse polarity, or 
a reverse phase sequence, can supply 
power to the rotorcraft's electrical system. 
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§27.1353 
Storage battery 
design and 
installation  
Modified For equipment whose failure could 
adversely safety:  
(a) Each storage battery must be designed 
and installed as prescribed in this section.  
(b) Safe cell temperatures and pressures 
must be maintained during any probable 
charging and discharging condition. No 
uncontrolled increase in cell temperature 
may result when the battery is recharged 
(after previous complete discharge)— 
(1) At maximum regulated voltage or 
power;  
(2) During a flight of maximum duration; 
and  
(3) Under the most adverse cooling 
condition likely to occur in service.  
(c) Compliance with paragraph (b) of this 
section must be shown by test unless 
experience with similar batteries and 
installations has shown that maintaining 
safe cell temperatures and pressures 
presents no problem.  
(d) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by 
any battery in normal operation, or as the 
result of any probable malfunction in the 
charging system or battery installation, 
may accumulate in hazardous quantities 
within the rotorcraft.  
(e) No corrosive fluids or gases that may 
escape from the battery may damage 
surrounding structures or adjacent essential 
equipment.  
(f) Each nickel cadmium battery 
installation capable of being used to start 
an engine or auxiliary power unit must 
have provisions to prevent any hazardous 
effect on structure or essential systems that 
may be caused by the maximum amount of 
heat the battery can generate during a short 
circuit of the battery or of its individual 
cells.  
(g) Nickel cadmium battery installations 
capable of being used to start an engine or 
auxiliary power unit must have— 
(1) A system to control the charging rate of 
the battery automatically so as to prevent 
battery overheating;  
(2) A battery temperature sensing and 
over-temperature warning system with a 
means for disconnecting the battery from 
its charging source in the event of an over-
temperature condition; or  
(3) A battery failure sensing and warning 
system with a means for disconnecting the 
Rationale:  Loss of battery power does not 
necessarily lead to any identified hazard.  
Therefore proper functioning of the 
batteries is only required where the battery 
supplies the parts of the system needed to 
maintain safety (e.g., the containment 
system). 
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battery from its charging source in the 
event of battery failure.  
§27.1357  
Circuit 
protective 
devices  
Modified For equipment whose failure could 
adversely affect safety:  
(a) Protective devices, such as fuses or 
circuit breakers, must be installed in each 
electrical circuit other than— 
(1) The main circuits of starter motors; and  
(2) Circuits in which no hazard is presented 
by their the omission of protective devices.  
(b) A protective device for a circuit 
essential to flight safety may not be used to 
protect any other circuit.  
(c) Each resettable circuit protective device 
(“trip free” device in which the tripping 
mechanism cannot be overridden by the 
operating control) must be designed so 
that— 
(1) A manual operation is required to 
restore service after tripling [sic]; and  
(2) If an overload or circuit fault exists, the 
device will open the circuit regardless of 
the position of the operating control.  
(d) If the ability to reset a circuit breaker or 
replace a fuse is essential to safety in flight, 
that circuit breaker or fuse must be located 
and identified so that it can be readily reset 
or replaced in flight.  
(e) If fuses are used, there must be one 
spare of each rating, or 50 percent spare 
fuses of each rating, whichever is greater. 
Rationale:  This change is strictly 
unnecessary given the caveat in 
subparagraph (a)(2).  However, this change 
emphasizes the point that only systems that 
can create hazards must include such 
protective devices. 
§27.1361  
Master switch  
Modified  For equipment whose failure could 
adversely affect safety:  
(a) There must be a master switch 
arrangement to allow ready disconnection 
of each electric power source from the 
main bus. The point of disconnection must 
be adjacent to the sources controlled by the 
switch.  
(b) Load circuits may be connected so that 
they remain energized after the switch is 
opened, if they are protected by circuit 
protective devices, rated at five amperes or 
less, adjacent to the electric power source.  
(c) The master switch or its controls must 
be installed so that the switch is easily 
discernible and accessible to a 
crewmember in flight. 
Rationale:  A master switch is necessary to 
ensure the safety of crewmembers before 
takeoff and after landing. 
§27.1365 
Electric cables  
Modified For equipment whose failure could 
adversely affect safety: 
(a) Each electric connecting cable must be 
of adequate capacity.  
(b) Each cable that would overheat in the 
Rationale:  Electrical cable failure (e.g., 
short circuit, open circuit) does not 
necessarily lead to any identified hazard.  
Therefore proper functioning of the 
electrical cables is only required on the 
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event of circuit overload or fault must be at 
least flame resistant and may not emit 
dangerous quantities of toxic fumes.  
(c) Insulation on electrical wire and cable 
installed in the rotorcraft must be self-
extinguishing when tested in accordance 
with appendix F, part I(a)(3), of part 25 of 
this chapter. 
parts of the system needed to maintain 
safety.  
§27.1367   
Switches  
Modified For equipment whose failure could 
adversely affect safety: 
Each switch must be— 
(a) Able to carry its rated current;  
(b) Accessible to the crew; and  
(c) Labeled as to operation and the circuit 
controlled. 
Rationale:  Proper functioning of safety-
relevant switches is necessary to ensure the 
safety of crewmembers before takeoff and 
after landing. 
Lights   
§27.1381 
Instrument 
lights 
Modified The instrument lights  For each display or 
other presentation of data required for 
systems whose failure adversely affects 
safety, that display or presentation must— 
(a) Make each instrument, switch, and 
other devices for which they are provided 
relevant device, display, or presentation 
easily readable; and  
(b) Be installed so that— 
(1) Their direct rays are shielded from the 
pilot's eyes; and  
(2) Nno objectionable reflections or 
illumination levels render required data 
unintelligible to the pilot in normal 
operations are visible to the pilot 
Rationale:  In general, the instruments 
(displays) in the ground control station will 
provide their own lighting.  Instrument 
lights in a cockpit are required for the pilot 
to perform safety-related tasks. 
§27.1383 
Landing lights 
– and 
supplemental 
lighting for 
night 
operations 
Modified (a) Each required landing or hovering light 
landing or hovering light or supplemental 
ground or airborne required for approved 
night rotorcraft operations must be 
approved.  
(b) Each landing light must be installed so 
that— 
(1) No objectionable glare is visible to the 
pilot;  
(2) The pilot is not adversely affected by 
halation; and  
(3) It provides enough light for night 
operation, including hovering and landing.  
(c) At least one separate switch must be 
provided, as applicable— 
(1) For each separately installed landing 
light; and  
(2) For each group of landing lights 
installed at a common location. 
Rationale: This requirement was reworded 
since landing lights may not be located only 
on the rotorcraft, but may be provided by 
ground support equipment. 
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§27.1385    
Position light 
system 
installation 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides position light requirements. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Mitigated by other regulation. Per the ConOps, the 
unmanned rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle 
(compared with Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational 
awareness for pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1387    
Position light 
system 
dihedral 
angles. 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements specific to the dihedral angle of the 
position lights. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard.  Per the ConOps, the unmanned 
rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle (compared with 
Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational awareness for 
pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1389    
Position light 
distribution 
and intensities 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements specific to the intensities of position 
lights. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard.  Per the ConOps, the unmanned 
rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle (compared with 
Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational awareness for 
pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1391    
Minimum 
intensities in 
the horizontal 
plane of 
forward and 
rear position 
lights 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph sets minimum requirements for position light intensities in 
the horizontal plane. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard.  Per the ConOps, the unmanned 
rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle (compared with 
Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational awareness for 
pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1393    
Minimum 
intensities in 
any vertical 
plane of 
forward and 
rear position 
lights 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph sets minimum requirements for position light intensities in 
the vertical plane. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard.  Per the ConOps, the unmanned 
rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle (compared with 
Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational awareness for 
pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1395    
Maximum 
intensities in 
overlapping 
beams of 
forward and 
rear position 
lights 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph sets maximum intensities for position lights. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Secondary hazard. Per the ConOps, the unmanned 
rotorcraft will yield right-of-way.  Due to the reduced size of the vehicle (compared with 
Part 27 rotorcraft), use of position lights may not enhance situational awareness for 
pilots of other aircraft. 
§27.1397 
Color 
specifications 
As is Each position light color must have the 
applicable International Commission on 
Illumination chromaticity coordinates as 
follows:   
(a) Aviation red—  
y is not greater than 0.335; and  
z is not greater than 0.002. 
(b) Aviation green—  
x is not greater than 0.440−0.320y;  
x is not greater than y−0.170; and  
Rationale:  These requirements are 
maintained to ensure compatibility with the 
expected colors by other airspace users. 
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y is not less than 0.390−0.170x. 
(c) Aviation white—  
x is not less than 0.300 and not greater than 
0.540;  
y is not less than x−0.040” or yc−0.010, 
whichever is the smaller; and  
y is not greater than x+0.020 nor 
0.636−0.400x;  
Where yc is the y coordinate of the 
Planckian radiator for the value of x 
considered. 
§27.1399    
Riding light 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements for riding lights (used in water 
applications). 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. Water operations are not part of the ConOps. 
§27.1401 
Anticollision 
light system  
Modified (a) General. If certification for night 
operation is requested, the rotorcraft must 
have an anticollision light system that— 
(1) Consists of one or more approved 
anticollision lights located so that their 
emitted light will not impair the crew's 
vision or detract from the conspicuity of 
the position lights; and  
(2) Meets the requirements of paragraphs 
(b) through (f) of this section.  
(b) Field of coverage. The system must 
consist of enough lights to illuminate the 
vital areas around the rotorcraft, 
considering the physical configuration and 
flight characteristics of the rotorcraft. The 
field of coverage must extend in each 
direction within at least 30 degrees below 
the horizontal plane of the rotorcraft, 
except that there may be solid angles of 
obstructed visibility totaling not more than 
0.5 steradians.  
(c) Flashing characteristics. The 
arrangement of the system, that is, the 
number of light sources, beam width, speed 
of rotation, and other characteristics, must 
give an effective flash frequency of not less 
than 40, nor more than 100, cycles per 
minute. The effective flash frequency is the 
frequency at which the rotorcraft's 
complete anticollision light system is 
observed from a distance, and applies to 
each sector of light including any overlaps 
that exist when the system consists of more 
than one light source. In overlaps, flash 
frequencies may exceed 100, but not 180, 
cycles per minute.  
(d) Color. Each anticollision light must be 
aviation red and must meet the applicable 
requirements of §27.1397.  
Rationale:  A small addition was made to 
this requirement in subparagraph (g) to 
emphasize that the pilot must be able to turn 
off the anti-collision lights to ensure other 
crewmembers can perform their safety role 
during takeoffs and landings. 
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(e) Light intensity. The minimum light 
intensities in any vertical plane, measured 
with the red filter (if used) and expressed 
in terms of “effective” intensities, must 
meet the requirements of paragraph (f) of 
this section. The following relation must be 
assumed:  
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where: 
Ie=effective intensity (candles).  
I(t)=instantaneous intensity as a function of 
time.  
t2−t1=flash time interval (seconds).  
Normally, the maximum value of effective 
intensity is obtained when t2 and t1 are 
chosen so that the effective intensity is 
equal to the instantaneous intensity at t2 
and t1. 
(f) Minimum effective intensities for 
anticollision light. Each anticollision light 
effective intensity must equal or exceed the 
applicable values in the following table: 
Angle above 
or below the 
horizontal 
plane 
Effective 
intensity 
(candles) 
0° to 5° 150 
5° to 10° 90 
10° to 20° 30 
20° to 30° 15 
 
(g) A means must be provided for the pilot 
to deactivate the anticollision lights in any 
flight phase. 
Safety Equipment 
§27.1411 
General 
Modified (a) Required safety equipment to be used 
by the crew in an emergency, such as flares 
and automatic liferaft releases, must be 
readily accessible.  
(b) Stowage provisions for required safety 
equipment must be furnished and must— 
(1) Be arranged so that the equipment is 
directly accessible and its location is 
obvious; and  
(2) Protect the safety equipment from 
Rationale:  The particular examples of 
safety equipment may not be relevant for 
unmanned rotorcraft operations; however, 
the pilot and other crewmembers may need 
some safety equipment (e.g., fire 
extinguishers) that must be readily 
available. 
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damage caused by being subjected to the 
inertia loads specified in §27.561. 
§27.1413    
Safety belts 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph requires seat belts to have a metal latching device. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.1415    
Ditching 
equipment 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph provides requirements for ditching equipment (e.g., life 
rafts). 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. 
§27.1419    
Ice protection 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements for operation in icing conditions. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
§27.1435    
Hydraulic 
systems 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements for design, test, and installation of 
hydraulic equipment. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard.  Ejection of high energy parts from a rupture of the 
hydraulic system was considered sufficiently inconsequential. 
§27.1457    
Cockpit voice 
recorders 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph provides requirements for cockpit voice recorders. 
Rationale: It is not clear what cockpit (or ground control station) voice recording would 
serve.  The expectation is that accident investigation (if necessary) will not need voice 
recordings.  Flight data (as per §27.1459) is assumed to be more relevant for 
determining accident cause. 
§27.1459 
Flight data 
recorders  
Modified (a) Each flight recorder required by the 
operating approval associated with the 
vehicle specified in this type design must 
meet the data recording requirements 
specified by the Administrator. 
rules of Subchapter G of this chapter must 
be installed so that:  
 (1) It is supplied with airspeed, altitude, 
and directional data obtained from sources 
that meet the accuracy requirements of 
§27.1323, §27.1325, and §27.1327 of this 
part, as applicable;  
(2) The vertical acceleration sensor is 
rigidly attached, and located longitudinally 
within the approved center of gravity limits 
of the rotorcraft;  
(3)(i) It receives its electrical power from 
the bus that provides the maximum 
reliability for operation of the flight data 
recorder without jeopardizing service to 
essential or emergency loads. 
(ii) It remains powered for as long as 
possible without jeopardizing emergency 
operation of the rotorcraft. 
(4) There is an aural or visual means for 
preflight checking of the recorder for 
proper recording of data in the storage 
medium;  
(5) Except for recorders powered solely by 
the engine-driven electrical generator 
system, there is an automatic means to 
simultaneously stop a recorder that has a 
data erasure feature and prevent each 
Rationale:  It is not clear exactly what 
purpose a flight data recorder would serve 
for an unmanned rotorcraft, nor is it clear 
that an unmanned aircraft needs the detailed 
survivability requirements as described in 
this paragraph.  The ground control station 
may provide all necessary data recording.  
The language was changed to allow more 
generic requirements for data recording.   
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erasure feature from functioning, within 10 
minutes after any crash impact; and 
(6) Whether the cockpit voice recorder and 
digital flight data recorder are installed in 
separate boxes or in a combination unit, no 
single electrical failure external to the 
recorder may disable both the cockpit 
voice recorder and the digital flight data 
recorder. 
(b) Each nonejectable recorder container 
must be located and mounted so as to 
minimize the probability of container 
rupture resulting from crash impact and 
subsequent damage to the record from fire.  
(c) A correlation must be established 
between the flight recorder readings of 
airspeed, altitude, and heading and the 
corresponding readings (taking into 
account correction factors) of the first 
pilot's instruments. This correlation must 
cover the airspeed range over which the 
aircraft is to be operated, the range of 
altitude to which the aircraft is limited, and 
360 degrees of heading. Correlation may 
be established on the ground as 
appropriate.  
(d) Each recorder container must:  
(1) Be either bright orange or bright 
yellow;  
(2) Have a reflective tape affixed to its 
external surface to facilitate its location 
under water; and  
(3) Have an underwater locating device, 
when required by the operating rules of this 
chapter, on or adjacent to the container 
which is secured in such a manner that they 
are not likely to be separated during crash 
impact.  
(e) When both a cockpit voice recorder and 
a flight data recorder are required by the 
operating rules, one combination unit may 
be installed, provided that all other 
requirements of this section and the 
requirements for cockpit voice recorders 
under this part are met. 
§27.1461 
Equipment 
containing 
high energy 
rotors  
Modified (a) Equipment whose failure adversely 
affects safety and contains high energy 
rotors must meet paragraph (b), (c), or (d) 
of this section.  
(b) High energy rotors contained in 
equipment must be able to withstand 
damage caused by malfunctions, vibration, 
abnormal speeds, and abnormal 
temperatures. In addition— 
Rationale:  The requirement was rewritten 
to emphasize that not all equipment with 
high-energy rotors that fails is capable of 
causing harm.  Furthermore, this 
requirement recognizes that non-engine 
related components might contain high-
energy rotors. 
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(1) Auxiliary rotor cases must be able to 
contain damage relevant to Paragraph (a) 
of this section and caused by the failure of 
high energy rotor blades; and  
(2) Equipment control devices, systems, 
and instrumentation must reasonably 
ensure that no operating limitations 
affecting the integrity of high energy rotors 
will be exceeded in service.  
(c) It must be shown by test that equipment 
containing high energy rotors can, without 
directly causing one or more of the failure 
conditions addressed in Paragraph (a) of 
this section, contain any failure of a high 
energy rotor that occurs at the highest 
speed obtainable with the normal speed 
control devices inoperative.  
(d) Equipment containing high energy 
rotors must be located where rotor failure 
will neither endanger the occupants nor not 
adversely affect continued safe flight. 
Subpart G—Operating Limitations and Information 
§27.1501 
General  
Modified (a) Each operating limitation required by 
the Administrator specified in §27.1503 
through §27.1525 and other limitations and 
information necessary for safe operation 
must be established and  
(b) The operating limitations and other 
information necessary for safe operation 
must be made available to the 
crewmembers as prescribed in §27.1541 
through §27.1589. 
Rationale: References to specific 
subparagraphs that specify operating 
limitations for Part 27 rotorcraft were 
deleted because operating limitations 
relevant to an unmanned rotorcraft 
operating in a confined area have not yet 
been established.  The reference was 
changed to a more general reference to 
operating limitations established by the 
FAA Administrator.  Those operating 
limitations should still be made available to 
crewmembers.  
Operating Limitations 
§27.1503    
Airspeed 
limitations: 
general 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires identifying an operating speed range, especially for 
establishing speed limitations. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. Operating at the UA’s speed limitations is not 
directly linked to a hazard, so it is necessary to know what the limits are.  For the most 
part, operating at the speed limits is not likely under the ConOps. 
§27.1505    
Never-exceed 
speed 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph establishes conditions on the never-exceed speed. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard.   It is not necessary to establish a never-exceed 
speed related to the structural limits of the vehicle, because exceeding that limit does not 
map directly to a hazard. 
§27.1509    
Rotor speed 
Rolled up 
to SI 
Summary:  This paragraph establishes ranges of values for maximum and minimum 
rotor speeds under power-off and power-on conditions.   
Rationale:  While maximum and minimum rotor speeds are clearly related to 
maintaining rotor system integrity, it is not known whether the specific ranges required 
for manned rotorcraft are directly applicable to an unmanned rotorcraft with different 
risk profiles. The paragraph was relegated to the rollup where the applicant and the 
regulator could determine the appropriate ranges of values. 
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§27.1519    
Weight and 
center of 
gravity 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary: This paragraph requires that weight and center of gravity limitations be 
established.   
Rationale:  Since these are critical parameters affecting controllability and 
maneuverability, this requirement was added to the CMS rollup. 
§27.1521    
Powerplant 
limitations 
Rolled up 
to PPS 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies a requirement to establish relevant powerplant 
limitations, such as torque, temperature, speed, and other parameters, under a variety of 
conditions and for various time limits.  
Rationale: The requirement to establish powerplant limitations was considered relevant 
to protecting rotor system integrity, but the specific conditions and times were 
considered too detailed. So, the general requirement for powerplant limitations was 
retained but rolled up into the more general language of the issue paper. 
§27.1523 
Minimum 
flight crew  
Modified The minimum flight crew must be 
established so that it is sufficient for safe 
operation, considering— 
(a) The workload on and safety roles of 
individual crewmembers; and  
(b) The accessibility and ease of operation 
of necessary controls by the appropriate 
crewmember; and  
(c) The kinds of operation authorized under 
§27.1525. 
Rationale: The word “flight” was deleted as 
a modifier to crew, since it is not 
appropriate for UAS (given the definition of 
crew). Wording was added in subparagraph 
(a) to include consideration of the crew’s 
safety role in determining the minimum size 
of the UAS crew.  
Words related to accessibility and ease of 
operation of controls were deleted in 
subparagraph (b), assuming that the original 
text referred to the accessibility of onboard 
controls to onboard crew, and that more 
general language about workload is desired 
because accessibility and ease of operation 
are only 2 of a larger set of attributes that 
affect the crew’s ability to perform their 
safety role. 
§27.1525 
Kinds of 
operations 
Modified  The kinds of operations (such as VFR, IFR, 
day, night, or icing) for which the 
rotorcraft UAS is approved are established 
by demonstrated compliance with the 
applicable certification requirements and 
by the installed equipment. 
Rationale: The approved operation includes 
capabilities of the whole UA system, 
including the vehicle, the ground control 
station, datalinks, etc. 
§27.1527 
Maximum 
operating 
altitude  
Modified The maximum altitude up to which 
operation is allowed, as limited by flight, 
structural, powerplant, functional, safety, 
or equipment characteristics, must be 
established. 
Rationale: The word “safety” was added to 
the list of considerations for establishing 
maximum altitude because operating 
limitations on altitude are an explicit 
limitation on the operation to help mitigate 
safety concerns when operating at altitudes 
where air traffic is expected (e.g., above 
500 ft). 
§27.1529 
Instructions for 
Continued 
Airworthiness 
Modified The applicant must prepare Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness in accordance 
with this G-1U issue paper, Aappendix A 
to this part that are acceptable to the 
Administrator. The Iinstructions may be 
incomplete at type certification if a 
program exists to ensure their completion 
prior to delivery of the first rotorcraft or 
issuance of a standard certificate of 
airworthiness, whichever occurs later. 
Rationale:   Instructions for continued 
airworthiness are applicable. Editorial 
changes were made to make it clear that the 
relevant instructions for continued 
airworthiness are those specified in the G-
1U issue paper.   
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Markings and Placards 
§27.1541 
General  
Modified (a) The rotorcraft UAS must contain— 
(1) The markings and placards specified in 
this G-1U Issue Paper §27.1545 through 
§27.1565, and  
(2) Any additional information, instrument 
markings, and placards required for the 
safe operation of rotorcraft UAS with 
unusual design, operating or handling 
characteristics.  
(b) Each marking and placard prescribed in 
paragraph (a) of this section— 
(1) Must be displayed in a conspicuous 
place; and  
(2) May not be easily erased, disfigured, or 
obscured. 
Rationale:  In (a), “rotorcraft” was changed 
to “UAS” (in 2 places) because markings 
and placards may be located in the ground 
control station or on other equipment in 
addition to the rotorcraft.  A UAS may need 
markings and placards for safe operation 
that are not usually needed for manned 
rotorcraft (e.g., markings for landing zone 
of vehicle).   
References to specific paragraphs that 
specify markings and placards in (1) were 
deleted in favor of a more general reference 
to the requirements for markings and 
placards identified in this G-1U Issue Paper 
(e.g., 27.1557, any of the special issue 
papers, etc.). 
§27.1543    
Instrument 
markings: 
general 
Excluded Summary: This paragraph addresses alignment of markings on cockpit instruments that 
have glass covers. 
Rationale: Does not map to a hazard. Not UAS relevant. Instruments with glass covers 
(like those found in a cockpit) are not expected in a UAS ground control station. 
§27.1545    
Airspeed 
indicator 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes the markings necessary on an airspeed indicator. 
Rationale:   The requirements for an airspeed indicator was excluded, so requirements 
for markings are not needed.  
§27.1547    
Magnetic 
direction 
indicator 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph describes placards necessary for magnetic direction 
indicators. 
Rationale:  The requirements for a magnetic direction indicator was excluded, so 
requirements for placards are not needed. 
§27.1549    
Powerplant 
instruments 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies required markings on powerplant instruments. 
Rationale:  The requirements for powerplant instruments were excluded, so 
requirements for markings are not needed 
§27.1551    
Oil quantity 
indicator 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph requires markings on oil quantity indicators. 
Rationale:  The requirements for an oil quantity indicator were excluded, so 
requirements for markings are not needed. 
§27.1553    
Fuel quantity 
indicator 
Excluded Summary:  This paragraph specifies requirements for markings relative to unusable fuel 
level. 
Rationale:  The requirements for a fuel quantity indicator were excluded, so 
requirements for markings are not needed. 
§27.1555    
Control 
markings 
Modified (a) Each cockpit control, other than 
primary flight controls or control whose 
function is obvious, must be plainly 
marked as to its function and method of 
operation. 
(b) For powerplant fuel controls— 
(1) Each fuel tank selector control must be 
marked to indicate the position 
corresponding to each tank and to each 
existing cross feed position; 
(2) If safe operation requires the use of any 
tanks in a specific sequence, that sequence 
Rationale:  Requirements for controls, as 
described in this paragraph, have been 
excluded because the pilot does not have 
inner-loop control.  However, subparagraph 
(d)(2) for marking emergency controls in 
red applies to emergency controls that the 
pilot would use to cause the rotorcraft to 
hover or land in emergency situations. 
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must be marked on, or adjacent to, the 
selector for those tanks; and 
(3) Each valve control for any engine of a 
multiengine rotorcraft must be marked to 
indicate the position corresponding to each 
engine controlled. 
(c) Usable fuel capacity must be marked as 
follows: 
(1) For fuel systems having no selector 
controls, the usable fuel capacity of the 
system must be indicated at the fuel 
quantity indicator. 
(2) For fuel systems having selector 
controls, the usable fuel capacity available 
at each selector control position must be 
indicated near the selector control. 
(d) For accessory, auxiliary, and 
emergency controls— 
(1) Each essential visual position indicator, 
such as those showing rotor pitch or 
landing gear position, must be marked so 
that each crewmember can determine at 
any time the position of the unit to which 
it relates; and 
(2) Each emergency control must be red 
and must be marked as to method of 
operation. 
(e) For rotorcraft incorporating retractable 
landing gear, the maximum landing gear 
operating speed must be displayed in clear 
view of the pilot. 
§27.1557 
Miscellaneous 
markings and 
placards  
Modified (a) BaggagePayload, and cargo 
compartments, and ballast location. Each 
baggage and cargo payload compartment, 
and each ballast location must have a 
placard stating any limitations on contents, 
including weight, that are necessary under 
the loading requirements.  
(b) Seats. If the maximum allowable 
weight to be carried in a seat is less than 
170 pounds, a placard stating the lesser 
weight must be permanently attached to the 
seat structure.  
(c) Fuel and oil filler openings. The 
following apply:  
(1) Fuel filler openings must be marked at 
or near the filler cover with— 
(i) The word “fuel”;  
(ii) For reciprocating engine powered 
rotorcraft, the minimum fuel grade;  
(iii) For turbine engine powered rotorcraft, 
the permissible fuel designations; and  
(iv) For pressure fueling systems, the 
Rationale:  “Baggage” and “cargo” were 
replaced in subparagraph (a) with “payload” 
because the UAS in an agricultural concept 
of operations is not intended to convey 
baggage or cargo, but will convey payload, 
such as agricultural chemicals or cameras or 
sensors for surveying fields.   
Subparagraph (b) was deleted because seats 
are not needed aboard the UAS.  Any seats 
in the ground control station are not 
considered critical to safety of flight. 
Subparagraph (c, 1, ii) was deleted because 
this G-1U was not intended to apply to 
rotorcraft with piston engines 
Subparagraph (d) was deleted because there 
are no people on board the UAS, hence 
there is no need for emergency exit placards 
on the rotorcraft.  We are assuming that 
OSHA requirements would necessitate exit 
placards for any indoor areas of a ground 
control station.   
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maximum permissible fueling supply 
pressure and the maximum permissible 
defueling pressure.  
(2) Oil filler openings must be marked at or 
near the filler cover with the word “oil”.  
(d) Emergency exit placards. Each placard 
and operating control for each emergency 
exit must be red. A placard must be near 
each emergency exit control and must 
clearly indicate the location of that exit and 
its method of operation. 
§27.1559 
Limitations 
placard  
Modified There must be a placard in clear view of 
the pilot that specifies the kinds of 
operations (such as visual line-of-sight, 
beyond visual line-of-sight, VFR, IFR, day, 
night, or icing) for which the UAS 
rotorcraft is approved. 
Rationale:  Visual line-of-sight and beyond 
line-of-sight operations are different from 
typical operations for Part 27 rotorcraft.  
They were added to the list of example 
operations because it is important for a 
UAS pilot to be aware of the sight-line 
limitations for approved UAS operations.  
§27.1561 
Safety 
equipment  
Modified (a) Each required safety equipment control 
to be operated by the crew in emergency, 
such as controls for automatic liferaft 
releases, must be plainly marked as to its 
method of operation.  
(b) Each location, such as a locker or 
compartment, that carries any fire 
extinguishing, signaling, or other life 
saving equipment, must be so marked. 
Rationale:  The example of life rafts as 
safety equipment was deleted since there is 
no need for life rafts on UAS.  The word 
“required” was added to safety equipment 
to indicate that not all safety equipment for 
a UAS may necessarily be considered 
required (e.g., a fire extinguisher in the 
ground control station should not need a 
placard).  If it is required, it should be 
marked appropriately.  
§27.1565 
Tail Rotor 
As is Each tail rotor must be marked so that its 
disc is conspicuous under normal daylight 
ground conditions. 
Rationale:  If the unmanned rotorcraft has a 
tail rotor, then it should be marked as 
described.   
 
Rotorcraft Flight Manual and Approved Manual Material 
§27.1581 
General 
Modified (a) Furnishing information. A Rotorcraft 
Flight Manual must be furnished with each 
rotorcraft, and it must contain the 
following:  
(1) Information required for UAS functions 
whose failure could adversely affect safety, 
and by §27.1583 through §27.1589.  
(2) Other information that is necessary for 
safe operation because of design, 
operating, or handling characteristics.  
(b) Approved information. Each part of the 
manual listed in §27.1583 through 
§27.1589, that is appropriate to the 
rotorcraft, must be furnished, verified, and 
approved under its associated type 
certificate, and must be segregated, 
identified, and clearly distinguished from 
each unapproved part of that manual.  
(c) [Reserved]  
Rationale:  A flight manual is important.  
References to Part 27 paragraphs specifying 
content of the flight manual were replaced 
with a more general requirement that the 
flight manual should provide information 
on safety-critical functions.  Not all of the 
original paragraphs referenced were 
considered applicable to this issue paper.  
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(d) Table of contents. Each Rotorcraft 
Flight Manual must include a table of 
contents if the complexity of the manual 
indicates a need for it. 
§27.1583  
Operating 
Limitations 
Modified A Rotorcraft Flight Manual must contain 
operating limitations for each of the 
following, as relevant to safety-critical 
functions, including, but not limited to: 
(a) Airspeed and Rrotor limitations. 
Information necessary for the marking of 
airspeed and rotor limitations on, or near, 
their respective indicators, must be 
furnished. The significance of each 
limitation and of the color coding must be 
explained. 
(b) Powerplant limitations. The following 
information must be furnished: 
(1) Limitations necessary to maintain 
powerplant integrity required by §27.1521. 
(2) Explanation of the limitations, when 
appropriate. 
(3) Information necessary for marking the 
instruments, required by §§27.1549 
through 27.1553. 
(c) Weight and loading distribution. The 
weight and center of gravity limits required 
by §§27.25 and 27.27, respectively, must 
be furnished. If the variety of possible 
loading conditions warrants, instructions 
must be included to allow ready 
observance of the limitations specifically 
for takeoffs. 
(d) Flight UAS crew. When a flight crew 
of more than one is required, the number 
and functions of the minimum flight crew 
determined under §27.1523 must be 
furnished. 
(e) Kinds of operation. Each kind of 
operation for which the rotorcraft and its 
equipment installations are approved must 
be listed. 
(f) [Reserved] 
(g) Altitude. The altitude established under 
§27.1527 and an explanation of the 
limiting factors must be furnished. 
Rationale:   Operating limitations should be 
documented in the flight manual.  
Modifications were made to generalize 
some of the requirements and delete 
references to Part 27 requirements that were 
not included in this issue paper. 
 
§27.1585  
Operating 
procedures  
Modified (a) Parts of the manual containing 
operating procedures must have 
information concerning any normal and 
emergency procedures and other 
information necessary for safe operation, 
including takeoff and landing procedures 
and associated airspeeds. The manual must 
contain any pertinent information 
Rationale: Subparagraph (a) was kept 
because the kind of information specified is 
relevant. 
Subparagraph (b) was deleted because 
multiengine rotorcraft were considered 
beyond the scope of the issue paper. 
In subparagraph (c), the reference to 
§27.1505(c) (for a stabilized power-off 
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including— 
(1) The kind of takeoff surface used in the 
tests and each appropriate climbout speed; 
and 
(2) The kind of landing surface used in the 
tests and appropriate approach and glide 
airspeeds. 
(b) For multiengine rotorcraft, information 
identifying each operating condition in 
which the fuel system independence 
prescribed in §27.953 is necessary for 
safety must be furnished, together with 
instructions for placing the fuel system in a 
configuration used to show compliance 
with that section.  
(c) For helicopters for which a VNE (power-
off) is established under this G-1U Issue 
Paper §27.1505(c), information must be 
furnished to explain the VNE (power-off) 
and the procedures for reducing airspeed to 
not more than the VNE (power-off) 
following failure of all the engines.  
(d) For each rotorcraft showing compliance 
with §27.1353 (g)(2) or (g)(3), the 
operating procedures for disconnecting the 
battery from its charging source must be 
furnished.  
(e) If the unusable fuel supply in any tank 
exceeds five percent of the tank capacity, 
or one gallon, whichever is greater, 
information must be furnished which 
indicates that when the fuel quantity 
indicator reads “zero” in level flight, any 
fuel remaining in the fuel tank cannot be 
used safely in flight.  
(f) Information on the total quantity of 
usable fuel for each fuel tank must be 
furnished. 
(g) The airspeeds and rotor speeds for 
minimum rate of descent and best glide 
angle as prescribed in §27.71 must be 
provided. 
VNE) was deleted because it is not included 
in this G-1U Issue Paper.  The vehicle’s 
ability to hold together under high speed 
conditions is not relevant to the concept of 
operations.   
In subparagraph (g), the reference to §27.71 
(Autorotation performance) was deleted 
because there is no mandated requirement 
for autorotation. If autorotation is 
implemented, the airspeeds, rate of descent 
and glide angle curves are required. 
§27.1587    
Performance 
information 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph specifies that the flight manual must include enough 
information to determine the height-speed envelope relative to a number of different 
parameters.  Other information required by the paragraph (e.g., the requirement to 
establish altitudes, temperatures, and winds at which the vehicle can be safely hovered) 
also relates to controllability and maneuverability. 
Rationale: Since the requirement to establish the height-speed envelope (§27.87) were 
rolled up to CMS(a), this paragraph was also rolled up.  
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§27.1589    
Loading 
information 
Rolled up 
to CMS(a) 
Summary:  This paragraph requires instructions to be included in the Flight Manual for 
all possible loading conditions that can cause the center of gravity to be exceeded. 
Rationale:  Loading information is important to maintaining control margins that allow 
the vehicle to be safely controllable and maneuverable.  This requirement is rolled up 
because only those loading conditions that affect controllability, maneuverability and 
stability needed to ensure rotor system integrity are needed.  
Appendix A—Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
A§27.1 
General 
Modified (a) This appendix specifies requirements 
for the preparation of Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness as required by 
§27.1529.  
(b) The Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness for each UAS rotorcraft must 
include the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness for each engine and rotor 
(hereinafter designated ‘products’), for 
each appliance required by this chapter, 
and any required information relating to 
the interface of those appliances and 
products with the UAS rotorcraft. If 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
are not supplied by the manufacturer of an 
appliance or product installed in the UAS 
rotorcraft, the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness for the UAS rotorcraft must 
include the information essential to the 
continued airworthiness of the UAS 
rotorcraft.  
(c) The applicant must submit to the FAA a 
program to show how changes to the 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
made by the applicant or by the 
manufacturers of products and appliances 
installed in the UAS rotorcraft will be 
distributed 
Rationale:  Continued airworthiness 
considerations should apply to an 
unmanned rotorcraft that requires 
airworthiness certification just as they apply 
to a manned aircraft.  The only change was 
to make it clear that the requirements apply 
to the UAS as a whole.  So, “rotorcraft” was 
replaced with “UAS.” 
A§27.2 
Format 
As is (a) The Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness must be in the form of a 
manual or manuals as appropriate for the 
quantity of data to be provided.  
(b) The format of the manual or manuals 
must provide for a practical arrangement. 
Rationale:  Instructions for continued 
airworthiness should be in a usable form. 
A§27.3 
Content 
Modified The contents of the manual or manuals 
must be prepared in the English language. 
The Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness must contain the following 
manuals or sections, as appropriate, and 
information:  
(a) UAS rotorcraft maintenance manual or 
section.  
(1) Introduction information that includes 
an explanation of the UAS’s rotorcraft  
features and data to the extent necessary 
for maintenance or preventive 
Rationale:  The same basic information for 
continued airworthiness applies to an 
unmanned rotorcraft.   The only change was 
to make it clear that the requirements apply 
to the UAS as a whole.  So, “rotorcraft” was 
replaced with “UAS.” 
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maintenance.  
(2) A description of the UAS rotorcraft  and 
its systems and installations including its 
engines, rotors, and appliances.  
(3) Basic control and operation information 
describing how the UAS rotorcraft 
components and systems are controlled and 
how they operate, including any special 
procedures and limitations that apply.  
(4) Servicing information that covers 
details regarding servicing points, 
capacities of tanks, reservoirs, types of 
fluids to be used, pressures applicable to 
the various systems, location of access 
panels for inspection and servicing, 
locations of lubrication points, the 
lubricants to be used, equipment required 
for servicing, tow instructions and 
limitations, mooring, jacking, and leveling 
information.  
(b) Maintenance instructions.  
(1) Scheduling information for each part of 
the UAS rotorcraft and its engines, 
auxiliary power units, rotors, accessories, 
instruments and equipment that provides 
the recommended periods at which they 
should be cleaned, inspected, adjusted, 
tested, and lubricated, and the degree of 
inspection, the applicable wear tolerances, 
and work recommended at these periods. 
However, the applicant may refer to an 
accessory, instrument, or equipment 
manufacturer as the source of this 
information if the applicant shows the item 
has an exceptionally high degree of 
complexity requiring specialized 
maintenance techniques, test equipment, or 
expertise. The recommended overhaul 
periods and necessary cross references to 
the Airworthiness Limitations section of 
the manual must also be included. In 
addition, the applicant must include an 
inspection program that includes the 
frequency and extent of the inspections 
necessary to provide for the continued 
airworthiness of the UAS rotorcraft.  
(2) Troubleshooting information describing 
problem malfunctions, how to recognize 
those malfunctions, and the remedial action 
for those malfunctions.  
(3) Information describing the order and 
method of removing and replacing 
products and parts with any necessary 
precautions to be taken.  
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(4) Other general procedural instructions 
including procedures for system testing 
during ground running, symmetry checks, 
weighing and determining the center of 
gravity, lifting and shoring, and storage 
limitations.  
(c) Diagrams of structural access plates and 
information needed to gain access for 
inspections when access plates are not 
provided.  
(d) Details for the application of special 
inspection techniques including 
radiographic and ultrasonic testing where 
such processes are specified.  
(e) Information needed to apply protective 
treatments to the structure after inspection.  
(f) All data relative to structural fasteners 
such as identification, discarded 
recommendations, and torque values.  
(g) A list of special tools needed. 
A§27.4 
Airworthiness 
Limitations 
section 
As is The Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness must contain a section, titled 
Airworthiness Limitations that is 
segregated and clearly distinguishable from 
the rest of the document. This section must 
set forth each mandatory replacement time, 
structural inspection interval, and related 
structural inspection procedure required for 
type certification. If the Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness consist of 
multiple documents, the section required 
by this paragraph must be included in the 
principal manual. This section must 
contain a legible statement in a prominent 
location that reads: “The Airworthiness 
Limitations section is FAA approved and 
specifies inspections and other 
maintenance required under §43.16 and 
91.403 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
unless an alternative program has been 
FAA approved.” 
Rationale:  The same basic requirement to 
specify information on airworthiness 
limitations applies to an unmanned 
rotorcraft. 
Appendix B 
Airworthiness 
Criteria for 
Helicopter 
Instrument 
Flight 
Excluded Summary:  This appendix specifies the design and installation requirements for 
operation under instrument flight rules. 
Rationale: Out of ConOps scope. 
Appendix C – 
Criteria for 
Category A 
Excluded Summary:  This Appendix specifies paragraphs under Part 29 that must be met in 
addition to Part 27  for Category A operation (for multi-engine rotorcraft) 
Rationale: Out of vehicle scope. 
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Appendix D  
HIRF 
Environments 
and Equipment 
HIRF Test 
Levels 
Modified This appendix specifies the HIRF 
environments and equipment HIRF test 
levels for electrical and electronic systems 
under §27.1317. The field strength values 
for the HIRF environments and laboratory 
equipment HIRF test levels must be 
established (TBD).are expressed in root-
mean-square units measured during the 
peak of the modulation cycle. 
(a) HIRF environment I is specified in the 
following table: 
 
Table I.—HIRF Environment I 
Frequency 
Field strength 
(volts/meter) 
Peak Average 
10 kHz-2 MHz 50 50 
2 MHz-30 MHz 100 100 
30 MHz-100 MHz 50 50 
100 MHz-400 MHz 100 100 
400 MHz-700 MHz 700 50 
700 MHz-1 GHz 700 100 
1 GHz-2 GHz 2,000 200 
2 GHz-6 GHz 3,000 200 
6 GHz-8 GHz 1,000 200 
8 GHz-12 GHz 3,000 300 
12 GHz-18 GHz 2,000 200 
18 GHz-40 GHz 600 200 
In this table, the higher field strength 
applies at the frequency band edges. 
(b) HIRF environment II is specified in the 
following table: 
Table II.—HIRF Environment II 
Frequency 
Field strength 
(volts/meter) 
Peak Average 
10 kHz-500 kHz 20 20 
500 kHz-2 MHz 30 30 
2 MHz-30 MHz 100 100 
Rationale:  Specific requirements for HIRF 
environments and equipment HIRF test 
levels were deleted and a placeholder 
inserted indicating that HIRF environments 
and equipment HIRF test levels need to be 
established for UAS. There is insufficient 
evidence, to date, to establish whether HIRF 
requirements specified in Part 27, Appendix 
D are applicable as is to UAS and to their 
intended operational environments.  It is 
possible, given that agricultural UAS are 
expected to fly slow and close to the surface 
that HIRF environments different from 
those for Part 27 rotorcraft may be 
encountered. 
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30 MHz-100 MHz 10 10 
100 MHz-200 MHz 30 10 
200 MHz-400 MHz 10 10 
400 MHz-1 GHz 700 40 
1 GHz-2 GHz 1,300 160 
2 GHz-4 GHz 3,000 120 
4 GHz-6 GHz 3,000 160 
6 GHz-8 GHz 400 170 
8 GHz-12 GHz 1,230 230 
12 GHz-18 GHz 730 190 
18 GHz-40 GHz 600 150 
In this table, the higher field strength 
applies at the frequency band edges. 
(c) HIRF environment III is specified in the 
following table: 
Table III.—HIRF Environment III 
Frequency 
Field strength 
(volts/meter) 
Peak Average 
10 kHz-100 kHz 150 150 
100 kHz-400 MHz 200 200 
400 MHz-700 MHz 730 200 
700 MHz-1 GHz 1,400 240 
1 GHz-2 GHz 5,000 250 
2 GHz-4 GHz 6,000 490 
4 GHz-6 GHz 7,200 400 
6 GHz-8 GHz 1,100 170 
8 GHz-12 GHz 5,000 330 
12 GHz-18 GHz 2,000 330 
18 GHz-40 GHz 1,000 420 
In this table, the higher field strength 
applies at the frequency band edges. 
(d) Equipment HIRF Test Level 1. 
(1) From 10 kilohertz (kHz) to 400 
megahertz (MHz), use conducted 
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susceptibility tests with continuous wave 
(CW) and 1 kHz square wave modulation 
with 90 percent depth or greater. The 
conducted susceptibility current must start 
at a minimum of 0.6 milliamperes (mA) at 
10 kHz, increasing 20 decibels (dB) per 
frequency decade to a minimum of 30 mA 
at 500 kHz. 
(2) From 500 kHz to 40 MHz, the 
conducted susceptibility current must be at 
least 30 mA. 
(3) From 40 MHz to 400 MHz, use 
conducted susceptibility tests, starting at a 
minimum of 30 mA at 40 MHz, decreasing 
20 dB per frequency decade to a minimum 
of 3 mA at 400 MHz. 
(4) From 100 MHz to 400 MHz, use 
radiated susceptibility tests at a minimum 
of 20 volts per meter (V/m) peak with CW 
and 1 kHz square wave modulation with 90 
percent depth or greater. 
(5) From 400 MHz to 8 gigahertz (GHz), 
use radiated susceptibility tests at a 
minimum of 150 V/m peak with pulse 
modulation of 4 percent duty cycle with a 1 
kHz pulse repetition frequency. This signal 
must be switched on and off at a rate of 1 
Hz with a duty cycle of 50 percent. 
(e) Equipment HIRF Test Level 2. 
Equipment HIRF test level 2 is HIRF 
environment II in table II of this appendix 
reduced by acceptable aircraft transfer 
function and attenuation curves. Testing 
must cover the frequency band of 10 kHz 
to 8 GHz. 
(f) Equipment HIRF Test Level 3. (1) From 
10 kHz to 400 MHz, use conducted 
susceptibility tests, starting at a minimum 
of 0.15 mA at 10 kHz, increasing 20 dB 
per frequency decade to a minimum of 7.5 
mA at 500 kHz. 
(2) From 500 kHz to 40 MHz, use 
conducted susceptibility tests at a 
minimum of 7.5 mA. 
(3) From 40 MHz to 400 MHz, use 
conducted susceptibility tests, starting at a 
minimum of 7.5 mA at 40 MHz, 
decreasing 20 dB per frequency decade to a 
minimum of 0.75 mA at 400 MHz. 
(4) From 100 MHz to 8 GHz, use radiated 
susceptibility tests at a minimum of 5 V/m. 
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